UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


IN RE: SAMUEL R. PIERCE, JR. (ABRAMS FEE APPLICATION)


89-0005d

D.C. Cir. 1999


*	*	*


Opinion for the Special Court filed Per curiam.


Per curiam: Philip Abrams petitions this Division of the  Court under s
593(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of  1978, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
s 591 et seq. (1994) (the "Act"),  for reimbursement of attorneys'
fees in the amount of  $389,334.52. Abrams is entitled to
reimbursement only if he  establishes that these fees "would not have
been incurred by  him but for the requirements of [the Act]," and
meets certain  other statutory criteria. Because we find that Abrams


established his entitlement under the statutory criteria for 
reimbursement of a portion of the fees we will, for the  reasons set
forth more fully below, allow recovery of  $229,949.80 under the


Background


The Abrams application arises out of an investigation con- ducted by
Independent Counsel ("IC") appointed by this  Division under the
provisions of the Act, to investigate allega- tions of abuses,
favoritism, and mismanagement at the De- partment of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") dur- ing the 1980s under the tenure of Secretary
Samuel R.  Pierce, Jr. We have recently set forth some details of the 
background of this investigation in our opinions disposing of  two
earlier applications from other persons whose conduct  became the
subject of the investigation. See In re Pierce  (Kisner Fee
Application), 178 F.3d 1356 (D.C. Cir., Spec.  Div., 1999) (per
curiam); and In re Pierce (Olivas Fee  Application), 178 F.3d 1350
(D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per  curiam). We will therefore not
rehash the full account of the  investigation, but will only discuss
those facts necessary to  the resolution of Abrams' petition, to which
we will allude as  we develop the law governing the disposition.


Abrams joined the Department of Housing and Urban  Development in 1981
as a General Deputy Assistant Secre- tary. He thereafter was promoted
to Assistant Secretary  and subsequently became Undersecretary of HUD
in 1983.  During his tenure at HUD, Abrams' responsibilities included 
a program called the "Moderate Rehabilitation Program"  ("MRP")
guaranteeing a determined level of rental income to  apartment
building owners refurbishing apartments rented to  persons within
specified income limits. Independent Coun- sel's investigations of
allegations, and ultimately prosecutions  of wide-ranging corruption
within HUD included allegations  of unlawful favoritism and other
illegalities in the disbursal of  funds under the program. After
Abrams returned to the  private sector in 1984, he became involved in
the development  and operation of programs receiving funding under the


The Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC"), as part of its  wide-ranging
investigation, conducted inquiries into Abrams'  involvement and
allegations that he and his associates had  been the beneficiaries of
favoritism. Abrams incurred attor- ney fees as a result of the
investigation by the OIC, as well  as separate investigations by the
HUD Inspector General, a  House Subcommittee, and a Senate
Subcommittee. Abrams  was never indicted, but did receive a grant of
immunity and  did provide testimony pursuant to that grant. The
applica- tion before us seeks reimbursement for attorneys' fees alleg-
edly incurred as a result of the Independent Counsel's in-
vestigation. To establish eligibility for reimbursement, and 
entitlement to specific amounts, Abrams bears the burden of 
establishing his qualifications under specific statutory ele- ments,


Analysis


The Statutory Elements


A. Subject


By its terms, the statute provides reimbursement of fees  only to "an
individual who is the subject of an investigation  conducted by an
independent counsel." 28 U.S.C. s 593(f)(1)  (emphasis added). Though
the statute does not define "sub- ject," we have previously held that
status as a "mere witness"  is not sufficient to meet the elemental
requirement of "sub- ject" designation for purposes of the Act; a fee
applicant  must establish that he is a person whose conduct was within
 the scope of the independent counsel's investigation in the  sense
that "the Independent Counsel might reasonably be  expected to point
the finger of accusation" at him. In re  North (Dutton Fee
Application), 11 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C.  Cir., Spec. Div., 1993) (per
curiam). Otherwise put, he must  not merely have been a witness to the
matters under investi- gation, but a potential defendant of
indictments that might  arise from that investigation. The filings of
Abrams in this  application, as well as the responses of the
Independent  Counsel and the Department of Justice establish that he
was  not only a subject, but was expressly notified by the Indepen-


dent Counsel through his counsel that he was "a target of a  federal
grand jury investigation ... into possible violations of  18 U.S.C. s
371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States),  and other provisions
of federal criminal law, arising from or  related to" HUD programs
during the period under investiga- tion. Letter of the OIC, dated
September 27, 1991.


We therefore conclude that Abrams has met the "subject"  requirement.
There remains, however, a dispute as to the  period of time and the
portion of the investigation, during  which Abrams was a "subject" and
during which he would be  therefore entitled to full or partial
reimbursement of his legal  expenses. Abrams asserts that he was a
subject from the  time of the appointment of the Independent Counsel
until the  completion of the investigation. The IC asserts that Abrams
 has the period too long on both ends. He argues that  Abrams did not
become a subject within the meaning of the  Act until September 27,
1991, when the OIC advised Abrams'  counsel that his client was a
"target." He further argues that  Abrams' status as a "subject" did
not continue until the OIC  issued his final report but only until May
5, 1994, when  Abrams received his court ordered immunity. After
review- ing the filings of the parties and relevant legal authorities,
we  conclude that Abrams is correct as to the commencement of  his
status as a subject but that the IC is correct as to its 


Our reasoning in reaching this conclusion focuses on the  definition of
the subject as a person "whose conduct was  within the scope of the
[Independent Counsel] investigation,  in the sense that the
[Independent Counsel] was examining  conduct of his in a way that
would lead a reasonably coun- seled person at the time of incurring
the fees to believe that  there was a realistic possibility that he
would become a  defendant." Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1079. In the real
world, the  reasonable apprehension of defendant status does not begin
 at the receipt of a grand jury subpoena, nor a target letter.  When a
person, such as Abrams, knows that a grand jury is  investigating his
conduct, and knows that he is or has been  engaged in conduct likely
to cause a prosecutor to suspect  him of a crime, his objective
apprehension of an accusation 


may commence long before his official designation as a target.  Abrams
knew that the IC was charged with investigating  HUD programs in which
he had participated in just such a  fashion as to attract the
prosecutorial attention of the IC. It  was at least reasonable for him
to believe that there was a  realistic possibility that he would
require a legal defense.  Therefore, we can conclude that his status
as a subject of the  independent investigation began with the
appointment of the  IC. However, we also conclude that the IC is
closer to the  mark in defining the termination of Abrams' status as a
 subject. On May 5, 1994, at the conclusion of the negotia- tions
between Abrams and the OIC, Abrams received court  ordered immunity
under 18 U.S.C. s 6002. Thereafter, he  testified before the grand
jury in furtherance of the IC's  investigation, under the statutory
assurance that his testimo- ny could not be used against him in any
prosecution for the  matters as to which he testified. The IC argues,
and we  agree, that thereafter Abrams could not reasonably contem-
plate that he would become a defendant in any further  prosecution
arising from the Independent Counsel's investiga- tion.


Abrams points out, correctly, that the immunity conferred  upon him
under the statute was not transactional. That is, it  did not
guarantee that he would not be prosecuted. The use  immunity arising
from compelled testimony under s 6002,  "does not confer transactional
immunity under which the  witness could not be prosecuted at all for
the transactions  about which he testifies," United States v.
Poindexter, 859  F.2d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Kastigar v.
United  States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972), but only provides that his 
testimony would not be used in any such prosecution. He  therefore
argues that the issuance of the order did not  terminate his status as
a subject because he could have been  prosecuted either for giving a
false statement after the grant  or even for events before the grant
of immunity if sufficient  evidence independent of his own testimony
were brought  forth. This is not a frivolous argument. Indeed, we have
 held in the past that, on specific facts, a reasonably counseled  fee
applicant having received a grant of use immunity may 


nonetheless "believe that there [remains] a realistic possibility  that
he would become a defendant." In re North (Cave Fee  Application), 57
F.3d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1995)  (per curiam) (quoting
Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1079). However,  this is not the norm. As we have
also held, even though "the  grant of use immunity is not dispositive,
it does change the  reasonable perception" as to whether the immunized
witness  can apprehend becoming a defendant. Dutton, 11 F.3d at  1079.
The one case in which we have held a subject status of  an immunized
witness to continue past the immunity grant  and to the conclusion of
the investigation involved a fee  applicant who demonstrated that
other witnesses had provid- ed significant incriminating evidence
against him; that the  Independent Counsel had not made any indication
of termi- nation of his subject status, even at the time of the final 
report; and that the Independent Counsel had prosecuted  two other
subjects who had received use immunity. See  generally Cave, supra, 57
F.3d 1117. No such extraordinary  facts are present here. Therefore,
the norm prevails.


In short, we conclude that a reasonably counseled person  situated as
Abrams was would have obtained counsel to  defend against the
Independent Counsel's investigation and  that he met the statutory
requirement for subject status. We  further conclude, however, that
for purposes of the reim- bursement provision of the statute, he, like
the application in  Dutton, lost his subject status "at such time as
the attorneys  he employed in that defense successfully negotiated for
him  the status of immunized witness as opposed to likely defen-
dant." Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1079.


B. The "But for" Requirement


The only other statutory element necessary for reimburse- ment
eligibility as to which the parties are in dispute is the  requirement
that subjects of the investigation may be reim- bursed only for
"attorneys' fees ... which would not have  been incurred but for the
requirements of [the Ethics in  Government Act]." 28 U.S.C. s
593(f)(1) (emphasis added).  See In re Sealed Case, 890 F.2d 451, 452
(D.C. Cir., Spec.  Div., 1989) (per curiam) ("All requests for


under the Act must satisfy the 'but for' requirement of [the  Act].").
It is on this requirement that the earlier fee applica- tions in the
Pierce investigation have foundered. Kisner, 178  F.3d at 1358-62;
Olivas, 178 F.3d at 1353-55. In Kisner and  in Olivas, we noted that
we have repeatedly held "the most  difficult element for a fee
applicant to establish under the act  is that the fees 'would not have
been incurred but for the  requirements of [the Act].' " In re North
(Bush Fee Applica- tion), 59 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div.,
1995) (per  curiam) (quoting Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1079). We further
noted  in those decisions that this difficulty arises not only from
the  inherent difficulty of establishing a negative but also from the 
"high component of speculation" involved in this particular  negative.
Kisner, 178 F.3d at 1359; Olivas, 178 F.3d at 1353.  Nonetheless, as
we further noted in the two prior applica- tions, we have held that


qualif[ied] for an award of fees in the face of the but-for  test in at
least four (4) circumstances:


1. When the independent counsel's investigation sub- stantially
constituted duplication of the preliminary in- vestigation conducted
by the Department of Justice. In  re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1420 (D.C.
Cir., Spec. Div., 1989)  (per curiam); In re North (Dutton Fee
Application), 11  F.3d at 1080.


2. When the petitioning subject has been "prejudiced  by the Department
of Justice's failure to comply with the  substantial protective
features of the Act." In re Nofzig- er, 925 F.2d at 438 (citing In re
Meese, 907 F.2d 1192  (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1990) (per curiam)).


3. When in the absence of the requirements of the  Act "the case could
have been disposed of at an early  stage of the investigation,"
without subjecting the peti- tioning subject to the conditions that
led to his incurring  the fees sought. In re Segal (Sagawa Fee
Application),  151 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1998) (per 
curiam) (quoting In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 438).


4. Not wholly distinct from No. 3, supra, when "high  public officials
[or derivative subjects] were investigated  under the Act in
circumstances where private citizens  would not [have been]
investigated." In re Nofziger, 925  F.2d at 442; In re North (Dutton
Fee Application), 11  F.3d at 1080.


Kisner, 178 F.3d at 1359; Olivas, 178 F.3d at 1354. These  categories
are not exhaustive, and an applicant can also meet  the "but for" test
by showing "some sort of 'unique factual  features that but for the
requirement of the Act would have  permitted a quick termination' of
the investigation or other- wise not have subjected him to the fees
for which he peti- tions." Kisner, 178 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Nofziger,
925 F.2d  at 439). See also Olivas, 178 F.3d at 1354.


In both Olivas and Kisner we concluded that neither  applicant had put
himself in any of the four categories or  otherwise established his
qualification under the "but for"  criterion. Abrams offers multiple
justifications for why he  has met the "but for" test. All but one
duplicate arguments  advanced in Olivas and Kisner and we reject them
for the  reasons set forth in those opinions. Abrams, however, has 
put himself in the fourth category at least as to a portion of  the
legal fees for which he now seeks reimbursement.


Abrams makes the "but for" argument on multiple levels.  Like the
petitioners in Olivas and Kisner, he first seeks to  establish that
all attorneys' fees incurred during the entire  investigation meet the
but-for standard because the IC con- ducted an investigation that a
professional or politically ap- pointed prosecutor would not have
conducted. We rejected  that theory in each of the prior cases and we
reject it now.  As we stated in disposing of both the Olivas and
Kisner  petitions, "if the investigative act generating the defensive 
cost would, in the absence of the Act have been pursued by  other
authorities--'had the case been handled by the Depart- ment of Justice
or other executive authorities rather than the  independent
counsel'--then Congress did not contemplate the  award of counsel
fees." Kisner, 178 F.3d at 1360 (quoting  Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1080);


rejected that argument in both Olivas and Kisner and reject  it now
because we simply "cannot hold that the Attorney  General and other
investigative authorities would not have  pursued allegations as deep
and widespread as those revealed  by the Independent Counsel's
investigations had there been  no such Act." Kisner, 178 F.3d at 1360;
Olivas, 178 F.3d at  1355.


However, Abrams is able to establish something missing in  the two
prior applications. A portion of the IC's investigation  of Abrams'
conduct was focused on determining whether he  had properly complied
with a provision of the HUD hand- book, an inquiry not normally
pursued in a criminal investiga- tion. This, in a sense, parallels the
investigation by an earlier  Independent Counsel which we reviewed in
Dutton. That  earlier Independent Counsel investigated activities
under an  appropriations amendment which had never before or since 
been treated by "executive branch authorities ... as having  criminal
consequences." Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1080. We held  in Dutton, among
other cases, that defense against that sort  of independent counsel
investigative activity does meet the  "but for" requirement. See id.;
see also In re North (Gadd  Fee Application), 12 F.3d 252, 256 (D.C.
Cir., Spec. Div.,  1994) (per curiam). Furthermore, Abrams has
demonstrated  that the IC pursued criminal allegations involving an
alleged  violation of a tax regulation by Mr. Abrams' signing a
certain  low-income tax credit application which amounted to a far 
more rigorous standard of the Tax Code than ordinarily  would have
been applied to an ordinary citizen, and we  further hold that this
also makes the resulting fees under the  "but for" requirement. Cf. In
re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982,  989-90 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1989) (per
curiam). In short,  we conclude that Abrams has established his
entitlement to  reimbursement of a portion of his legal fees under the
"but  for" requirement insofar as those fees are generated by the 
Independent Counsel's pursuit of the handbook violation and  of the


It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise  portion
of those legal fees incurred by Abrams between  March 1, 1990, and May
5, 1994, which would not have been 


incurred but for the ICs appointment as opposed to those fees  that
would have been incurred in the event of investigation by  traditional
constitutional and statutory authorities. Arguably,  therefore, we
should reject the entire application, as Abrams  bears the burden of
establishing each element of entitlement.  We think, however, that
this would be too harsh a rule and  too high a standard. Given the
difficulty of sorting out the  fees attributable to each separate
element of an investigation,  we doubt that the statutory provision
for the award of fees  would bear much reason for being if we applied
the standard  of proof so rigorously. We therefore will subject the
fees,  after other deductions relating to the date requirement estab-
lished above and the reasonableness standards we set forth  below, to
a further reduction of twenty-five percent (25%) to  reflect the
indisputable fact that some portion of the fees  would have been
incurred with or without the passage of the  Act.


As there is no serious dispute as to any other element of  eligibility
for the award of attorneys' fees, we will enter an  award in Abrams'
favor as to those fees incurred by him  which meet the standards
applicable to fee awards under the  Act.


C. Reasonableness


Sufficiency of billing documentation. To establish that he  is entitled
to reimbursement for particular items of attorneys'  fees under the
Act, the fee petitioner must provide the court  with the attorneys'
billing records that describe the work  performed in sufficient detail
to establish that the work is  reasonably related to a defense against
the IC's investigation.  See, e.g., In re North (Dwyer Fee
Application), 120 F.3d 293,  297 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1997) (per
curiam); In re Donovan,  877 F.2d at 994. In their evaluations, the IC
and the DOJ  point out that a number of billing entries do not meet
these  criteria. Both the IC and the DOJ note that the billing 
records contain many entries that inadequately describe the  work
performed--giving only very generalized descriptions,  such as
"Various calls" or "Review of materials." See, e.g.,  Fulbright &
Jaworski, Billing Memorandum for 7/25/91 to 


8/29/91, Appendix, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in  Support of
Petition of Philip Abrams for Reimbursement of  Attorneys' Fees and
Costs. As we have held previously,  adequate documentation of legal
work performed is a neces- sary ingredient for the reimbursement of
attorneys' fees, see  In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir.,
Spec. Div., 1990)  (per curiam), and inadequate documentation "makes
it impos- sible for the court to verify the reasonableness of the
billings,  either as to the necessity of the particular service or the
 amount of time expended on a given legal task." In re Sealed  Case,
890 F.2d at 455. In prior cases we have imposed a ten  percent (10%)
reduction of the final fee award for similar  insufficiencies, see,
e.g., In re North (Gardner Fee Applica- tion), 30 F.3d 143, 147-48
(D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1994) (per  curiam); In re Meese, 907 F.2d at
1204, and we will impose  the same reduction here.


Additionally, the billing entries for July 27 through August  5, 1993,
totaling $4420, have no work description whatsoever.  We will deduct
this amount from the total amount prayed for,  as these omissions "do[
] not allow the court to evaluate  whether the time billed was spent
on issues that have been  found not within the contemplation of s
593(f) and this com- pels the court to exclude such hours." In re
Donovan, 877  F.2d at 995.


Defensive monitoring. The IC points out that several  billing entries
appear to constitute "defensive monitoring,"  that is, the observation
of other ongoing investigations and  prosecutions conducted by the IC.
As we have previously  suggested, this may be a useful and even
valuable activity for  defense attorneys to perform, but it is not
within the realm of  reasonableness generally available to criminal
defendants, nor  is it one which we believe Congress contemplated as
within  the realm of reasonableness for which the taxpayers should 
reimburse subjects of independent counsel investigations.  See
Gardner, 30 F.3d at 147 (rejecting fees for "the 'defensive 
monitoring' of the ongoing prosecution [brought by the Inde- pendent
Counsel]"); In re North (Fee Applications of Shields  and Gruner), 53
F.3d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1995)  (per curiam) (holding
that "fees connected to the monitoring 


of the on-going prosecution of Iran-Contra defendants" were  not
reimbursable). Consistent with our precedent, we must  apply the same
standard to the Abrams application and reject  the fee for defensive
monitoring. A review of the billing  documents indeed reveals a number
of entries that fall into  this category. Many of these entries are
grouped with other  entries for the same date, and for purposes of
making the  deductions we will assume that each entry for that date
took  up an equal amount of time. We will thus divide the number  of
entries for each date into the amount billed, and deduct of Entries
that amount from the total amount petitioned. Number Amount  of
Entries Billed Amount Date Defensive Monitoring Entry for Date for
Date Deducted 4/16/92 "review of V. Cruse indictment" 3 $280 $93.33
5/7/92 "telecon w/ S. Wehner re: status of D. Dean trial proceedings"
3 $240 $80.00 5/21/92 "review pleadings filed in Dean case" 4 $360
$90.00 5/28/92 "Review of material in Dean case" 1 $150 $150.00
6/03/92 "Took notes at Debbie Dean's hearing  with Judge Gesell and
prepared a  memo for the file" 1 $220 $220.00 6/04/92 "Proofed and
edited memo to file re- garding Debbie Dean's hearing with  Judge
Gesell" 1 $110 $110.00 6/09/92 "telecon w/counsel for D. Dean re:
status" 3 $200 $66.66 6/15/92 "Attended Debbie Dean's hearing and 
wrote memo to the file" 1 $165 $165.00 6/16/92 "Edited memo to file on
6/15/92 Dean  hearing" 1 $41.25 $41.25 7/07/92 "various telecons re:
Dean supersed ing indictment" 2 $200 $100.00 7/08/92 "Telecon w/D.
Dean's counsel; review  Dean superseding indictment" 1 $280 $280.00
7/09/92 "Review of Dean indictment" 1 $150 $150.00 7/13/92 "Attended
Dean hearing and wrote  memo to file" 1 $137.50 $137.50 7/14/92 "Read
Dean's superseding indictment" 1 $110 $110.00 7/29/92 "conference w/R.
Beckler re: status of  Dean case" 2 $200 $100.00 8/06/92 "Telecon w/C.
Feldman re: status of  Dean case" 3 $120 $40.00 10/14/92 "Telecon with
P. Abrams re: DeBar- tolomeis plea; telecon with C. Feld- man re:


Number Amount  of Entries Billed Amount Date Defensive Monitoring Entry
for Date for Date Deducted 10/15/92 "Review pleadings re: S.
DeBartolo- meis plea" 1 $160 $160.00 11/10/92 "review recent
developments in Wilson  case" 3 $280 $93.33 12/11/92 "review Demery
superseding indict- ment" 4 $1240 $310.00 12/30/92 "Review of Demery
indictment" 3 $150 $50.00  2/10/93 "Review Winn plea agreement and re-
lated materials" 4 $360 $90.00 2/22/93 "Meeting with J. Hume and R.
Beckler  r: Demery indictment" 1 $585 $585.00 3/08/93 "Prepare for
meeting with P. Abrams  re: Demery indictment; review doc- uments re:
same; meet with P.  Abrams re: Demery indictment and  re: status." 1
$675 $675.00 4/21/93 "Various telecons with P. Abrams re:  Wilson
sentencing" 2 $45 $22.50 9/17/93 "review Queenan indictment" 3 $225
$75.00 9/20/93 "telecon with A. Pings re: status of  Queenan
prosecution" 4 $225 $56.25 9/29/93 "Review of material and attendance
at  trial of Deborah G. Dean" 1 $330 $330.00 9/29/93 "attend sessions
of D. Dean trial" 5 $585 $117.00 3/18/94 "telecon with S. Rosenbaum
re: out- come of Queenan trial" 3 $160 $53.33 3/25/94 "Telecon with A.
Pings re: outcome of  Queenan trial" 3 $240 $80.00 4/11/94 "attending
sentencing of P. Winn at  US District court; conference with  M.
McGovern regarding the same" 1 $48.75 $48.75 4/25/94 "review Strauss


__________

n Total Deduction: $4946.56


Miscellaneous. Finally, on 12/15/92 is the entry, "telecon with P.
Abrams and B. Kaufman re: divorce proceedings."  We do not see how
this entry could in any way be related to  Abrams' defense, and
therefore, again using the formula from  above, divide the three
entries from that date into the $1320  billed, and subtract the
quotient of $440 from the amount  prayed.


Conclusion


Abrams seeks reimbursement for attorneys' fees in the  amount of
$389,334.52. In accordance with the analysis set forth above, we will
make the following deductions from this  amount:


1. $11,740.39 for time and expenses billed before the  Independent
Counsel was appointed on March 1, 1990.


2. $27,121.20 for time and expenses billed after  Abrams' grant of
immunity on May 6, 1994.


3. $4420 for billing entries for July 27 through Au- gust 5, 1993, for
which there are no work descriptions.


4. $4946.31 for time expended on defensive monitor- ing.


5. $440 for work done on "divorce proceedings."


6. 10% deduction for insufficient billing descriptions.


7. 25% deduction reflecting the court's estimate of  fees that would
have been incurred without the passage  of the Act.


For the reasons set forth above, it is ordered that Abrams  be awarded
$229,949.80 in reasonable attorneys' fees and  expenses. The
computation is set forth in the appendix.


Appendix Total Fee Request $389,334.52


Deductions in Opinion  1. Fees before IC appointed 11,740.39 2. Fees
after "subject" status ended 27,121.20 3. Billing entries with no work
descriptions 4420.00 4. Time expended on defensive monitoring 4946.56
5. Work performed on divorce proceedings 440.00 


__________

n Total of specific deductions 48,668.15 Request minus specific
deductions 340,666.37 6. 10% deduction for insufficient descriptions
306,599.73 7. 25% deduction reflecting fees incurred without Act


TOTAL AWARD $229,949.80