UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


JOHNSON, ELEANOR T.

v.

WMATA


95-7254b

D.C. Cir. 1999


*	*	*


PER CURIAM.


In 1986, of her own volition and intending to commit  suicide, Devora
Johnson jumped from a subway station plat- form into the path of an
oncoming WMATA train and was  killed. Her parents brought a wrongful
death action against  the WMATA and ultimately obtained a jury verdict
in their  favor. The jury found that the WMATA had the last clear 


chance to save Ms. Johnson and that the train operator acted  willfully
or wantonly in his operation of the train. See  Johnson v. WMATA, 98
F.3d 1423, 1424-25 (D.C. Cir. 1996).


The WMATA moved for judgment as a matter of law,  which the district
court denied, and then filed this appeal,  arguing that the Johnsons
are barred from recovering under  the doctrine of "last clear chance"
because Ms. Johnson had  assumed the risk of death by jumping onto the
tracks.  Because we were unable to find a controlling District of 
Columbia precedent on this point, we certified the following  question
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals:


Under District of Columbia law, and upon the facts  described below,
may a plaintiff who has voluntarily  assumed an unreasonable risk of
incurring a particular  injury recover from a defendant who failed to
take the  last clear chance to prevent that injury?


Johnson, 98 F.3d at 1424.


The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has answered  the question in
the negative. See WMATA v. Johnson, No.  96-SP-1784 (Mar. 3. 1999).
The court held that Ms. Johnson  "purposely invited the harm ....
[and] thereby relieved  WMATA of any duty it otherwise owed her,
including a duty  to grasp the final opportunity--the last clear
chance--to  avert a harm brought about by her own intentional act."
Id.  at slip op. 6; see also id. at slip op. 8 ("Plaintiff has cited
no  authority, and we have found none, that would apply last  clear
chance to a plaintiff's conduct deliberately intended to  bring about
the harm another inflicts, either negligently or  recklessly. Violenti
non fit injuria ('to the willing no injury  is done')"). The court
concluded that the doctrine of "last  clear chance may not be employed
to restore liability in  another for a plaintiff's suicidal act." Id.


Because D.C. law does not allow the Johnsons to recover  under the
doctrine of last clear chance, it is


ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the  district court from
which this appeal has been taken be 


REVERSED and that judgment as a matter of law be  entered for the
appellant. It is


FURTHER ORDERED, on the court's own motion, that  the Clerk shall
withhold issuance of the mandate herein until  seven days after
disposition of any timely petition for rehear- ing. See D.C. Cir. R.
41(a)(1). This instruction to the clerk  is without prejudice to the
right of any party at any time to  move for expedited issuance of the
mandate for good cause  shown.