UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


UNITED STATES

v.

ROUSE, DONNA JUNE


97-3134a

D.C. Cir. 1999


*	*	*


Tatel, Circuit Judge: Following her conviction on nine  counts of fraud
and 11 counts of money laundering, appellant  moved for a new trial
based on what she claimed to be "newly  discovered" evidence that her
co-defendant had abused her  physically, sexually, and emotionally.
She argued that she  became able to admit the abuse only after
undergoing post- trial counseling and that the abuse precluded her
from having  the requisite criminal intent. Relying on this history of
 abuse, appellant also requested a downward departure in  sentencing
on grounds of diminished mental capacity, duress,  and coercion.
Mindful of the deferential standard of review  applicable to district
court credibility determinations, we af- firm the district court's
rejection of these and other claims.


I


A federal grand jury indicted appellant Donna Rouse, as  well as Pamela
Glascoe and Richard Gartmon, on charges of  interstate transportation
of securities obtained by fraud, 18  U.S.C. s 2314 (1994), and money
laundering, id. s 1956(a)(1).  Rouse and Gartmon proceeded to trial,
while Glascoe pled  guilty and testified for the government. Rouse and
Gartmon  were convicted and sentenced to prison for 57 months and 120 
months, respectively. In a separate appeal, we affirmed  Gartmon's
conviction and sentence. See United States v.  Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015
(D.C. Cir. 1998).


The indictments arose from a scheme to defraud the  George Washington
University Health Plan of over $450,000.  Glascoe, a secretary in the
Health Plan's marketing and sales  department, prepared check requests
authorizing sponsor- ships of local events and programs as well as
payments to  vendors for services purchased by the Health Plan. Upon 
approval by Health Plan executives, checks were issued by  the finance
department. Glascoe had no authority to approve  or sign check
requests.


Glascoe and Gartmon began dating in November 1994. At  Gartmon's
request, Glascoe soon began submitting check  requests for fictitious
sponsorships. She gave the issued  checks to Gartmon. Because Health
Plan employees knew  that Glascoe was dating Gartmon, she never
requested checks  in his name. Instead, Gartmon gave her the names of
three  women to use on the checks. One was Donna Rouse, another 
Gartmon girlfriend.


On January 11, 1995, Glascoe created a request for a $5,500  check to
Rouse for sponsorship of a fictitious "clean air  challenge." The
Health Plan issued the check, Glascoe gave  it to Gartmon, and Rouse
endorsed it, deposited it in her  personal bank account, and received
$1,000 cash back from  the teller. Glascoe never met or spoke to
Rouse. Rouse  never organized any events featuring the Health Plan as
a  sponsor.


Glascoe also submitted fraudulent invoices for services  from a
printing company owned by one of Gartmon's friends.  Eight times
between January and March 1995, Glascoe typed  up invoices and
corresponding check requests, each time  naming Rouse as payee.
Glascoe also drafted phony con- tracts to support the invoices.
Ranging from $16,800 to  $84,600, the eight checks totaled $438,000.
Rouse personally  endorsed and deposited six of the eight checks into
her  checking account. Using a deposit slip for Rouse's account, 
Gartmon's cousin deposited the seventh. It was unclear who  deposited
the eighth. During this time, Rouse opened a  money market account,


Rouse never performed any printing services, nor was she  ever employed
by the printing company. Searching Rouse's  home, the police found a
phony civil complaint signed by  Rouse, which alleged that the Health
Plan had failed to fulfill  a contract for printing services. The
complaint falsely  claimed that Rouse was vice-president of the
printing compa- ny and that the company had printed materials for the
Health  Plan.


Rouse gave Gartmon most of the money from the fraudu- lently obtained
checks, although she never wrote checks from 


her accounts in his name. Instead, knowing that the money  was for
Gartmon, she wrote checks and obtained cashier's  checks payable to
Gartmon's other girlfriends, his friends,  and various businesses.
Gartmon used the money to make  and repay loans and to buy three
sports cars, a hair salon,  and a jacuzzi and gazebo for his house. In
all, Rouse gave  Gartmon's surrogates 11 checks ranging from $3,000 to
 $23,000. These checks totaled $140,000.


After a jury convicted Rouse on nine counts of criminal  fraud and 11
counts of money laundering, she filed three post- trial motions that
are now at issue in this appeal. First, she  moved for acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict, claiming that  the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. The  district court denied the
motion. Second, eight months after  her conviction, she moved for a
new trial based on "newly  discovered" evidence that she had suffered
"battered woman's  syndrome" during her 14-year relationship with
Gartmon.  According to Rouse, that syndrome precluded her from hav-
ing the requisite criminal intent under the fraud and money 
laundering statutes. Despite a psychiatrist's testimony that  Rouse
had endured severe sexual, physical, and emotional  abuse by Gartmon
during the time of her criminal conduct,  the district court
determined that the abuse was not "newly  discovered" and refused to
order a new trial. Finally, Rouse  requested a downward departure from
the applicable sentenc- ing guidelines based on diminished mental
capacity and coer- cion or duress. Following an evidentiary hearing in
which  Rouse testified for the first time, the district court found
her  claims not credible and sentenced her to a 57-month prison  term,
the maximum sentence under the guidelines. We con- sider each of the


II


We begin with Rouse's claim of evidence insufficiency.  Challenging the
fraud counts, Rouse argues that the govern- ment failed to prove that
she knew the checks she endorsed  or deposited were obtained by fraud.
According to Rouse,  while the evidence showed that Glascoe and
Gartmon colluded 


in the fraud, it failed to show that either Glascoe or Gartmon  told
Rouse the source of the checks. Rouse further argues  that even if the
evidence showed that she had the requisite  knowledge by the end of
the scheme, it failed to show that  she knew of the fraud at the time
each check was transferred  to her, as the fraud statute requires. See
18 U.S.C. s 2314.  With respect to the money laundering counts, Rouse
argues  that the government failed to prove that she knew that the 
money she gave Gartmon was obtained illegally or that her  purpose in
writing the checks was to conceal Gartmon's  ownership or control of
the money. See id. s 1956(a)(1).  Overall, Rouse's theory is that she
was an unknowing victim  of Gartmon's schemes and deceits.


In assessing claims of evidence insufficiency, we view the  evidence in
the light most favorable to the government,  drawing all reasonable
inferences in the government's favor.  Our inquiry is "limited to the
question of whether 'any  rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements  of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " United
States v.  Dingle, 114 F.3d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson
v.  Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We must affirm the 
conviction unless we conclude that "a reasonable juror must 
necessarily have had a reasonable doubt as to the defen- dant['s]
guilt." United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 437  (D.C. Cir. 1983).


Applying this standard, we find no basis for setting aside  the jury's
verdict. As to the fraud counts, the evidence shows  that Rouse never
applied for any sponsorships from the  Health Plan, that she performed
no services for the Health  Plan, and that she had no contact with any
Health Plan  employee responsible for submitting or approving check
re- quests. The evidence also shows that, during the four  months
prior to the deposit into her accounts of nine checks  ranging from
$5,500 to $84,600, Rouse carefully monitored  her bank accounts, made
no deposits larger than $944, and  kept an average balance no greater
than $235. Acting on the  sensible assumption that Rouse knew that
organizations do  not hand out large checks for no reason, a rational
jury could  conclude from this evidence that Rouse knew that each


issued to her was illegitimate. The physical evidence recov- ered from
Rouse's home--the phony civil complaint signed by  Rouse falsely
claiming that she was vice-president of a print- ing company and that
the company had provided printing  services for the Health
Plan--further supports the finding  that Rouse knew the checks were
obtained by fraud.


With respect to the money laundering counts, the evidence  shows that
Rouse knew that the large checks she wrote were  used to buy goods and
services for Gartmon's benefit, even  though none of the checks bore
Gartmon's name. The evi- dence also shows that when Rouse wrote small
checks on  Gartmon's behalf in the past, she consistently noted the 
check's purpose on the memo line of the check; the large  checks she
wrote for Gartmon carried no such notation.  Along with the evidence
that Rouse knew that the money she  was spending for Gartmon's benefit
was obtained illegally,  these facts provide sufficient grounds for a
rational jury to  infer that Rouse knew that the checks she wrote for
Gartmon  served to conceal his ownership or control of the illegally 
obtained funds.


III


We turn next to Rouse's challenge to the district court's  denial of
her motion for a new trial. Arguing that she  became able to reveal
Gartmon's physical, sexual, and emo- tional abuse only after
undergoing post-trial psychotherapy,  Rouse claimed that this "newly
discovered" evidence could  lead a new jury to find that she
participated in the fraud only  to avoid Gartmon's abuse and that she
therefore lacked the  requisite criminal intent.


The facts leading up to Rouse's claim of "newly discovered"  evidence
are as follows: Before trial began, the government  alerted Rouse's
lawyer to the possibility that Gartmon had  abused Rouse, referring
the lawyer to entries in Rouse's  diary mentioning acts of violence,
forced sex, and threats by  Gartmon during the three-month period of
the charged con- duct. The government also gave Rouse's lawyer a tape 
recording of a pre-indictment interview in which Rouse told a 
prosecutor that although she loved Gartmon, she was afraid 


of him. During the interview, Rouse also said that Gartmon  had been
verbally and physically abusive, and that not want- ing to upset
Gartmon, she asked no questions when he told  her to deposit or write
checks. Asked by her lawyer about  her diary entries and the tape
recording, Rouse denied having  been abused and rejected his
suggestion that she see a  psychologist with experience working with
battered women.  Rouse never testified at trial, and her lawyer
presented no  claim or evidence of abuse to the jury.


Between conviction and sentencing, Rouse underwent 11  months of
psychotherapy with a clinical social worker, during  which she
admitted that her relationship with Gartmon had  been abusive for many
years. The social worker referred  Rouse to a psychiatrist. Examining
Rouse for seven hours  over two days, the psychiatrist prepared a
report finding that  on numerous occasions over a 10-year period,
Gartmon hit  her, raped her, and forced her to have sex with another
man.  See Letter from Dr. Susan J. Fiester to Howard Katzoff of 
12/2/96, at 6-8. Through this constant abuse, the report  stated, "Mr.
Gartmon was able to terrorize Ms. Rouse and to  virtually control her
life." Id. at 15. According to the  psychiatrist, Rouse's "compliant,
even servile behavior" in  response to Gartmon's requests that she
open accounts, de- posit checks, and provide him money "is typical of
a woman  who has been severely battered." Id. Concluding that "Ms. 
Rouse is clearly suffering from the Battered Woman Syn- drome," the


[A]s a battered woman, she came under [Gartmon's]  control, and, as a
result of coercion and duress, experi- enced a diminished ability to
make appropriate decisions  regarding her behavior.... [Her] criminal
activity was  directly related to her abusive relationship with Mr. 
Gartmon, specifically: 1) her chronic fear of being beaten  and
sexually abused; 2) the depression and anxiety  which occurred as a
consequence, and 3) her need to  deny reality in the interest of
minimizing any type of  conflict with Mr. Gartmon because that
conflict would  likely lead to serious physical abuse.


Id. at 17. The report further stated that "[i]t is an essential  part
of the battering relationship for the victim to conceal the  fact of
the abuse from others for a variety of reasons includ- ing denial and
fear of physical harm...." Id. at 18. "Ulti- mately," according to the
report, "Ms. Rouse's ability to  recognize and accept the tragic
reality of her abuse by Mr.  Gartmon evolved from an internal process
fostered by her  psychotherapeutic treatment and could not have
emerged  even with aggressive external probing [by] the Government  or
her attorney." Id.


Relying on the psychiatrist's report, Rouse moved for a  new trial,
claiming that the "newly discovered" evidence of  abuse, "unlocked" by
post-trial psychotherapy, could lead a  jury to conclude that she was
merely a passive participant in  the fraud and thus lacked criminal
intent. Summarizing her  report at the hearing on the motion, the
psychiatrist testified  that Rouse's fear of Gartmon's abuse made her
susceptible to  doing or believing whatever he told her during the
period of  the charged conduct, and that her state of severe denial 
prevented her from reporting the abuse. Rouse chose not to  testify.


The government never disputed that Rouse had suffered  physical,
sexual, and psychological abuse by Gartmon. In- stead, it argued that
she and her lawyer knew of the abuse  and that she had the capacity to
introduce it at trial but  simply chose not to. The district court
agreed, ruling that  the evidence of abuse was not "newly discovered."
As long as  the district court did not misapply the law or abuse its 
discretion, we must affirm. See United States v. Kelly, 790  F.2d 130,
133 (D.C. Cir. 1986).


In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on the  following
findings: (1) Rouse's entries in her diary and her  statements in the
pre-indictment interview showed that she  was capable of acknowledging
the abuse before trial; (2)  aware that Rouse had been abused, her
lawyer advised her to  seek counseling, but she refused; (3) because
Gartmon was  incarcerated before trial, he was unable to harm Rouse 
physically; (4) because Rouse did not live with Gartmon, had 


no children with him, and did not depend on him financially,  she had
little reason to fear reprisal for reporting the abuse;  and (5)
having been convicted, Rouse had a strong motive for  feigning an
inability to discuss the abuse at the time of trial.


We think these findings are less probative than they might  first
appear. That Rouse mentioned the abuse in her person- al diary says
little about her ability to report the abuse to  others. Her admission
of abuse in the pre-indictment inter- view, moreover, consisted of
nothing more than the following  dialogue:


Prosecutor: You must have a specific reason for feeling  ... that you
had no choice [but to continue in the fraud  scheme]. There must be
more than a vague feeling that  you didn't know what his reaction
would be.


Rouse: I mean, I didn't want any verbal, mental, physi- cal abuse,
like, towards me.


Prosecutor: Is he verbally abusive towards you?


Rouse: Sometimes.


Prosecutor: Physically?


Rouse: Sometimes.


7/12/95 Interview Tr. at 44. We likewise suspect that the  district
court may have relied too heavily on the fact that  Rouse was not
under Gartmon's physical control. According  to the psychiatrist,
Rouse was unable to report the abuse  because she was psychologically
debilitated by denial and  fear:


[T]he simple physical factors of having a place to go  already,
[having] a job or resources, is [sic] only a piece  of the situation.
One can't ignore the very powerful  psychological aspect of the
attachment....  ...


[I]f a woman doesn't have kids and may have a place to  go, the
psychological factors may play a much more  powerful role in why
they're essentially stuck and inca- pacitated and staying in that


2/6/97 Mot. Hearing Tr. at 76-77. Indeed, an entry in  Rouse's diary
reveals that Rouse went to Gartmon's house to  cook him breakfast and
wash his clothes just two days after  he hit her in the eye and forced
her to have sex with another  man. In the context of this and other
self-defeating behavior  detailed in the psychiatrist's report,
Rouse's refusal to seek  psychotherapy before trial, viewed by the
district court as a  free and rational choice to "stand by [her] man,"
id. at 61,  could just as easily be evidence of her chronic state of
denial  and fear.


In the end, however, because the burden of proof was on  Rouse, and
because our standard of review is highly deferen- tial, we cannot say
that the district court abused its discre- tion. The court did not
reject the existence of battered  woman's syndrome as a general
matter, nor did it summarily  reject Rouse's claim of "newly
discovered" evidence. Instead,  the court reviewed the psychiatrist's
report, carefully ques- tioned the psychiatrist during the hearing on
Rouse's motion,  and gave Rouse's lawyer ample opportunity to
explicate her  claim. Aware of the incentives facing Rouse after being
 convicted, the district court asked the psychiatrist whether 
"avoid[ing] punishment [could have been] a motivation" for  Rouse to
allege an inability to report the abuse earlier. Id. at  84. The
psychiatrist responded: "[I]t's not really my profes- sional expertise
to determine if somebody is lying or telling  the truth" and that
"opportunism" could have been a motive  for Rouse's claim. Id. at 84.
Unconvinced that the psychia- trist had adequately verified Rouse's
truthfulness, the district  court said: "We're on the eve of
sentencing. So, why didn't  the doctor focus on that? Why didn't she
attach any signifi- cance to these revelations being made at the
eleventh hour?  That's very significant, in my view." Id. at 130. The
court  concluded that Rouse "knew what was going on in her life"  and


Since the district court had legitimate concerns about  Rouse's
credibility given the timing of her claim, and since  the court had
understandable doubts about the psychiatrist's  report and testimony,
we see no grounds for withholding the  deference we ordinarily give to
a district court's credibility 


determinations. See Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 67 (D.C.  Cir.
1988) ("The district court's credibility determinations are  entitled
to the greatest deference from this court on appeal.").  Although the
evidence in this case might support a different  conclusion, that
possibility does not warrant a finding that the  district court abused
its discretion. We thus affirm the denial  of Rouse's motion for a new
trial.


IV


After the district court denied her new trial motion, Rouse  sought a
downward departure on the grounds of diminished  mental capacity and
coercion or duress. See U.S.S.G.  ss 5K2.12-.13. At her sentencing
hearing, Rouse testified  for the first time, claiming that Gartmon's
abuse effectively  compelled her to participate in the fraud and money
launder- ing scheme or, alternatively, weakened her ability to resist 
such participation. Observing that Rouse was "very articu- late,
sophisticated, [and] very intelligent," the district court  found
"absolutely incredible" and "preposterous" her testimo- ny that she
simply did whatever Gartmon told her to do and  that she knew nothing
about the source or amount of money  going into and out of her bank
account during the period of  the charged conduct. 9/19/97 Sentencing
Hearing Tr. at 7-8,  10. Struck by Rouse's "total lack of candor," id.
at 64, the  court rejected her claim that Gartmon's abuse had
debilitated  her to such an extent that she was unable to control her
own  actions. Deferring again to the district court's credibility 
determination, we see no grounds for disturbing its decision  to deny
Rouse a downward departure. See United States v.  Leandre, 132 F.3d
796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (district court's  downward departure
decision must be upheld on appeal in the  absence of "a mistake of law
or an incorrect application of the  Guidelines").


V


We affirm Rouse's conviction and sentence.


So ordered.