UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


PANAMSAT CORP

v.

FCC


98-1408a

D.C. Cir. 1999


*	*	*


Williams, Circuit Judge: Congress requires that the Fed- eral
Communications Commission collect fees to finance its  regulatory
activities. In 1985, as part of the Consolidated  Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, it amended the Commu- nications Act of 1934 by
adding a section 8, 47 U.S.C. s 158,  which created a schedule of
"application fees" for regulatees  to pay to the FCC. In 1993, again
as part of the Omnibus  Budget Reconciliation Act, it expanded FCC fee
collection by  adding a section 9, which mandated the collection of
"regula- tory fees" to recover the costs of "enforcement activities, 
policy and rulemaking activities, user information services,  and
international activities." 47 U.S.C. s 159(a)(1).


PanAmSat Corporation, an operator of satellites for tele-
communications purposes, petitions for review of two separate  aspects
of the FCC's 1998 assessment of regulatory fees.  See Assessment and
Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal  Year 1998, 13 FCC Rcd 19820
(1998) ("1998 Order"). Both  challenges relate to the Commission's
interpretation of s 9.  In the first PanAmSat attacks the FCC's
exemption of Com- sat Corporation from "space station fees," 47 U.S.C.
s 159(g),  for satellites Comsat operates as part of the Intelsat and 
Inmarsat systems. In the second it challenges the FCC's  assessment of
fees on PanAmSat for "international circuits."  Id.


Both challenges confront a jurisdictional problem. Al- though PanAmSat
attacks a 1998 Order, the decisions it  complains of are identical to
the formulations reached by the  Commission in its 1997 Order. See
Assessment and Collec-


tion of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 1997, 12 FCC Rcd  17161,
17187-89 (1997) ("1997 Order"). The statute authoriz- ing judicial
review states that petitions for review must be  filed within 60 days
of the final order, see 28 U.S.C. s 2344;  PanAmSat's petition is
timely for the 1998 Order but not for  that of 1997. We assume without
deciding that the clock does  not automatically start fresh on each
new annual iteration of  an order that imposes burdens with respect to
a specific year.  Even with that assumption, PanAmSat has brought
itself  within standard exceptions to any inference of preclusion to 
be drawn from the 60-day limit. See Independent Comm.  Bankers of Am.
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve  Sys., , at *19 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 2,  1999) (noting that typical statutory review periods rarely 
contain an "explicit bar" to challenges brought after the time 
limit). Because the exceptions are different, we address the 
jurisdictional issue separately for each substantive challenge.


Space Station Fees for Comsat


Comsat is a private corporation formed pursuant to the  Communications
Satellite Act of 1962. See 47 U.S.C. s 701  et seq. At Comsat's
creation Congress designated it the  United States's sole
representative and signatory to the In- ternational Telecommunications
Satellite Organization ("Intel- sat"), 47 U.S.C. s 731, and later the
International Maritime  Satellite Organization ("Inmarsat"), 47 U.S.C.
s 752; see also  Comsat Corp. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1997).  These organizations own satellites that are used by signato-
ries, such as Comsat, to provide international communica- tions.
Comsat provides such services as a common carrier  and is "fully
subject to the provisions of title II and title III  of [the
Communications] Act," 47 U.S.C. s 741. Title II  governs regulation of
common carriers, 47 U.S.C. s 201 et  seq.; Title III governs radio
communication, 47 U.S.C. s 301  et seq. To participate in the launch
of an Intelsat satellite,  for example, Comsat must seek authority
from the FCC  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. s 309. See, e.g., In the Matter of
 Comsat Corporation Application for authority to participate 


in a program for the construction of up to four Intelsat VIII 
satellites and to provide its authorized Intelsat services via  these
facilities, 12 FCC Rcd 15971 (1997) ("Authority to  Participate").


Until 1985 the FCC required (with limited exceptions) that 
international fixed satellite services be provided via the Intel- sat
system. In that year it authorized provision of separate 
international satellite services; in 1988 PanAmSat became the  first
U.S. provider of a separate system and it now operates  its own
worldwide fleet of satellites. Unlike Comsat, PanAm- Sat operates as a


Both Comsat and PanAmSat pay s 8 application fees for  space stations.
47 U.S.C. s 158. Such fees apply to those  who "launch and operate"
space stations. 47 U.S.C. s 158(g)  (Schedule of Application Fees,
Common Carrier Services  (16)(b)). PanAmSat launches and operates its
own satellites,  so it obviously must pay the fees; in 1987 the FCC
concluded  that Comsat must do so as well insofar as it
"participate[s] in  the construction, or in the launch and operation,
of [a station  in the Intelsat or Inmarsat system]." In the Matter of 
Establishment of a Fee Collection Program to Implement the  Provisions
of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilia- tion Act of 1985, 2 FCC
Rcd 947, 974 & n.226 (1987) ("1987  Order"). But when Congress
established regulatory fees for  space stations in 1993 under s 9, the
FCC concluded that  Comsat was exempt from such fees for its Intelsat
and  Inmarsat space stations, even though companies like PanAm- Sat
were required to pay the new s 9 fees. See 47 U.S.C.  s 159(g)
(Schedule of Regulatory Fees, Common Carrier  Bureau); Assessment and
Collection of Regulatory Fees for  Fiscal Year 1995, 10 FCC Rcd 13512
(1995) ("1995 Order").  Comsat's exemption from these fees persists


PanAmSat says that its challenge to the Comsat exemption  is timely for
two reasons. It argues first that an intervening  decision of this
circuit, Comsat Corp. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 223  (D.C. Cir. 1997), reopened
the issue, and second that the  FCC's 1997 decision, although deciding
the issue for 1997,  explicitly kept the issue open for the future.


The FCC exempted Comsat from space station fees back in  1995, but in
1996 it noted that Comsat was not being charged  for the regulatory
costs it imposed on the FCC.1 This  prompted the agency to adopt a
"signatory fee" that applied  to Comsat as the United States's
signatory in organizations  like Intelsat. See Comsat, 114 F.3d at
225-26. Comsat  challenged the fee, and in an opinion filed May 30,
1997, this  court invalidated it because the FCC had not adopted the 
signatory fee as a consequence of any identified "rulemaking 
proceedings or changes in law," a requisite for changes in  regulatory
fees under 47 U.S.C. s 159(b)(3). See Comsat,  114 F.3d at 227-28. At
that point, the FCC had already  proposed retaining the signatory fee
for 1997 in a March 5,  1997 notice of proposed rulemaking. The FCC's
final order,  filed June 26, 1997, dropped the signatory fee, because
of the  judicial intervention, and put nothing in its stead. Noting
our  decision, the FCC said, "Accordingly, we will not, at this time, 
assess a fee to recover the costs of our regulatory activities in 
connection with Comsat's role as U.S. Signatory." 1997  Order, 12 FCC
Rcd at 17187. The Commission noted that  those costs amounted to
"approximately 7.8% of all interna- tional costs." Id. at 17187 n.26.
In the 1998 Order, the FCC  made no attempt to recover these costs and
did not discuss  possible space station fees for Comsat, even though
PanAm- Sat argued in its comments that Comsat should not be  exempt.
See 1998 Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 19835-36 (discuss- ing fees for
geostationary satellites without mentioning any  attempt to recoup
signatory-related costs attributable to  Comsat).


PanAmSat argues that this court's decision in Comsat  reopened the
issue of Comsat's fees sufficiently to render a  challenge to the 1998
Order timely. We said in Kennecott  Utah Copper Corp. v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d  1191, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996), that judicial
review of agency 




__________

n 1 Even in its 1995 Order exempting Comsat the FCC noted that  Comsat
was escaping fees for its regulatory costs to the FCC. See  1995
Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 13550 ("[W]e intend to explore other  ways to
recover the regulatory costs imposed on the Commission on  behalf of
Comsat's participation in the Intersat [sic] and Inmarsat 


action can sometimes amount to a "constructive reopening" of  a prior
agency decision, where "[f]or us to foreclose review of  the agency's
[new] decision to adhere to the status quo ante  under changed
circumstances, on the ground that the agency  had not evidenced a
willingness to reconsider the issue, would  be to deny the
significance of our own earlier ruling." But  we qualified the
reopening concept by saying that it would not  be available where the
"parties had adequate notice of a  forthcoming change that might alter
their incentive to seek  judicial review," id., and indeed found in
that case that the  "potential litigants were on notice by the
petition for review"  which led to the intervening change, id. at


PanAmSat may have had adequate notice of Comsat's  petition for review
of the signatory fee. Certainly it had  notice of the intervening
decision in Comsat when the FCC  issued its 1997 Order. But we need
not decide whether the  timing of our decision in Comsat was such that
a challenge  should have been brought to the 1997, and not the 1998, 
Order. In the 1997 Order the FCC itself made statements  that kept the
issue open enough for a challenge to the 1998  Order.


The FCC said in the 1997 Order that it would not "at this  time, assess
a fee to recover the costs of our regulatory  activities in connection
with Comsat's role as U.S. Signatory."  1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at
17187 (emphasis added). We  think this statement is most reasonably
read as stating an  intention by the FCC to hold its approach to
recovery of costs  from Comsat open, especially given "the entire
context of the  rulemaking," see National Ass'n of Reversionary
Property  Owners v. Surface Transp. Bd., 158 F.3d 135, 141 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (quoting Public Citizen v. NRC, 901 F.2d 147, 150 (D.C.  Cir.
1990)): the 1995 statement that the Commission would  "explore other
ways to recover the regulatory costs," 1995  Order, 10 FCC Rcd at
13550, the 1996 imposition of the  signatory fee, and the initial 1997
proposal (thwarted by our  decision) to continue the signatory fee.
With that back- ground the Commission's statement that it would not


recover the costs "at this time," far from merely "reaffirming  [the
agency's] prior position," Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1213, was  a
commitment to continue the quest for a solution. Accord- ingly, we
find PanAmSat's challenge to the 1998 Order timely  and reach the
merits of PanAmSat's attack on the exemption  of Comsat from the
regulatory fees under s 9.2


The Commission's theory is that exemption is commanded  by the
statute's "plain legislative history," though not by the  text itself.
See Respondent's Br. at 24. We examine this  theory under the standard
principle that if Congress has  spoken to the precise question at
issue, we must "give effect  to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress," but if  Congress has not, we defer to a permissible agency
construc- tion of the statute. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984).


The statute itself seems to have no suggestion that Comsat  should be
exempt. Section 9 directs the Commission to  "assess and collect
regulatory fees to recover the costs of ...  enforcement activities,
policy and rulemaking activities, user  information services, and
international activities." 47 U.S.C.  s 159(a)(1). Fees are derived
from a number of "factors,"  including the number of Commission
employees in various  "bureaus," and "the benefits provided to the
payor of the fee  by the Commission's activities, including such
factors as  service area coverage, shared use versus exclusive use,
and  other factors that the Commission determines are necessary  in
the public interest." 47 U.S.C. s 159(b)(1)(A). If the  Commission
wants to adjust or amend the schedule of fees, it  must satisfy
certain preconditions. See Comsat, 114 F.3d at  227-28. The statute
then provides a starting schedule of  fees, which includes a "space
station" category, under which  Congress assessed a fee "per




__________

n 2 PanAmSat has standing to challenge a decision to exempt  Comsat
from space station fees because Congress sets a fixed  amount the FCC
must recover through s 9 fees. Thus an exemp- tion for Comsat from
certain fees increases the amount that must  be extracted from other
regulatees, such as PanAmSat.


ronous orbit." 47 U.S.C. s 159(g) (Schedule of Regulatory  Fees, Common
Carrier Bureau).


The Commission's invocation of legislative history of course 
presupposes some obscurity in the statute. "[W]e do not  resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is  clear." Ratzlaf
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994);  see also Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,  2146 (1999); Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.  249, 253-54 (1992); United States v.
Bost, 87 F.3d 1333, 1336  (D.C. Cir. 1996). It is most unclear to us
where the neces- sary statutory ambiguity lurks.


The plain terms of s 9 have already been quoted; they  clearly do not
require an exemption for Comsat, and there is  no obvious hook in the
language on which to hang an exemp- tion. Moreover, the Commission
conceded in its 1995 Order  that "regulatory costs [are] imposed on
the Commission on  behalf of Comsat's participation in the Intersat
[sic] and  Inmarsat programs." 1995 Order, at 13550. Thus Comsat's 
payment of regulatory fees for its space stations would serve  s 9's
general purpose of recovering the Commission's costs  for its
regulatory activities. And s 9 contains a category of  "Exceptions" to
the fee schedule, 47 U.S.C. s 159(h), saying  that the fees should not
apply to "(1) governmental entities or  nonprofit entities; or (2) to
amateur radio operator licenses  under part 97 of the Commission's
regulations." If Congress  intended an exception for Comsat, we might
expect to find it  there.


Further, the FCC's treatment of the analogous provision in  s 8 argues
for non-exemption. Section 8 calls for a fee for an  "application for
authority to launch and operate" for "space  stations," 47 U.S.C. s
158(g) (Schedule of Application Fees,  Common Carrier Services
(16)(b)), and the Commission in  1987 concluded that Comsat must pay
such a fee when it  participates in the launch and operation of
stations in the  Intelsat and Inmarsat systems. See 1987 Order, 2 FCC
Rcd  at 974 & n.226. It is hard to see why the "space station" 
application fee under s 8 covers Comsat, but the "space 


station" regulatory fee under s 9 does not. The Commis- sion's reading
of s 8 was in place when Congress enacted s 9.


At oral argument the Commission cautioned that a parallel  construction
of the two sections would force the Commission  to extract s 9 fees
when, for example, Comsat and other U.S.  companies use Canadian and
Mexican satellites; according to  Commission counsel, U.S. companies
pay s 8 fees when ap- plying to use foreign satellites. When pressed,
however,  counsel did not know whether such use of foreign satellites 
actually causes the Commission any regulatory burdens--a  prerequisite
for s 9 fees and a conceded reality for Comsat's  participation in
Intelsat and Inmarsat.


Thus the statute plainly does not require--and may not 
permit--Comsat's exemption from space station regulatory  fees. Nor
would the legislative history change the result,  assuming the statute
to be ambiguous enough to allow its  consideration. The Commission
points to the Conference  Report for the 1993 amendments, which
explicitly incorporat- ed by reference, "[t]o the extent applicable,
the appropriate  provisions of the House Report (H.R. Rep. 102-207)."
See  Conf. Rep. H. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1993). 
The latter explicated a virtually identical bill that passed the 
House in 1991 but failed to be enacted. The relevant passage  of the
incorporated report reads as follows:


The Committee intends that [space station fees] be as- sessed on
operators of U.S. facilities, consistent with  FCC jurisdiction.
Therefore, these fees will apply only  to space stations directly
licensed by the Commission  under Title III of the Communications Act.
Fees will  not be applied to space stations operated by international 
organizations subject to the International Organizations  Immunities
Act, 22 U.S.C. s 288 et seq.


H.R. Rep. 102-207, at 26 (1991). In exempting Comsat from  s 9 space
station regulatory fees the Commission relied solely  on this
legislative history and on the fact that Intelsat and  Inmarsat are
both, by executive order, international organiza- tions subject to the
International Organizations Immunities  Act. See 1995 Order, 10 FCC
Rcd at 13550 & n.30.


The legislative history does not seem to us anywhere near  as
conclusive as it did to the Commission. The 1991 report  speaks of
granting cost recovery authority "consistent with  FCC jurisdiction"
for "space stations directly licensed by the  Commission under Title
III of the Communications Act."  H.R. Rep. 102-207, at 26. Comsat must
seek FCC authoriza- tion under Title III (i.e., "application for
license," 47 U.S.C.  s 309) for its launch and operation of Intelsat
and Inmarsat  satellites. See Statement of Policy Concerning
Procedures  Applicable to Comsat's Applying for Commission Authoriza-
tion to Participate in Certain Intelsat Activities, 46 FCC 2d  338,
338 & n.2 (1974); see, e.g., Authority to Participate, 12  FCC Rcd
15971, 15971 n.1 (1997). Thus imposing s 9 fees on  Comsat is
consistent with the FCC's Title III licensing juris- diction. It was
this precise rationale that led the FCC to  include Comsat in the s 8
application fees. See 2 FCC Rcd  at 974 & n.226.


At oral argument the Commission attempted a delicate  distinction
between, on the one hand, applications for satellite  licenses, and on
the other hand, Comsat's applications for  approvals of its
participation in the launch and operation of  Intelsat satellites. The
Commission insisted that, even  though it issues its approvals of the
latter under the authority  of 47 U.S.C. s 309, see Authority to
Participate, 12 FCC Rcd  at 15971 n.1, which relates exclusively to
licensing, it does not  "license" Intelsat satellites. But it seems
perfectly reason- able to say under these circumstances that the
Commission  "licenses" Comsat's operation of Intelsat satellites.
Thus, the  legislative history's embrace of fees for satellites
"directly  licensed by the Commission under Title III" seems reason-


Even if we take the 1991 House report as gospel, the key  passage seems
most plausibly to leave Comsat subject to fees  for the regulatory
activity that it generates, and to exempt 


only organizations like Intelsat and Inmarsat themselves.  Both
organizations are covered by the International Organi- zations
Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. s 288 et seq., and their  exemption would be
consistent with the many privileges,  exemptions, and immunities such
organizations enjoy. See,  e.g., 22 U.S.C. s 288a(d) ("Insofar as
concerns customs duties  and internal-revenue taxes imposed upon or by
reason of  importation, and the procedures in connection therewith;
the  registration of foreign agents; and the treatment of official 
communications, the privileges, exemptions, and immunities  to which
international organizations shall be entitled shall be  those accorded
under similar circumstances to foreign gov- ernments."). Comsat, on
the other hand, has no claim to such  privileges.


Given the ambiguity of the legislative history, and more  importantly
the absence of any clear exemption in the statute,  the FCC was
mistaken in its conclusion that the statute  compelled an exemption
for Comsat. Neither the statute nor  its legislative history speaks
precisely to an exemption for  Comsat. Perhaps there is some ambiguity
in the coverage of  the "space station" category in s 9, such that the
Commission  might "permissibly" read the statute as allowing a Comsat 
exemption. But the FCC reached its conclusion via a plain  misreading
of the statute, finding exemption compelled. "An  agency action,
however permissible as an exercise of discre- tion, cannot be
sustained 'where it is based not on the  agency's own judgment but on
an erroneous view of the  law.' " Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department
of Transporta- tion, 137 F.3d 640, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Prill
v.  NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). We accordingly  grant
the petition and remand the case to the Commission for 
reconsideration of Comsat's exemption from the s 9 space  station


Non-common Carrier International Circuits


PanAmSat's second challenge is to the FCC's assessment  of fees on
PanAmSat for "international circuits." The statute 


explicitly covers such circuits. 47 U.S.C. s 159(g) (Schedule  of
Regulatory Fees, Common Carrier Bureau). Until 1997  the FCC collected
such fees only from common carriers,  leaving PanAmSat off the hook.
But in 1997 it extended the  fees to non-common carriers. See 1997
Order, 12 FCC Rcd  at 17188. This assessment persists in the 1998


Responding to the Commission's invocation of the time bar  implicit in
the 60-day limit of 28 U.S.C. s 2344, PanAmSat  argues that the
Commission itself reopened the issue in 1998,  by responding in detail
to comments and by not relying on its  prior resolution of the issue.
We agree.


The controlling principle is that if an agency's response to  comments
"explicitly or implicitly shows that the agency  actually reconsidered
the rule, the matter has been reopened  and the time period for
seeking judicial review begins anew."  National Ass'n of Reversionary
Property Owners, 158 F.3d  at 141; see also Public Citizen, 901 F.2d
at 150.


Here we find that the FCC did reconsider the issue in  adopting the
final rule, and did not expressly reaffirm its  prior position as if
the matter were settled in 1997. Both  findings are important. First,
the 1998 Order states that "we  [the FCC] proposed [in the NPRM] to
again assess the  bearer circuit fee." 1998 Order, 13 FCC Rcd at
19837. The  Order then devotes five paragraphs to defending the fee 
against the various comments that were made, including  PanAmSat's,
and concludes by stating "we continue to believe  that our regulation
of these entities has sufficiently changed  so that it is now
appropriate for them to contribute to the  recovery of Commission
costs through payment of the bearer  circuit fee." Id. at 19839.


Moreover, the FCC did not suggest in 1998 that it had  settled the
matter conclusively in 1997. In a sense, then, the  Commission's
characterization of the petition for review as  untimely invokes
reasoning that it failed to make in its 


response to comments. We do not ordinarily consider agency  reasoning
that "appears nowhere in the [agency's] order."  Graceba Total
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 115 F.3d 1038,  1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332  U.S. 194, 196 (1947). Our
reopening analysis does not create  a disincentive to an agency's
responding to the substance of a  renewed attack on a rule: without
risking loss of the benefits  of the 60-day rule, the Commission could
have first relied on  the fact that the matter was settled in 1997,
and then  discussed the continued justification of the fee. But it
opted  only for the latter, and in a manner that reasonably reads as 
a reopening. PanAmSat's claim is therefore not time-barred.


The attack on the "international circuits" assessment has  two
elements. First, PanAmSat says that the "international  circuit"
category as created by Congress applies only to  common carriers,
which PanAmSat is not. Second, if the  FCC has amended the fee
schedule (which must be true if the  first argument is sound), then it
must justify the change on  the basis of "changes in the nature of its
services as a  consequence of Commission rulemaking proceedings or 
changes in law," 47 U.S.C. s 159(b)(3); see also Comsat, 114  F.2d at
227, which PanAmSat says the Commission has failed  to do. We need not
consider the first challenge: assuming in  PanAmSat's favor that the
"international circuit" category  originally excluded non-common
carriers, we find that the  Commission's decision to include
non-common carriers is jus- tifiable on the basis of changes in the
Commission's services  that flow from earlier rulemakings.


PanAmSat does not deny that regulatory changes have  occurred in the
services non-common carriers may offer. The  most noteworthy
development was progressive relaxation of a  prior ban on
interconnection between non-common carriers  and the public switched
telephone network. The Commission  invoked this and other rulemaking
changes in justifying the  new fee assessment in its 1997 Order and
represented that  "the steady expansion of services offered by the
non-common  carrier satellite operators has greatly increased the need


our oversight of their commercial activities and imposed a  greater
burden on [Commission] staff and other resources."  1997 Order, 12 FCC
Rcd at 17189 & nn.30-32 (citing other  rulemakings). The Commission
reiterated this rationale in  the 1998 Order, and noted that
"Commission staff [have] also  spent considerable time representing
non-[common] carrier  satellite operators in international forums,"
which corre- sponds directly with one of the purposes of the
regulatory  fees, the recovery of costs for "international
activities." 1998  Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 19839; 47 U.S.C. s


PanAmSat concedes that such changes may have "argu- ably" increased the
Commission's oversight responsibilities,  but says that the increased
costs to the FCC have not been  enough to justify the fee changes, and
that the fees from the  common carriers suffice to cover costs.
Another theme from  PanAmSat is that deregulation (which has
admittedly oc- curred) does not logically entail an increase in
regulatory  costs for the Commission. The Commission's response is
that  deregulation has indeed entailed greater regulatory costs.


This response, that deregulation has made the Commission  busier than
ever, might at first glance seem worthy of Sir  Humphrey Appleby, hero
of the comedy "Yes Minister":  "Naturally, as an experienced civil
servant, a proposal to  reduce and simplify the administration of
government con- jured up in Humphrey's mind a picture of a large
intake of  new staff specifically to deal with the reductions."
Jonathan  Lynn and Antony Jay, eds., The Complete Yes Minister 113 
(1987). But it is not difficult to imagine deregulatory scenar- ios
that would in fact place greater burdens on the regulator.  A
deregulatory change that generates significant growth in  both the
number of providers and the array of satellite  services they may
offer (which are activities to be overseen by  the agency), may
decrease regulation per provider or per unit  of activity and yet
sharply increase total regulatory action.  Given PanAmSat's grudging
concession that the Commis- sion's oversight responsibilities have
"arguably" increased  and no evidence that the Commission has been
deceitful about  its burdens, we find that the Commission has


pointed to regulatory changes and to apparently contributory  changes
in law. See Comsat, 114 F.3d at 227-28.


* * *


We grant the petition in part, remanding the case to the  Commission
for reconsideration of Comsat's exemption from  s 9 space station
fees. We deny the petition with respect to  the assessment of
international circuit fees on PanAmSat.


So ordered.