UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


UNITED STATES

v.

WILLIAMS, KEVIN C.


98-3083a

D.C. Cir. 1999


*	*	*


Tatel, Circuit Judge: In Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct.  1215
(1999), the Supreme Court held that a factor that  increases a
defendant's sentence under the federal carjacking  statute is an
element of the crime that the jury must find  beyond a reasonable
doubt, rather than a sentencing factor to  be decided by the
sentencing judge. In this case, a jury  convicted Appellant of
possessing a detectable amount of  cocaine base with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.  s 841. Appellant argues that
Jones requires us to reverse  the district court's ruling that the
quantity of drugs he  possessed is a sentencing factor, not an element
of the  offense. Concluding that Jones' effect on section 841 is not 
sufficiently clear to permit a panel of this court to reconsider  our
precedent holding that quantity is a sentencing factor, not  an
element of the offense, and finding Appellant's other  claims without


I


Section 841(a) makes it unlawful for any person to possess  with intent
to distribute a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C.  s 841(a)(1).
Subsection (b)(1) of section 841 specifies differ- ent penalties
depending on the amount and type of controlled  substance at issue:
ten years to life for fifty grams or more of  crack; five to forty
years for five grams or more of crack;  and up to twenty years for
less than five grams of crack.


The difference in the amount of drugs attributed to Appel- lant, Kevin
Williams, at different stages of his prosecution  forms the basis of
his Jones argument. The grand jury  indicted him for possessing with
intent to distribute fifty  grams or more of cocaine base. The jury
was instructed that  it could convict if it found he possessed with
intent to  distribute a detectable or measurable amount. The district 
court found that he possessed sixty-six grams and imposed a  sentence
of ten years under the Sentencing Guidelines. Rely- ing on Jones,
Williams argues that quantity is an element of a  section 841 offense
and that because the jury was instructed 


that it could convict him if it found that he possessed a  "detectable"
or "measurable" amount of cocaine base, the  district court erred by
imposing a penalty for possessing  more than fifty grams.


Before considering Williams' Jones argument, we must first  address the
Government's contention that we need not reach  the issue at all.
Specifically, the Government claims that  Williams failed to preserve
the issue for appeal because he  never presented it to the district
court. We disagree. Fol- lowing the close of evidence, Williams moved
for judgment of  acquittal, expressly arguing that quantity is an
element of the  offense and that the Government had failed to prove
that the  quantity of drugs at issue exceeded fifty grams. Denying the
 motion, the district court ruled that quantity "is not an  essential
element ... of the offense charged under our case  law." After
addressing several other issues, the district court  reiterated that
quantity is not an element of a section 841  offense. To be sure,
defense counsel lodged no objection to  the district court's
"detectable amount" jury instructions.  But having had his argument
that quantity is an element of  the offense twice rejected by the
district court, Williams had  no obligation to go through the futile
exercise of interposing  the same objection to the jury


The Government urges us not to reach Williams' argument  for a second
reason. It claims that even if Williams were  correct that quantity is
an element of a section 841 offense,  his sentence would not be
affected because, as calculated by  the district court under the
Sentencing Guidelines, it fell well  below section 841's twenty-year
maximum for defendants who  (like Williams) are convicted of
possessing a detectable or  measurable amount of crack. See 21 U.S.C.
s 841(b)(1)(C).  Under these circumstances, the Government argues, the
Su- preme Court's recent decision in Edwards v. United States,  523
U.S. 511 (1998), bars us from addressing Williams' argu- ment. Again,


In Edwards, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to  possess
with intent to distribute cocaine or crack. 523 U.S. at  513. Applying
the Sentencing Guidelines, the district judge 


calculated defendants' sentences based on his finding that the  illegal
conduct involved both cocaine and crack. Defendants  argued that
because the jury had convicted them of partici- pating in a cocaine or
crack conspiracy, the district judge  erred by sentencing them for
crack-related conduct rather  than for a cocaine-only conspiracy. The
Court declined to  reach the merits of this argument since, even were
it correct,  their sentences would not have been affected. This was so
 because the Sentencing Guidelines permitted the district  judge to
consider crack-related conduct in calculating defen- dants' sentences
regardless of whether the jury found a  cocaine-only conspiracy or a
crack and cocaine conspiracy,  and defendants' sentences were shorter
than the statutory  maximum for cocaine-only conspiracies. Id. at


In this case, the Government's entire Edwards argument is  set forth in
two rather cryptic sentences: "[A]ppellant could  have received a
maximum sentence of 20 years even if no  specific quantity of crack
had been proven. His ten year  sentence was well below that maximum,
and, here, as in  Edwards, the constitutional issue is not even
presented."  The Government apparently is arguing that regardless of 
whether Williams is correct that quantity is an element of a  section
841 offense, the district judge would retain authority  to determine
quantity under the Sentencing Guidelines, and  since Williams'
Guidelines sentence was less than the statuto- ry maximum for
possession with intent to distribute a detect- able or measurable
amount of crack, we have no reason to  reach the merits of his


The Government's argument rests on the assumption that  under Edwards a
defendant can show he was harmed only if  his sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum that would have  been applicable absent the alleged
error. But Edwards itself  recognized another way defendants could
establish harm: by  showing that the crack-related conduct was not
part of the  same course of conduct as the cocaine-only conspiracy
found  by the jury. 523 U.S. at 515-16. Identifying still a third 
type of harm, the defendants in Edwards argued that "the  judge might
have made different factual findings" if he had  accepted their
argument as correct. The Court never 


reached this latter argument, however, because defendants  "seem to
have raised their entire [cocaine-only conspiracy]  argument for the
first time in the Court of Appeals." Id.  Not so here. Williams
expressly argued in the district court  that quantity is an element of
the offense to be decided by the  jury. See supra at 3. If Williams
turns out to be correct, the  jury's finding that he possessed a
"detectable" amount might  very well have influenced the district
court's quantity deter- mination under the Guidelines, possibly
resulting in a shorter  sentence. Because Edwards never addressed this
situation,  we do not think it bars our consideration of Williams'
argu- ment. We thus save for another day (when the matter is  fully
briefed) consideration of Edwards' precise scope and  turn to the


II


Announced in the final days of the Supreme Court's most  recent term,
Jones considered whether a factor that substan- tially increases a
defendant's sentence under the federal  carjacking statute is an
element of the offense or a matter to  be decided by the district
court at sentencing. As the Court  pointed out, this seemingly
semantic distinction has enormous  practical significance. "[E]lements
must be charged in the  indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by
the Govern- ment beyond a reasonable doubt." 119 S. Ct. at 1219. Sen-
tencing factors may be determined by the district court.


The statute at issue in Jones provided:


Whoever ... takes a motor vehicle that has been trans- ported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign  commerce from the person or
presence of another by  force and violence or by intimidation, or
attempts to do  so, shall--


(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more  than 15 years, or
both,


(2) if serious bodily injury ... results, be fined under  this title or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or  both, and


(3) if death results, be fined under this title or impris- oned for any
number of years up to life, or both.


18 U.S.C. s 2119 (1992). After a jury convicted Jones of  carjacking,
the district court found that serious bodily injury  had occurred and
imposed a longer sentence based on that  finding. On appeal, Jones
argued that "serious bodily injury"  was an element of the crime that
had to be submitted to the  jury. According to the Government, the
statute created a  single offense--carjacking--and "serious bodily
injury" was a  sentencing factor for the judge, not the jury.


The Supreme Court agreed with Jones. Analyzing the  structure of the
statute and considering that serious bodily  injury has historically
been considered an element of a crime,  the Court read the statute to
create three separate offenses:  carjacking with no aggravating
factors (maximum penalty of  fifteen years); carjacking resulting in
serious bodily injury  (maximum penalty of twenty-five years); and
carjacking re- sulting in death (maximum penalty of life
imprisonment).  Serious bodily injury, the Court ruled, is an element
of the  offense, meaning that the higher penalty for a carjacking 
offense involving serious bodily injury may be imposed only if  the
indictment alleges such injury and the jury finds it  beyond a


Characterizing its interpretation as the "fairest" reading of  the
statute, the Court nonetheless "recognize[d] the possibili- ty of the
other view"--i.e., interpreting the statute to make  serious bodily
injury a sentencing factor. 119 S. Ct. at 1222.  But adopting that
"other view," the Court said, would have  required it to address a
"serious constitutional question[ ] on  which precedent is not
dispositive," a question the Court  described as follows: "when a jury
determination has not  been waived, may judicial factfinding by a
preponderance  support the application of a provision that increases
the  potential severity of the penalty for a variant of a given 
crime?" Id. at 1228, 1224. Faced with interpreting a statute 
"susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and  doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of  which such
questions are avoided," the Court found that it 


had a "duty" to adopt the latter construction. Id. at 1222  (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).


Jones has thus far been applied by two of our sister  circuits. In
United States v. Davis, the Fourth Circuit faced  a Jones challenge to
a South Carolina law that increased the  maximum penalty for failing
to stop when signaled by a police  officer if serious bodily injury
occurred. 184 F.3d 366 (4th  Cir. 1999). The court held that serious
bodily injury is an  element of the offense because any other
interpretation of the  statute would present the constitutional
question posed in  Jones. Id. at 368-72. In United States v. NuNez,
the Fifth  Circuit held that Jones "foreclose[d]" the Government's
argu- ment that use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, which raised  the
maximum penalty for the offense of forcibly resisting a  federal
officer from three to ten years, was a mere penalty  provision. 180
F.3d 227, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1999).


Like the penalty provisions at issue in Jones, Davis, and  NuNez,
section 841 penalties vary depending upon the circum- stances of the
offense. Subsection (a)(1) provides that "it  shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally  ... [to] possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or  dispense, a controlled substance."
Subsection (b) provides  that "any person who violates subsection (a)
of this section  shall be sentenced ..." and goes on to set forth a
wide range  of penalties depending on the quantity and type of drug 
involved as well as other aggravating factors, such as serious  bodily
injury and recidivism. Quantity significantly affects  the severity of
the penalty. Defendants convicted of possess- ing with intent to
distribute fifty grams or more of crack face  ten years to life, while
those convicted of possessing fewer  than five grams face a maximum of


Williams argues that because quantity so dramatically af- fects the
severity of section 841 penalties, allowing the judge  to determine
quantity implicates the unsettled constitutional  issue identified in
Jones. Therefore, he argues, we must  consider whether the statute is
susceptible to an alternative  construction that would make quantity
an element of the 


offense. The Government responds that, unlike the carjack- ing statute,
section 841 unambiguously makes quantity a  sentencing factor and
that, so read, the statute presents no  serious constitutional


Were we writing on a clean slate, Jones would require us to  resolve
this issue by asking whether treating quantity as a  sentencing factor
raises "grave and doubtful constitutional  questions," and if so,
whether section 841 can be interpreted  to make quantity an element of
the crime. But our slate is  not clean. Unlike the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits, which had  never interpreted the statutes challenged in
those cases, this  circuit did construe section 841 prior to Jones and
squarely  held that it makes quantity a sentencing factor, not an 
element of the offense. In United States v. Patrick, we noted  "that
the quantity of drug possessed is not a constituent  element of the
offense of possession with intent to distribute  under 21 U.S.C. s
841(a). Quantity is relevant only to pun- ishment; the district judge,
and not the jury, makes this  determination." 959 F.2d 991, 995-96 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1992)  (citations omitted). In United States v. Lam
Kwong-Wah,  we reiterated that we had "recently joined the majority of
 other circuits holding that the quantity of drugs involved in a 
conspiracy or distribution charge is not a basic element of the 
offense, but is rather a sentencing factor to be determined by  the
judge." 966 F.2d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citations  omitted). The
question, then, is whether Jones effectively  overrules, i.e.,
"eviscerate[s]," Patrick and Lam Kwong-Wah.  See Dellums v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,  863 F.2d 968, 978 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Silberman, J.). We  think it does not.


To begin with, Jones never squarely held that the carjack- ing statute
would have been unconstitutional had the Court  been unable to
interpret serious bodily injury as an element  of the crime. Jones
held only that the opposite reading-- treating serious bodily injury
as a sentencing factor--raised  sufficient constitutional doubt to
require the Court, if possi- ble, to interpret the statute as it did.
That the Supreme  Court had doubts about the constitutionality of the
carjacking  statute, doubts that it never had to resolve, is simply


a reed to permit a panel of this court to find similar doubts in  a
different statute and, based on those doubts, to depart from  circuit
precedent expressly interpreting the statute as making  quantity a
sentencing factor.


We are also reluctant to reexamine our precedent because  it is not at
all clear whether Jones applies broadly to all  criminal statutes or
is limited to the unique facts of that case.  Jones represents only
the latest in a series of seemingly  conflicting cases addressing the
sentencing factor versus ele- ment issue, and its attempt to
distinguish, explain, and recon- cile earlier cases leaves unresolved
several questions that lead  us to wonder about the precise scope of


The story begins with two cases that set forth the princi- ples
underpinning Jones. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),  held that
criminal defendants have a right to have the Gov- ernment prove each
element of a crime beyond a reasonable  doubt. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), held that  there are limitations on the state's power
to circumvent  Winship by redefining elements as sentencing factors.
"[I]f  Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as 
defined by state law," the Court reasoned, "a State could  undermine
many of the interests that decision sought to  protect.... It would
only be necessary to redefine the  elements that constitute different
crimes, characterizing them  as factors that bear solely on the extent
of punishment....  Winship is concerned with substance rather than
this kind of  formalism." Id. at 698-99.


Later cases retreated from the principle set forth in Mulla- ney. In
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), for  instance, the Court
held that a state could constitutionally  define visible possession of
a firearm, a fact that triggered a  mandatory minimum sentence for
certain enumerated of- fenses, as a sentencing factor to be determined
by the sen- tencing judge, rather than as an element of the offense.
The  Court noted that defendants' argument "would have at least  more
superficial appeal if [the judge's finding] exposed them  to greater
or additional punishment." Id. at 88. But on the  basis of the facts
presented, the Court concluded that because 


the statute "gives no impression of having been tailored to  permit the
[sentencing factor] finding to be a tail which wags  the dog of the
substantive offense," it raised no constitutional  issue. Id.


Building on McMillan, the Court held in Almendarez- Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), that an immigra- tion statute that
enhances the maximum penalty on the basis  of a judicial finding of
recidivism raised no constitutional  issues. This was especially so,
the Court reasoned, because  of the long tradition of treating
recidivism as a sentencing  factor. Id. at 243-44. According to the
Court, the only  difference between the case before it and McMillan
was that  the finding of recidivism under the immigration statute al-
tered the statutory maximum, while the finding of visible  possession
of a firearm affected the mandatory minimum.  Id. at 243. Observing
that mandatory minimums often affect  sentences more significantly
than statutory maximums, the  Court found this not to be a
"determinative difference"  between the two cases. Id. at 244-45.


While Jones draws on the principles set forth in Winship  and Mullaney,
it does not question the Court's later conclu- sion in cases like
McMillan and Almendarez-Torres that not  "every fact with a bearing on
sentencing must be found by a  jury...." Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 1226.
Jones even declares  that it "does not announce any new principle of
constitutional  law, but merely interprets a particular federal
statute in light  of a set of constitutional concerns that have
emerged through  a series of our decisions over the past quarter
century." Id.  at 1228 n.11. By framing the unresolved constitutional
issue  as whether "any fact (other than prior conviction) that in-
creases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in  an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a  reasonable
doubt," Jones leaves undisturbed the Court's pre- vious holdings as to
mandatory minimums (McMillan) and  recidivism (Almendarez-Torres). Id.


Yet we are not at all sure that federal courts should treat  as
"unresolved" the potential constitutional issue lurking in 


every sentence-enhancing statute except those involving in- creased
mandatory minimums and recidivism. For example,  if quantity (like
recidivism) has historically been treated as a  sentencing factor, is
the unresolved constitutional issue identi- fied in Jones still
implicated? Is it constitutionally significant  that in section 841,
quantity affects both mandatory mini- mums and maximums? Do section
841's penalty provisions,  which extend for pages, cover topics
ranging from death and  serious bodily injury to water pollution on
federal lands to  date rape, and significantly affect sentence
severity, suggest  that the sentencing tail may be wagging the section
841 dog?  See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. And, if so, is examining the 
relationship between a dog and its tail any longer relevant in  view
of the fact that Jones mentions neither?


These unanswered questions, together with the fact that  Jones never
ultimately resolved the constitutional doubts it  raised, convince us
that Jones falls far short of "eviscerating"  Patrick and Lam
Kwong-Wah. We therefore remain bound  by their holding that under
section 841 quantity is a sentenc- ing factor, not an element of the


This leaves one remaining issue. Williams argues that if  Patrick and
Lam Kwong-Wah are binding, then Jones ren- ders section 841
unconstitutional because the question of  quantity is left to the
sentencing judge. Since Williams failed  to challenge the
constitutionality of section 841 before the  district court, we review
for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim.  P. 52(b); Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997).  Williams must therefore establish
(1) that there is "error," (2)  that the error is "plain," and (3)
that the error "affect[s]  substantial rights." Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. at  467 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if
Williams can  establish all three may we exercise our discretion to
"notice a  forfeited error, but only if ... the error seriously
affect[s] the  fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceed- ings." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).


Williams falls far short of satisfying this very heavy bur- den. Even
with the benefit of Jones, it is hardly "plain" that  section 841 is
unconstitutional. As we indicated above, not 


only does Jones expressly declare that it "does not announce  any new
principle of constitutional law," but it is not at all  clear whether
Jones even applies to section 841. See supra  at 10-11. Under these
circumstances, we find no plain error.


III


Having concluded that in this circuit quantity remains a  sentencing
factor in a section 841 offense, we turn to  Williams' alternative
argument. He claims that the district  court never made a factual
determination that the amount of  drugs at issue was sixty-six grams
but instead erroneously  assumed that the jury had found that


Williams was arrested after police officers discovered him  with his
hand in a gym bag that turned out to contain crack  cocaine. The
investigator who field-tested the drugs, Officer  Ramadhan, testified
at trial that he tested a total of sixty-six  grams: twenty-two grams
in nine small clear plastic bags and  forty-four grams in two larger
bags. The two arresting  officers testified that when they arrested
Williams they found  two large chunks of crack cocaine. Neither
mentioned seeing  an additional nine plastic bags of drugs, although
one of the  arresting officers identified the contents of an envelope
that  contained the items tested by Officer Ramadhan, including  the
nine small bags, as the same items that had been seized  when Williams


Arguing that the arresting officers' testimony conflicted  with Officer
Ramadhan's, that this inconsistency fatally un- dermined the
Government's case, and that in any event there  was insufficient
evidence of possession to convict, Williams  moved for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the Govern- ment's case. Although the
district court acknowledged that  the testimony was potentially
conflicting, it found that "there  is certainly sufficient evidence as
to the chain of custody and  the type and quantity of drugs that were
seized," and, while  characterizing the Government's evidence of
possession as  "thin," it found sufficient evidence to submit the


At sentencing, defense counsel again pointed out the incon- sistency in
the testimony with respect to the twenty-two  grams, arguing that the
gym bag contained only forty-four  grams. The district court rejected
Williams' argument:


I am going to deny you any relief under the Sentencing  Guidelines as
to the issues about the difference in testi- mony of the police
officers.... And whether or not they  were in the possession of Mr.
Williams, that was an issue  for the jury as to their differences in
testimony and  whether they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Williams was in actual possession or construc- tive
possession of those drugs and the jury made that  determination.


Based upon all of the testimony after hearing, argu- ment of counsel on
each side, and experienced counsel  tried the case for Mr. Williams in
a good fashion trying  to point out these inconsistencies and the
failure of the  evidence. But that was a jury issue I believe and it 
doesn't affect the Court now under the Guidelines be- cause I will
accept the jury's finding he was in posses- sion knowingly of all of
those drugs, which adds up to  the 66 grams, instead of a lesser


Formally entering judgment against Williams, the district  court
adopted the factual findings in the presentence report.  According to
that report, a laboratory analysis of "the drugs  recovered from
defendant Williams determined same to be  66.49 grams of cocaine
base.... [T]he total amount of drugs  accountable to defendant
Williams is 66.49 grams of cocaine  base."


From this sequence of events, we think that the district  judge did
determine that Williams possessed sixty-six grams.  He said as much at
the sentencing hearing. He adopted the  factual findings of the
presentence report, which stated that  Williams was accountable for
sixty-six grams. And he sen- tenced Williams based on sixty-six


Williams interprets the district court's oral ruling, particu- larly
the last sentence, to mean that the court mistakenly  believed that
the jury had found that sixty-six grams of 


cocaine base were seized from the bag and that the court  based its
finding on that mistaken assumption. We disagree.  To begin with, it
defies logic that an experienced district  judge, having ruled that
quantity is not a matter for the jury  but is instead a question for
the court at sentencing, see  supra at 3, would then turn around and
impose sentence on  the basis of an assumption that the jury had
determined  quantity. Moreover, we read the district court's words
quite  differently than does Williams. From the district court's 
comments in ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal  and at
sentencing, it is clear that he thought the evidence that  Williams
possessed any drugs at all was thin. But once the  jury found that
Williams in fact possessed the drugs, the  district court concluded
that there was sufficient evidence to  attribute to Williams the
entire amount, "which adds up to  the 66 grams, instead of a lesser
amount." Read in this  context, the phrase "that was a jury issue I
believe and it  doesn't affect the Court now under the Guidelines"


IV


This brings us to Williams' final argument. He challenges  the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs  seized when he was
arrested.


Seven officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, exe- cuting a
search warrant obtained on the basis of an infor- mant's tip that guns
and crack were present in an apartment  at 1209 Valley Avenue in
Southeast Washington, entered the  apartment and found ammunition,
handgun magazines, mari- juana, and items often used in connection
with drug distribu- tion, including plastic bags, razor blades, and
scales. Finding  neither guns nor crack, they left. Speculating that
they may  have executed the warrant too early, five officers returned.
 When the door of the apartment was opened, they saw  Williams moving
away from them toward a back bedroom  with his right arm "tucked ...
close to his side.... like he  was carrying something." Although the
officers testified that  they could not see what Williams was
carrying, they said they  suspected he might have had a gun. The two


Williams into a back bedroom. Seeing Williams with his hand  in a gym
bag, the officers secured him and dumped the  contents of the bag. Out
fell two large chunks of crack.  Williams was arrested.


Denying Williams' motion to suppress, the district court  held that he
lacked standing to challenge the seizure because  he had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in either the  apartment or the bag and because
he had voluntarily aban- doned the drugs. Although Williams correctly
points out that  whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of
privacy  "is more properly placed within the purview of substantive 
Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing," Minne- sota v.
Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472 (1998) (internal quotation  marks and
citation omitted), he cannot escape the well- accepted rule that in
order to demonstrate that the search  violated his Fourth Amendment
rights he must establish that  he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area  searched. See id. Moreover, an individual who
abandons  property forfeits any reasonable expectation of privacy in
the  property. See United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845-46 


Williams neither challenges the district court's determina- tion that
he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the  area searched nor
argues that the district court erred in  finding that he abandoned the
drugs. Instead, he claims that  the "police discovered the bag only as
a result of the illegal  seizure of Mr. Williams' person." Because
Williams failed to  argue either that the allegedly illegal seizure
invalidated the  abandonment or that he had some sort of privacy
interest in  the bag and therefore did not abandon the drugs by
putting  them in the bag, however, his claim that the police illegally
 "seized his person" is irrelevant. We therefore find no basis  for
questioning the district court's denial of the motion to  suppress.


V


Williams' conviction and sentence are affirmed.


So ordered.