UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


KEEFE CO

v.

AMERICABLE INTL INC


98-7093a

D.C. Cir. 1999


*	*	*


Wald, Circuit Judge: The Keefe Co. ("Keefe"), a self- described
"governmental relations/public affairs firm," Joint  Appendix ("J.A.")
at 428, entered into a contract in 1985 with  Americable
International, Inc. ("Americable"), a Florida- based operator of cable
television facilities, to help America- ble break into the burgeoning
business of supplying cable  television to United States military
installations. Keefe  claims that in 1988, Americable stopped making
payments  due under the contract. Americable argues that the contract 
is void because it violates a statutory prohibition of contingent  fee
arrangements for the procurement of government ser- vices, and also,
that Keefe is barred from bringing this suit by  the District of
Columbia's three-year statute of limitations on  breach of contract
claims. On Americable's motion for sum- mary judgment, the district
court ruled that some of Keefe's  claims were not time-barred, but
granted summary judgment  to Americable on the grounds that the
contract violated the  statute. For the reasons stated below, we
disagree that the  contract is invalid as a matter of law, and certify
the statute  of limitations issue to the District of Columbia Court of


I.


In a letter agreement executed by Keefe and Americable  on September 4,
1986,1 Keefe agreed to provide Americable  with "consulting, advisory,
liaison, marketing, negotiating and  related services which may be
required in obtaining contracts  to install cable television (CATV)
service systems to United  States Government installations both in the
United States and  abroad." J.A. at 8. Paragraph 4 of the letter
agreement  states in relevant part:


In the event that [Americable is] awarded a contract to  install a CATV
system on a U.S. Government installation 




__________

n 1 The first agreement between the parties was executed on  September
24, 1985. We will refer only to the more recent agree- ment, which
does not materially differ from the earlier one.


after the date of this agreement, The Keefe Company  shall be entitled
to receive fees as follows:


(A) The Keefe Company shall be paid a one-time fee of  $10.00 for each
"home passed." "Home" means a single- family residence. BOQ's,
barracks, multi-family residen- tial buildings and the like shall be
considered as one  home.... 


(B) The Keefe Company shall receive 3% of the gross  monthly subscriber
revenues received by the system  from and after 90 days after
initiation of service. Such  payment shall be made once a month on the
first of the  month and shall continue until sale of the system. In 
the event the Government Installation is closed or [Am- ericable]
ceases to provide services to said Government  Installation
[Americable's] obligation to pay The Keefe  Company shall cease.
Termination of this agreement as  hereinafter provided shall not
affect The Keefe Company  [sic] right to said fee or [Americable's]
obligation to pay  the same on bases where a service agreement has
been  executed and a CATV system has been constructed by 


J.A. at 9. In addition, if Americable sold a cable system,  Keefe was
to receive 2 percent of the gross sale price. Keefe  also agreed not
to represent any other cable company while  working for Americable.


Keefe alleges that in 1988, Americable stopped making  payments under
paragraphs 4(A) and 4(B) of the letter  agreement. Americable's
version is that the relationship  "soured." J.A. at 411 (Defendant's
Statement of Material  Facts Not in Dispute). Americable now argues
that the  entire contract is void because it violates the law against 
contingent fee arrangements for the procurement of govern- ment
services. That law, 41 U.S.C. s 254(a), provides that:


Every contract ... shall contain a suitable warranty, as  determined by
the agency head, by the contractor that  no person or selling agency
has been employed or re- tained to solicit to secure such contract
upon an agree- ment or understanding for a commission, percentage, 


brokerage, or contingent fee, excepting ... bona fide  established
commercial or selling agencies maintained by  the contractor for the
purpose of securing business, for  the breach or violation of which
the Government shall  have the right to annul such contract without
liability or  in its discretion to deduct from the contract price the
full  amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or  contingent


As we have previously held, "[a] compensation contract in  violation of
the required warranty will not be enforced by the  courts." Le John
Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir.  1955) (violation of
materially identical warranty previously  required by executive
order); accord Quinn v. Gulf & West- ern Corp., 644 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.


Keefe argues that it falls within the "bona fide agency"  exception to
the warranty requirement. The applicable Fed- eral Acquisition
Regulations define "bona fide agency" as "an  established commercial
... agency, maintained by a contrac- tor for the purpose of securing
business, that neither exerts  nor proposes to exert improper
influence to solicit or obtain  Government contracts nor holds itself
out as being able to  obtain any Government contract or contracts
through improp- er influence." 48 C.F.R. s 3.401 (1986).2 "Improper
influ- ence" is defined as "any influence that induces or tends to 
induce a Government employee or officer to give consider- ation or to
act regarding a Government contract on any basis  other than the
merits of the matter." Id. Finally, the  following guidelines
"describe circumstances ordinarily exist- ing in acceptable
arrangements in which the agency is bona  fide ...":


(1) The fee should not be inequitable or exorbitant  when compared to
the services performed or to custom-




__________

n 2 Although these are the primary governing regulations, the  parties
also cite other subparts of the Code of Federal Regulations  that are
identical to 48 C.F.R. ss 3.400-3.410, see, e.g., 48 C.F.R.  s
52.203-5 (1984), cited in Keefe's Brief (K. Br.) at 15. For the  sake
of consistency we refer to subpart 3.4 throughout our opinion.


ary fees for similar services related to commercial busi- ness.


(2) The agency should have adequate knowledge of the  contractor's
product and business, as well as other quali- fications necessary to
sell the products or services on  their merits.


(3) The contractor and the agency should have a con- tinuing
relationship or, in newly established relation- ships, should
contemplate future continuity.


(4) The agency should be an established concern that  has existed for a
considerable period, or be a newly  established going concern likely
to continue in the future.  The business of the agency should be
conducted in the  agency name and characterized by the customary
indicia  of the conduct of regular business.


(5) While an agency that confines its selling activities  to Government
contracts is not disqualified, the fact that  an agency represents the
contractor in Government and  commercial sales should receive
favorable consideration.


Id. s 3.408-2(c).


The district court rejected the notion that Keefe qualified  as a bona
fide agency. The court applied a two-part test:  first, the court held
that there is a "threshold requirement  that an entity not use
improper influence"; and second, that  the federal regulations
establish additional criteria for evalu- ating the applicability of
the bona fide agency exception.  Keefe Co. v. Americable Int'l, Inc.,
Civ. No. 94-1568, at 5  (D.D.C. May 11, 1998). The court awarded
summary judg- ment to Americable because Keefe failed the threshold
test.  "Principally, it is Keefe's efforts at using congressional con-
tacts to advance Americable's business that steer the Court to  this
conclusion," the district court found. "Keefe arranged to  have two
congressmen--in their capacities as members of the  House
Appropriations Committee on Military Construction-- write letters
lauding Americable to the commanders of bases  that Americable wished
to service. These letters were sent  during the procurement process


that the bases hire Americable based on reasons other than  the merits
of their work." Id. at 6-7.


The district court was referring to identical letters jointly  signed
by Reps. Vic Fazio and Bill Lowery and addressed to  commanders of
naval bases in California (three of these  letters appear in the
record). J.A. at 305-07. Each letter  began by explaining that the
congressmen were writing about  requests for proposals (RFPs) that had
recently been issued  for interactive-capable CATV services at the
naval bases.  The letters continued:


As Members of the House Appropriations Subcommit- tee on Military
Construction we are particularly con- cerned about quality of life
programs for servicemen and  women and their families. We are pleased
therefore that  the Navy is pursuing the installation of cable TV at
this  base. Given the expanded viewing opportunities that  cable
afford the subscribers, we feel that this will be of  great benefit to
those who live and work on Navy facili- ties.


In view of the scope of this RFP, we wanted to let you  know that one
of the firms which has submitted a  proposal, Americable
International, Inc. has earned an  excellent reputation for the
service it provides at other  military bases throughout the country.
This company  which has been awarded contracts at Vanderberg [sic] 
AFB, Homestead AFB, Roosevelt Roads Naval Station  and all five Navy
bases in San Diego[3], provides state-of- the-art equipment and the
type of organization needed to  provide quality service for military
personnel and their  families.


We share your desire to provide our service families  with a top notch
cable system at the lowest possible  price. Thus, we hope that you
will give the Americable  proposal every consideration.




__________

n 3 The congressmen sent their first letter to the naval commander  in
San Diego. Americable was eventually awarded the contract for  the San
Diego installations, and this fact appeared in the two  subsequent
letters that appear in the record. J.A. at 306, 307.


J.A. at 305 (letter to Captain J.W. Cook, Navy Public  Works Center,
August 26, 1986). Other letters, which were  not discussed by the
district court but appear in the record,  provide further detail of
Keefe's contacts with politicians on  behalf of Americable. Most of
these contacts seem to have  been initiated by Eli Feinberg, a Florida
consultant who  introduced Americable's chairman, Charles Hermanowski,
to  Keefe officers, and who entered into a contract with Keefe to 
help in its representation of Americable. See J.A. at 33. In  May
1986, Feinberg sent a note to Rep. William M. Lehman,  the congressman
for Americable's district. Feinberg wrote,  "It was good talking to
you today and I hope this note finds  you and Joan in the best of
health," and he then mentioned  that Americable was vying for the
cable franchise at the  McClellan Air Force Base in California.
Feinberg asked  Rep. Lehman if he would ask Rep. Fazio, whose district
 included McClellan, "to put in a good word for Ameri-Cable 
International [sic], as your constituent, with the Base Com- mander."
J.A. at 304. In addition, three letters appear in  the record that
were sent to Feinberg: one from Rep. Dante  Fascell of Florida, one
from Sen. Lawton Chiles' administra- tive assistant, and one from Sen.
Chiles. J.A. at 308, 309,  311. The letters address the fact that
Feinberg had contact- ed Fascell's and Chiles' offices regarding
Americable's protest  of a contract that was awarded to another cable
provider at  the Guantanamo Naval Station. It appears from these
letters  that Rep. Fascell and Sen. Chiles agreed to contact, and did 
contact, the General Accounting Office (GAO) regarding Am- ericable's
protest. See also J.A. at 310, 312 (letters from  GAO to Rep. Fascell


Americable argues that this series of correspondence, as  the district
court concluded, "can be read to suggest" that  Keefe improperly tried
to use its political connections so "that  the bases [would] hire
Americable based on reasons other  than the merits of [Americable's]
work." "Most importantly,  the district court relied on the
uncontradicted fact that Keefe  invited the intervention of
influential Congressmen into the  procurement process. That fact is
sufficient to trigger the  contingent-fee prohibition...."


at 14. In addition to letters from politicians, Americable  points to
testimony in the record showing that Keefe met  with the staff of Sen.
Murkowski regarding Alaska military  installations and used a personal
connection to gather infor- mation about cable outlets at Nellis Air
Force Base near Las  Vegas. Am. Br. at 8-9.


We disagree that this evidence is sufficient to support  summary
judgment on Americable's argument that Keefe  intended to "induce a
Government employee or officer to give  consideration or to act
regarding a Government contract on  any basis other than the merits of
the matter." 48 C.F.R.  s 3.401. "A court may dispose of a case on
summary judg- ment before trial only where there is no genuine issue
as to  any material fact." Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d 1463, 
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "The  standard
test for summary judgment is 'whether a fair- minded jury could return
a verdict for the [nonmovant] on the  evidence presented.' " Id.
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lob- by, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)).
Where more than one  plausible inference can be drawn from the
undisputed facts,  summary judgment is not appropriate. See United
States v.  Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995). However, if  "
'[u]ndisputed facts ... point unerringly to a single, inevit- able
conclusion,' " summary judgment would be warranted.  Id. (quoting In
re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1994)).  Finally, "[i]n
reviewing a district court's decision on a sum- mary judgment motion,
our role is" the same as the trial  court's. Shields, 895 F.2d at


As this case is an appeal from a grant of summary judg- ment to
Americable, in order to sustain that judgment we  must conclude that
Americable has succeeded in showing that  an inference of improper
influence is the only reasonable one  to be drawn from this set of
circumstances. We cannot so  conclude. Even if, as the trial judge
found, the letters from  Reps. Fazio and Lowery "can be read" to
suggest that Keefe  intended to exercise "improper influence," it is
just as plausi- ble that the letters "can be read" to suggest that
Keefe  merely used its knowledge of the political process to press 
Americable's case "on the merits." The letters from Reps. 


Fazio and Lowery, as well as Feinberg's letter to Rep.  Lehman, all
focus (at least in part) on Americable's qualifica- tions to provide
cable service at military bases. The letters  from the GAO to Rep.
Fascell and Sen. Chiles acknowledge  the lawmakers' interest in
Americable's bid protest but no- where suggest the use of any improper
pressure to resolve  the protest in a certain way.4 It is true, as the
district court  noted, that Keefe cannot win its case by resting on
the  absence of evidence that it actually exerted improper influ-
ence. Rather, the definition of "improper influence" in the 
regulations requires us to look to the tendency of America- ble's and
Keefe's contractual relationship, as well as the  tendency of Keefe's
business practices, to germinate improper  influence. See 48 C.F.R. s
3.401. Even so, we do not find  that the contract and Keefe's
activities on behalf of America- ble give rise to only one reasonable
inference--that Keefe  "propose[d] to exert improper influence to
solicit or obtain  Government contracts." Id.


Although the district court did not reach the second part of  its test
for the bona fide agency exception, applying the  factors listed in
the FARs, we note that Americable does not  argue that Keefe's fees
were "inequitable or exorbitant," id.  s 3.408(c)(1); or that
Americable and Keefe did not contem- plate a "continuing
relationship," id. s 3.408(c)(3); or that  Keefe is not an
"established concern that has existed for a  considerable period," id.
s 3.408(c)(4). Instead, Americable  argues that Keefe did not have
adequate knowledge of the  cable industry, id. s 3.408(c)(2), and that
Keefe's only mission  was to sell Americable to the government, id. s
3.408(c)(5).  Americable folds these two arguments into one general
objec- tion: that Keefe's supposed lack of regular and specified 
duties shows that it was hired to curry influence with public 
officials, and not for its expertise in the cable industry and  with
business contracts. But as the Second Circuit observed  in Puma
Industrial Consulting, Inc. v. Daal Assoc. Inc., 808  F.2d 982 (2d




__________

n 4 We assume, without deciding, that Feinberg's letters are attrib-
utable to Americable.


these enumerated factors can be meaningful only in light of  the
policies underlying s 254(a). The purpose of this warran- ty
requirement is to 'protect government agencies against  corrupting
influences.' " 808 F.2d at 985 (quoting Mitchell v.  Flintkote Co.,
185 F.2d 1008, 1010 (2d Cir. 1951)). Applying  the FAR factors to a
case much like the one at bar, the  Second Circuit in Puma upheld a
district court judgment in a  consulting firm's favor. The court found
that the bona fide  agency exception applied to a firm whose business
was assist- ing small companies in obtaining government contracts and 
who had helped a textile wholesaler obtain government busi- ness by,
among other things, gathering information on bid  proposals. "Puma is
in the business of assisting small busi- nesses in procuring contracts
with the government and other  agencies. There is not even a hint of
the selling of govern- mental influence." Id. We think many of the
same consider- ations apply here.


Americable argues, however, that the regulations should be  read
restrictively to permit contingent fee contracts to pro- cure
government services only when the performing party fits  "into the
narrow category reserved for technical and adminis- trative experts,"
Am. Br. at 25, because that is what the  common law presumption
against contingent fee arrange- ments required. Even if that were what
the common law  required--and we are not at all sure it was so
confined, see  generally Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United States,
347  F.2d 538, 548-550 & n.11 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (common law adopted 
totality of the circumstances approach to evaluating the chal- lenged
relationship), Le John, 222 F.2d at 51 (restrictive  approach of the
common law nonetheless involves evaluating  totality of the
circumstances)--we find no support for this  view in the statute or


We therefore conclude that the district court erred in  granting
summary judgment to Americable on the ground  that--as a matter of
law--its contract with Keefe violated the  statute against contingent
fee contracts for obtaining govern- ment services.


II.


Having decided that this case is not fit for summary  judgment on the
question of whether the contract violates  public policy, we are still
faced with another potentially  determinative issue: whether all of
Keefe's contract claims  are barred by the District of Columbia's
three-year statute of  limitations on contract claims. See D.C. Code s
12-301(7).  Keefe claims that Americable breached paragraph 4(A) of
the  September 4, 1986 letter agreement when Americable failed  to pay
Keefe the "one-time fee of $10.00 for each home  passed"--that is,
$10.00 for each military base resident con- nected to cable on all
contracts Americable obtained at Unit- ed States military
installations--resulting in unpaid fees of  $395,000. Complaint
("Compl.") %57 4. Keefe also claims that  Americable breached
paragraph 4(B) of the letter agreement,  in which Americable had
agreed to pay Keefe a monthly fee  of 3 percent of the gross monthly
subscriber revenues earned  by Americable on the military contracts
until the sale of the  cable system, amounting to $870,000 in unpaid
fees. Id.  Keefe alleges that Americable stopped making payments to 
Keefe under both paragraphs some time in 1988; Americable  avers that
the "Keefe-Americable relationship soured in mid- to late-1987." J.A.
at 411 (Defendant's Statement of Material  Facts Not in Dispute).5


Americable argues that the three-year statute of limitations  has run
on all of Keefe's claims because Keefe did not file suit  to recover
the one-time fees and the subscriber revenue fees  within three years
of the date the payments ended in 1988.  Keefe responds that the
contract should be viewed as one for  installment payments. The law
governing installment pay-




__________

n 5 Neither party provides details of this alleged termination.  There
is a vague allusion in the record to an instance in which  Hermanowski
communicated to Keefe that Americable was termi- nating the contract.
See J.A. at 183 (testimony of Richard D.  Shelby, former senior vice
president of Keefe); J.A. at 592 (testimo- ny of Eli M. Feinberg,
Florida lobbyist who assisted Keefe). But  neither party raised this
information before the district court, nor is  it discussed in this
appeal. We will therefore treat it as immaterial.


ments is that "the Statute of Limitations begins to run on  each
instalment [sic] when it becomes due and payable....  This is also
true where a monetary obligation is payable in  instalments." 18
Samuel Williston & Walter H.E. Jaeger, A  Treatise on the Law of
Contracts s 2926(C) (3d ed. 1978).  Thus, Keefe, argues, it should be
able to recover for all  payments due within three years of the time
it filed suit. The  district court agreed with Americable that Keefe
was time- barred from bringing suit on Americable's failure to make
the  "one-time fee" payments because, by their nature, one-time  fees
are not "installments"--they are due and owing only  once--and these
fees were due and owing six years before  Keefe filed suit.6 But the
court also held that Keefe was not  time-barred from bringing suit on
the unpaid monthly sub- scriber fees because such fees were payable in
installments.  Americable appeals the latter ruling, arguing that its
alleged  failure to pay fees beginning in 1988 constituted a complete 
"termination" of the contract, thus triggering a single limita- tions
period that ran from the date of termination.


We find there is no clear precedent in the decisions of the  District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. We therefore certify  the following
question of law to the District of Columbia  Court of Appeals pursuant
to D.C. Code s 11-723:


Under District of Columbia law, and upon the facts  described in this
opinion, when parties have entered into  a contract in which payment
is due on the first of each  month, calculated as a percentage of the
promisor's  revenues from a specific service already rendered by the 
promissee, does the limitation period begin to run sepa- rately on
each missed payment, as is generally the case  with installment
contracts, or, does repudiation or breach  of the contract as a whole
trigger a single limitations  period?


Americable argues that "termination of a contract to make  a stream of
payments does not establish a pattern of 're- peated breaches,' " as
in an installment contract, because it is 




__________

n 6 Keefe does not challenge this ruling.


"a single breach of a contract to make a series of payments."  Resp.
Br. at 34 (emphasis in original). The local D.C. courts  have not
addressed this argument--or at least, not so recent- ly or directly
that we can discern a clear answer.


In one very early case, the plaintiff sued the estate of a  woman who
had promised to pay the plaintiff $50 a month for  life in exchange
for services the plaintiff performed for the  woman when she was
alive. But the suit was filed more than  five years after the payments
had stopped--well outside the  three-year limitation period.
Nonetheless, the Court of Ap- peals of the District of Columbia
opined: "[I]t is well settled  that where a debt is payable in
independent instalments [sic]  the right of action accrues upon each
as it matures, and if the  obligee shall fail to commence his action
until the statutory  bar has intervened in the case of one or more
instalments, he  can only recover those not barred when his action was
 commenced." Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Darling, 21  App. D.C.
132, 140 (D.C. 1903). In Darling, however, the  court did not discuss
the possibility that the contract had  been repudiated or totally
breached. Instead, the Darling  court, directly applying the general
rule of installment pay- ments, concluded that the limitations period
began to run at  the time each payment was due and owing and that the 
plaintiff could therefore bring suit on unpaid installments for  the


In Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 91 A.2d 332 (D.C. 1952),7 the  court held
that a contract identical to the one at issue--a  contingent fee
contract to procure government business, with  payments for services
based on a percentage of the business  procured and payable in
installments--can be viewed as an  "ordinary installment contract." 91
A.2d at 335 (holding that  plaintiff had to bring claims for all
installment payments that  were past due at the time he filed suit or
be barred by res  judicata; accordingly, plaintiff could not




__________

n 7 This case was the precursor to Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222  F.2d
48 (D.C. Cir. 1955), discussed above. The District of Columbia 
Municipal Court dismissed the earlier case for lack of jurisdiction, 
see infra.


claims to avoid the $3,000 jurisdictional limit on cases brought  in
municipal court). But Le John does not advance the ball  much, because
the court again was not presented with the  question of whether to
treat the breach of an employment  contract providing for monthly
payments over an indefinite  period of time as a total breach of the
whole contract trigger- ing one limitations period, or as a series of
separate breaches  for failure to make payments, each triggering its
own limita- tions period. A case cited with approval in Le John,
Goodwin  v. Cabot Amusement Co., 149 A. 574 (Me. 1930), held that a 
plaintiff who had received a judgment in an earlier suit for  missed
installment payments on an employment contract was  not barred by res
judicata from bringing another suit for  subsequently missed payments.
The defendant in Goodwin  had argued that the plaintiff's judgment on
the earlier suit  was for total breach and accordingly encompassed all
future  damages and barred him from suing again on the same  contract.
The Goodwin court held that the plaintiff in his  first suit had a
"right to have chosen to proceed either on the  basis of a total
breach and in that action recover all damages,  present and future, or
to sue for the separate installments  due at the time suit might be
brought," 149 A. at 579, and  found that the plaintiff had only sued
for separate install- ments.


Where an agreement provides for the payment of  installments of money,
suit may be brought for succes- sive installments, if they are not
paid as they become  due, during the continuance of the agreement....


In view of ... a clear intent to give the [plaintiff] the  benefit of
definite and regular payments of money at  agreed periods, we find
that the agreement is divisible in  its terms, susceptible of
successive breaches on failure to  pay installments when due, and that
each successive  failure to pay under the agreement constitutes a
fresh  cause of action of which the plaintiff can avail himself if  he


Id. at 579. See also Davis v. Young, 412 A.2d 1187 (D.C.  1980)
(holding with regard to a claim for unpaid wages under 


the Minimum Wage Act that "[i]n cases of periodic payment,  such as
wages, each payment date gives rise to a new claim").  This, of
course, suggests that the promisee of installment  payments, such as
Keefe, may choose to bring suit on the  payments due and owing instead
of on the entire contract.


More recently, in Press v. Howard University, 540 A.2d  733, 735 (D.C.
1988), the Court of Appeals addressed the  converse factual setting of
Darling and Le John--a single,  total breach of an employment
contract. But the Press court  was not presented with the argument
that the contract could  be viewed as providing for installment
payments. The plain- tiff in Press relied on Davis to argue not only
that each  missed salary payment stemming from the total suspension of
 his employment gave rise to a new limitation period, but  further,
that all missed payments for which the limitation  periods had expired
could still be recovered under a "continu- ing violation" theory. The
Press court rejected this argu- ment, holding that "[i]n the case
before us [ ], the alleged  breach of contract--the
suspension--occurred only once...."  Id. Press expressly rejected
application of Davis on the  grounds that Davis had nothing to do with
the "continuing  violation" doctrine; rather, it involved a "series of
repeated  acts occurring at different times, not a single act
extending  over a long period," id., as the continuing violation
doctrine  would normally require. Moreover, the court noted that 
Davis did not involve a contract claim. Thus, Press did not  precisely
address the issue before us because Keefe is not  arguing that
Americable committed a "continuing violation"-- only that the law


In short, the Press scenario, where an employment contract  was totally
breached in a single instance, and the Darling  scenario, where breach
of an employment contract was  viewed as a series of individual
breaches of the duty to make  installments, have not yet been
interposed as competing  arguments before the Court of Appeals. Thus,
we do not  know whether the Davis-Le John-Goodwin line of cases is 
available to Keefe, and we are compelled to certify the  question for
resolution. Appended to this certification are 


the briefs and portions of the district court record on sum- mary
judgment provided by the parties to this appeal.


III.


For the reasons stated above, we vacate the judgment of  the district
court on the issue of the validity of the contract  and remand for
proceedings in accordance with this opinion  and we certify the
statute of limitations issue to the District  of Columbia Court of
Appeals for resolution.


So ordered.