UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


WARREN, WILLIAM A.

v.

UNITED STATES


00-5130a

D.C. Cir. 2000


*	*	*


Edwards, Chief Judge: William A. Warren appeals from  the District
Court's dismissal of his suit to quiet title to  Navassa Island and
its deposit of guano (bird droppings rich  in nitrogen and phosphate).
The District Court held that the  12-year limitations period in the
Quiet Title Act ("QTA"), 28  U.S.C. 2409a(g) (1994), barred Warren's
claim because he and  his predecessors in interest knew, or should
have known, of a  claim by the United States to the Island asserted
more than  12 years before Warren brought his action in February 1997.
 The District Court also found that, even if it had jurisdiction  over
the action, Warren had failed to demonstrate a legally  cognizable
interest in Navassa Island and its guano, because  Warren's
predecessors in interest possessed merely a revoca- ble license to
mine guano that the United States terminated  as early as 1916.


We agree that Warren's action is barred. Numerous  events establish
that, at least 12 years before Warren filed his  action, there was
notice, both actual and constructive, of the  United States' claim of
sole and exclusive ownership of the  Island and its mineral resources.
None of Warren's prede- cessors in interest challenged any of the
Government's claims,  and there is no support for Warren's contention
that the  Government abandoned its claim to the Island in 1996.


Even were jurisdiction proper over Warren's quiet-title  action, we
agree with the District Court that neither Warren  nor his
predecessors in interest possessed a legally cognizable  fee ownership
interest in Navassa Island. Warren's prede- cessors in interest
possessed nothing more than a revocable  license to occupy the Island
for the purpose of mining guano,  and the United States revoked that
license in the early 1900s.


I. Background


Navassa Island is an island of less than three square miles,  located
in the Caribbean Sea between Haiti and Jamaica, 


approximately 100 miles south of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  See Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. General Account- ing Office, Pub. No.
GAO/OGC-98-5, Report to House Comm.  on Resources, U.S. Insular Areas:
Application of the U.S.  Constitution 47 (1997); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202,  205 (1890). Peter Duncan discovered the Island,
and claimed  it for the United States on November 18, 1857, pursuant
to  the Guano Islands Act of August 18, 1856, 48 U.S.C. ss 1411- 1419
(1994). See Jones, 137 U.S. at 204-06, 217.


The Guano Islands Act provides for islands, rocks, or keys,  not within
the jurisdiction of any other government, to "be  considered as
appertaining to the United States," if a United  States citizen
discovers upon them a deposit of guano and  provides notice of
discovery to the Department of State. 48  U.S.C. ss 1411, 1412. Upon
giving the appropriate notice,  "[t]he discoverer, or his assigns ...
may be allowed, at the  pleasure of Congress, the exclusive right of
occupying such  island, rocks, or keys, for the purpose of obtaining
guano, and  of selling and delivering the same to citizens of the
United  States." 48 U.S.C. s 1414.


On December 8, 1859, then-Secretary of State, Lewis Cass,  issued a
proclamation granting Edward Cooper, the assignee  of Peter Duncan,
"all the privileges and advantages intended  by [the] act." Jones, 137
U.S. at 206. Cooper subsequently  assigned his interest to the Navassa
Phosphate Company.  See Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415,
Transcript of  Motions Hearing before the Honorable Paul L. Friedman 
("Hearing Tr.") at 30 (Feb. 16, 2000).


In 1889, an employee of the Navassa Phosphate Company  was tried and
convicted in the U.S. District Court for the  District of Maryland for
the murder of his supervisor on  Navassa Island. See Jones, 137 U.S.
at 203-04. The defen- dant argued that a federal court in the United
States did not  have the authority to try him because Navassa Island
was not  within the jurisdiction of the United States. See id. at 209.
 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the only issue  was the
status of Navassa Island as a possession of the  United States. The
Supreme Court ruled that the question 


of the United States' sovereignty over Navassa Island was for  the
political branches of government, the Congress and the  Executive, to
determine. The opinion of the Court examined  in detail the history of
the exercise of United States sover- eignty over Navassa Island and
concluded that "the Guano  Islands Act of August 18, 1856 ... is
constitutional and valid;  ... the Island of Navassa must be
considered as appertaining  to the United States." Id. at 224.


The removal of guano from Navassa Island continued until  1898 when, at
the outset of the Spanish-American War,  President William McKinley
ordered all inhabitants of Navas- sa Island removed. See Hearing Tr.
at 30. Thereafter, the  Navassa Phosphate Company was placed in
receivership, and  its assets were sold at auction to pay creditors.
See id. It is  not clear how the interests of the Navassa Phosphate
Compa- ny were ultimately divided. For purposes of the proceeding 
before this court, the Government accepts Warren's chain of  title to
the rights and interests of the Navassa Phosphate  Company. It is not
disputed that all guano mining on  Navassa Island ended by 1901 and
that the Navassa Phos- phate Company was dissolved in 1924. See id.


By an Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 224 (1913), Con- gress
appropriated $125,000 "[f]or a light station on Navassa  Island, in
the West Indies." Subsequently, by a Proclamation  of January 17,
1916, 39 Stat. 1763 (1916), President Woodrow  Wilson declared that
the "Island of Navassa in the West  Indies be and the same is hereby
reserved for lighthouse  purposes, such reservation being deemed
necessary in the  public interests." In support of this reservation of
Navassa  Island, the Proclamation recited the Guano Islands Act and 
the 1913 congressional appropriation.


Construction of the lighthouse was completed on October  21, 1917.
Though originally tended by keepers, the light- house was eventually
automated. The Coast Guard main- tained lighthouse facilities on
Navassa Island until September  1996, at which time the Coast Guard
removed its equipment  and facilities from the property. See Hearing


On July 16, 1996, Warren requested permission from the  Coast Guard to
land on Navassa Island to shoot a documenta- ry. See Letter from Bill
Warren, to Commander of the  Seventh U.S. Coast Guard District (July
16, 1996), reprinted  in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 191, 470. He stated
therein,  "[a]lthough Navassa is U.S. owned, we understand that even 
U.S. Citizens such as ourselves are required to get your  permission
to land there." Id. On September 11, 1996, the  United States granted
Warren's request to visit the Island,  subject to his submission of a
waiver of liability and accep- tance of responsibility form prior to
landing. See Letter from  B.W. Hadley, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, to
Bill Warren  (Sept. 11, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 192. The following
day,  Warren submitted a letter providing "notice of his discovery, 
occupation and possession of Navassa Island." See Letter  from Charles
P. LeBeau, Esq., to Warren Christopher, Secre- tary of State (Sept.
12, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 148-49. The  letter claimed that the
Coast Guard had abandoned the  Island, and requested that the
Department of State enter and  certify Warren's claim of discovery
under the Guano Islands  Act. See id. at 149.


On January 7, 1997, the Department of State sent an  interim response
to Warren, indicating that Navassa Island  was already under United
States' jurisdiction and that the  matter had been taken under
advisement. See Letter from  T. Michael Peay, Office of the Legal
Adviser, U.S. Depart- ment of State, to Charles P. LeBeau, Esq. (Jan.
7, 1997),  reprinted in J.A. 194. On January 16, 1997, the Secretary
of  the Interior issued Order No. 3205, placing the civil adminis-
tration of Navassa Island under the Director of the Office of  Insular
Affairs. See Secretary's Order No. 3205, Department  of the Interior
(Jan. 16, 1997), reprinted in J.A. 361; Secre- tary's Order No. 3205,
Amendment No. 1, Department of the  Interior (Jan. 14, 1998),
reprinted in J.A. 363. Order No.  3205 was superseded by a Memorandum
of Understanding  entered between the Office of Insular Affairs and
the U.S.  Fish and Wildlife Service on April 22, 1999, pursuant to
which  the Fish and Wildlife Service currently manages Navassa  Island
as a National Wildlife Refuge. See Memorandum of 


Understanding between the Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife  Service and
the Director, Office of Insular Affairs (Apr. 22,  1999), reprinted in
J.A. 388-90.


On February 13, 1997, Warren filed a pro se complaint in  the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California  seeking an
injunction against an alleged sale of Navassa  Island and "full and
complete title to the Island, buildings and  guano." Complaint, Warren
v. United States, Civ. No. 97- 242-B (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1997). Warren
amended his com- plaint two more times to include additional parties
such as  Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright as defendants. See First Amended  Complaint,
Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-242-B (S.D.  Cal. Aug. 26, 1997);
Second Amended Complaint, Warren v.  United States, Civ. No. 97-2415
(D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1998). In  October 1997, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern Dis- trict of California transferred the case to the U.S.
District  Court for the District of Columbia. See Warren v. United 
States, Civ. No. 97-242-B, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9. 1997) (order 


In 1998, Warren obtained a quit claim deed and assignment  of interest
from heirs of two individuals--James A. Wood- ward and George W.
Grafflin--alleged assignees of the inter- est of the Navassa Phosphate
Company. On September 17,  1998, Warren filed a third amended
complaint, adding claims  based on an unconstitutional taking of his
property rights and  violations of the Administrative Procedure Act,
and request- ing the imposition of penalties against three members of 
Congress and the President of the United States for failing to 
represent adequately his interests. See Third Amended  Complaint,
Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415  (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1998).


On November 25, 1998, the United States filed a motion to  dismiss,
arguing that the District Court lacked subject matter  jurisdiction
over Warren's claims and, in the alternative,  moved for summary
judgment. Warren filed a motion for  leave to file a fourth amended
complaint that the District  Court subsequently granted. See
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave 


to File Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Civ. No.  97-2415 (D.D.C.
Apr. 5, 1999). The complaint set forth four  claims based entirely on
the quit claim deed and assignments  of interest. Claims one and two
sought declaratory relief  establishing Warren's ownership and rights
to Navassa Is- land. See id. In claim three, Warren claimed that Order
No.  3205, "violat[ed] the separation of powers between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government as provided in the 
Constitution of the United States," id., and sought an injunc- tion
against continuing "such wrongful and unlawful conduct."  Id. Claim
four stated the takings claim. Id.


On February 16, 2000, the District Court held a hearing  and dismissed
Warren's claims for lack of subject matter  jurisdiction. Hearing Tr.
at 39-40. In the alternative, the  District Court rejected the claim
of fee title ownership of  Navassa Island, finding that the Guano
Islands Act conveyed  only a revocable license, and that the President
possessed the  authority to reserve Navassa Island for navigational
use,  thereby revoking such license, based on Congress's authoriza-
tion of funds for the lighthouse and the President's implied  power to
reserve public lands. See id. The District Court  also dismissed the
takings claim from which Warren does not  appeal.


II. Analysis


The Quiet Title Act ("QTA") is the "exclusive means by  which adverse
claimants [may] challenge the United States'  title to real property."
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,  286 (1983). The statute operates
as a waiver of the United  States' sovereign immunity as to certain
quiet title actions.  See 28 U.S.C. s 2409a(a). That waiver is limited
in scope,  however, and the terms of the Act "define the extent of the
 court's jurisdiction." United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834,  841
(1986); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,  586 (1941).
One limitation specified in the Act is the require- ment that:


[a]ny civil action under this section, except for an action  brought by
a State, shall be barred unless it is com-


menced within twelve years of the date upon which it  accrued. Such
action shall be deemed to have accrued  on the date the plaintiff or
his predecessor in interest  knew or should have known of the claim of
the United  States.


28 U.S.C. s 2409a(g).


A "test of reasonableness" applies to determine whether a  plaintiff,
or his predecessors in interest, "knew or should have  known" of a
federal claim of interest in property. See D.C.  Transit System, Inc.
v. United States, 717 F.2d 1438, 1441  (D.C. Cir. 1983). "Knowledge of
the claim's full contours is  not required. All that is necessary is a
reasonable awareness  that the Government claims some interest adverse
to the  plaintiff's." Knapp. v. United States, 636 F.2d 279, 283 (10th
 Cir. 1980).


In this case, there is undisputed evidence in the record  demonstrating
that Warren and his predecessors in interest  "knew or should have
known" that the United States claimed  an interest in Navassa Island
more than 12 years before  Warren filed his quiet title action. Actual
notice of the  United States' adverse claim of title to Navassa Island
was  given to Warren's predecessor in interest, James Woodward,  as
early as 1915, in a letter from the Assistant Secretary of  the
Department of Commerce. See Letter from E.S. Sweet,  Assistant
Secretary, Department of Commerce, to James  Woodward (Apr. 14, 1915),
reprinted in J.A. 315. In re- sponse to a communication from Woodward
to President  Wilson in which Woodward offered to sell Navassa Island
to  the United States, Assistant Secretary Sweet informed Wood- ward
that "as the title to the island [of Navassa] is in the  United States
it is considered unnecessary to take any mea- sures looking to the
purchase of land on the island in connec- tion with the establishment
of a lightstation thereon." Id.


Warren's predecessors in interest were also afforded con- structive
notice of the United States' claim to Navassa Island.  The most
significant instance of such notice arose in 1916,  when President
Woodrow Wilson, pursuant to a congressional  authorization, issued a
Proclamation declaring that all of 


Navassa Island was unqualifiedly reserved for a lighthouse  base. The
Proclamation stated that


the said Island of Navassa in the West Indies be and the  same is
hereby reserved for lighthouse purposes, such  reservation being
deemed necessary in the public inter- ests, subject to such
legislative action as the Congress of  the United States may take with


39 Stat. 1763 (1916) (emphasis added).


Warren contends that the presidential Proclamation was  not
inconsistent with private ownership of the Island or the  right to
occupy such lands to mine guano. He contends that  the lighthouse on
Navassa takes up only a portion of the  Island, and refers to a
lighthouse located on Fenwick Island,  Delaware, which allegedly
operates in close proximity to  private ownership interests. Whether
or not the situation of  Fenwick Island is as Warren asserts it to be,
its status is  unquestionably inapposite. Here we have a presidential 
Proclamation that clearly and lawfully reserved the entire  Island of
Navassa for use by the United States Government.  The reservation of
the Island served to terminate any con- trary private interest in the
land, if any existed at that point.  And nearly 50 years after the
issuance of the 1916 Proclama- tion, federal officials were still
citing it as evidence of the  United States' claim. In 1962, for
example, in response to an  inquiry regarding the status of Navassa


[t]his Island is under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction  of the
United States pursuant to 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1411, and by  Proclamation of
the President dated 17, January, 1916,  the entire Island was reserved
for lighthouse purposes.  Therefore, it is unlike other possessions of
the United  States in that the entire Island is a government (Coast 
Guard) reservation.


Letter from D. McG. Morrison, Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast  Guard, Acting
Commandant, to Francis K. Campbell (Oct. 11,  1962), reprinted in J.A.
423-24.


Warren questions the President's authority to revoke any  interest in
Navassa Island. He notes that by the express  provisions of the Act,
the rights accorded to private tenants  were terminable only "at the
pleasure of Congress." See 48  U.S.C. s 1414 (emphasis added). But he
ignores the impor- tant sequence of events leading to the reservation
of Navassa  Island as a navigational aid. In 1913, Congress sanctioned
 the termination of guano mining interests on Navassa Island  by
appropriating $125,000 for the construction of a lighthouse.  See 38
Stat. 224 (1913). Three years later, the President  formalized the
revocation of guano mining interests in the  Proclamation which
referred to the congressional appropria- tion, and declared that it
was "necessary" and in the "public  interest" to reserve the Island
for lighthouse purposes. See  39 Stat. 1763 (1916).


Warren contends that, even if the United States expressed  an interest
in Navassa Island sufficient to threaten claims of  fee simple
ownership, the President's act and subsequent  Government acts of
"ownership" did not provide constructive  notice that the Government's
interest was adverse to pre- existing mining rights, nor would, Warren
asserts, the subse- quent administration and maintenance of the Island
by the  Coast Guard. See Michel v. United States, 65 F.3d 130, 132 
(9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen the plaintiff claims a non-possessory 
interest such as an easement, knowledge of a government  claim of
ownership may be entirely consistent with a plain- tiff's claim"). We
find no merit in Warren's position.


"The sufficiency of actual and open possession of property  is to be
judged in the light of its character and location."  United States v.
Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 279 (1947). In  this case, Warren and his
predecessors "knew or should have  known the government claimed the
exclusive right" to use the  Island and to deny access to all others.
Michel, 65 F.3d at  132 (emphasis added). Although the United States
did not  avail itself of the opportunity to mine the guano itself,
there  were significant acts, sufficient to place Warren's predeces-
sors in interest on notice that their mining rights were in  jeopardy.
No private mining ventures operated on the Island  after 1901. Indeed,
there is no evidence of sustained occu-


pancy on the Island by private parties after the early 1900s. 
Beginning in 1963 and until at least 1967, the Island was  posted with
signs prohibiting trespassing, and for many years  the Coast Guard
denied access to the Island to all but federal  employees. From 1970
until 1996, the Coast Guard restricted  access to Navassa, and no
person was able to enter Navassa  Island legally without the Coast
Guard's express permission.


Since 1978 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis- tration
("NOAA") of the U.S. Department of Commerce has  issued nautical
charts clearly stating that


Navassa Island is a reservation administered through the  Commander,
Seventh Coast Guard District. Landing or  entry on the island is
prohibited, except under permit  signed by the Commander, 7th U.S.
Coast Guard Dis- trict.


Declaration of David B. MacFarland, Captain, NOAA, War- ren v. United
States, Civ. No. 97-2415 (May 18, 1999), re- printed in J.A. 407-11
(emphasis added). The nautical charts  are significant, because there
is no way to approach Navassa  Island except by sea. In addition,
beginning in July 1984, the  NOAA has released a publication
describing Navassa Island  as a federally restricted area and
informing the public that  requests to visit Navassa should be made to
the Commander,  Seventh District Coast Guard, Miami, Florida. It was
pre- sumably for this reason that Warren sought permission from  the
Commander of the Seventh District Coast Guard in  Miami, Florida, to
land on Navassa Island in July 1996.


The presidential Proclamation reserving Navassa Island for  lighthouse
purposes, coupled with the Coast Guard's practice  of restricting
access, and, for some years, denying access  altogether, to the
Island, as well as the Government's consis- tent claims of sole and
exclusive ownership, reasonably and  clearly indicated that the United
States had revoked any  outstanding rights or interests to "occupy"
Navassa Island for  the purpose of mining guano. Warren's predecessors
in  interest therefore had actual and constructive notice of the 
United States' claims to Navassa Island and its resources 


more than 12 years before Warren brought his suit to quiet  title to
the Island in his favor.


Warren makes an alternative argument: that the Coast  Guard's removal
of lighthouse equipment from Navassa Is- land in August 1996 was a
formal abandonment of the United  States' claim to the Island, and
triggered a new statute of  limitations period. We reject this
assertion. In the first  place, the Government cannot abandon property
without con- gressional authorization. See Royal Indem. Co. v. United 
States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941); see also United States v. 
California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947). Moreover, the undisputed  facts do
not support the abandonment claim. Before disman- tling the
lighthouse, the Coast Guard explained, in a 1995  communiquE to the
American Embassy in Haiti, that "[t]he  discontinuation of the
lighthouse operations is in no way  intended to affect U.S. possession
of or jurisdiction over  Navassa Island." CommuniquE from Commandant
Cogard,  to American Embassy, Port Au Prince, (Mar. 1995), reprinted 
in J.A. 466. Indeed, following the Coast Guard's removal of  the
lighthouse equipment, the United States continued to  assert its
jurisdiction over the Island, and it has continued to  regulate and
restrict access to the Island. In contrast, there  is no proof that
any of Warren's predecessors in interest ever  set foot on the Island
after 1901, or even inquired of the  continuing viability of their
rights. There is, thus, no evidence  that the United States abandoned
its claim to the Island, and  Warren's attempt to resurrect mining
interests long since  terminated is based on a meritless claim. The
District Court  correctly determined that it was without subject


Even if the Court had jurisdiction to hear the quiet title  action, it
is abundantly clear that the Guano Islands Act did  not convey any fee
ownership interest in the land or minerals  to a discoverer. As the
Supreme Court explained in Duncan  v. Navassa Phosphate Co., 137 U.S.
647 (1891), the interest  conveyed under the Act was in the nature of
a "usufruct" or  license to mine guano that was terminable "at the
pleasure of  Congress." Id. at 652-53. "The whole right conferred upon
 the discoverer and his assigns is a license to occupy the island 


for the purpose of removing the guano." Id. at 651. The Act  conveyed
only a license that was revocable at will by the  United States, and
that revocation occurred when the Presi- dent reserved Navassa Island
for navigational purposes in  1916 pursuant to the 1913 congressional
appropriation.


Warren's final argument is that this court should recognize  his fee
title claim to Navassa based on a "federal common  law" ownership
doctrine culled from the Supreme Court's  decision in United States v.
Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947).  In Fullard-Leo, the Supreme Court
recognized the interests  of private claimants (against the United
States) in Palmyra  Island, a former possession of the Kingdom of
Hawaii. See  id. Fullard-Leo does not, however, establish a "federal 
common law" right of ownership in "remote islands." Indeed,  the Court
expressly dismissed the possibility, stating that  "[w]e are not
dealing with an explorer's claim of title to lands  of a savage tribe
or that of a discoverer of a hitherto unknown  islet." Id. at 268.
Rather, the Court considered the doctrine  of "lost grant," which, it
observed, was an established doc- trine in Hawaiian common law before
its annexation by the  United States, and could therefore be applied
against the  United States, as the successor to Hawaii. See id at
269-70.  The lost grant doctrine has no application in this case.


III. Conclusion


Warren's action is barred by the 12-year limitations period  in the
Quiet Title Act. Even were Warren's claim timely, it  would fail for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the  District Court is
affirmed.


So ordered.