UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


PRICE, GORDON E.

v.

UNITED STATES


00-5185a

D.C. Cir. 2000


*	*	*


Opinion for the court filed Per Curiam.


Per Curiam: Gordon Price, appearing pro se, filed a com- plaint in the
district court alleging the United States Depart- ment of Veteran
Affairs (VA) wrongfully failed to reimburse  him for certain medical
expenses he incurred in October 1994  while hospitalized for an
emergency colon cancer operation at  a non-VA medical facility. Price
also alleged Northeast Flori- da Credit Bureau (Northeast) caused him
harm when it  persistently sought to collect on the unpaid medical
bills on  behalf of the medical service providers. As relief, Price 
sought $5 million in damages from the government alone,  apparently
for his medical expenses and emotional distress.  The district court
vacated an entry of default against North- east and dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim.  Price appealed and both he
and the government filed cross- motions for summary disposition.
Because the district court  lacked jurisdiction to consider an
indirect challenge to the  government's veterans' benefits
determination, we grant the  government's motion and deny Price's


As amended by the Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L.  No. 100-687,
102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (VJRA), the Veterans'  Benefits Act of 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-56, 71 Stat. 83, precludes  judicial review in Article
III courts of VA decisions affecting  the provision of veterans'
benefits, including medical expense  reimbursement. 38 U.S.C. s
511(a); see Larrabee v. Derwin- ski, 968 F.2d 1497, 1499-1501 (2d Cir.
1992) (detailing history  of veterans' benefits legislation); see also
Zimick v. West, 11  Vet. App. 45, 48 (Vet. App. 1998) (term "benefit"
encompasses  medical expenses veteran incurred at non-VA facility)
(citing  38 C.F.R. s 20.3(e)). The exclusive avenue for redress of 
veterans' benefits determinations is appeal to the Court of  Veterans
Appeals and from there to the United States Court  of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See 38 U.S.C. ss 511,  7252, 7292; In re Russell, 155
F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 1998) (per  curiam); Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d
965, 967-71 (6th Cir.  1997); Larrabee, 968 F.2d at 1501.


The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Price's  federal
claim because underlying the claim is an allegation  that the VA
unjustifiably denied him a veterans' benefit.  Price alleged the VA's
failure to pay his medical bills was 


wrongful because the agency was under a legal obligation to  make
payment on account of Price's veteran status. He  attached to his
amended complaint a September 1996 letter  from the VA's Gainesville,
Florida office advising Price the  office had received his request for
reimbursement but could  not process his claim because Price failed to
provide the  personal information necessary to verify his veteran
status  and ascertain the nature of the claim. In the letter, the VA 
explained the eligibility criteria for reimbursement for medi- cal
services at a non-VA facility and directed Price's attention  to an
enclosed claim form. See 38 U.S.C. s 1728 (setting  forth scheme for
VA reimbursement of certain medical ex- penses incurred by veterans).
Price referred to the 1996  letter in the amended complaint, asserting
that he met the  eligibility criteria.


The record does not reflect whether Price pursued a formal 
reimbursement claim with the VA. Nevertheless, because  Price is
challenging the VA's action or inaction with respect  to a veterans'
benefits matter, the district court lacked sub- ject matter
jurisdiction over the complaint. See 38 U.S.C.  s 511(a); Weaver v.
United States, 98 F.3d 518, 519-20 (10th  Cir. 1996) (the substance of
veteran's claims, not the labels  plaintiff assigns them, governs
jurisdictional determination);  cf. Kidwell v. Department of the Army,
Bd. for Correction of  Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (plain  language of complaint does not settle question of Tucker
Act  jurisdiction--court looks to the complaint's substance, not 


Perhaps to avert a headlong collision with 38 U.S.C.  s 511(a), the
district court liberally construed Price's com- plaint as asserting a
federal tort claim for intentional or  negligent failure to pay
medical bills. Under the Federal  Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. ss
1346(b), 2671 et seq., a tort  claim is actionable if it arises "under
circumstances where the  United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the  claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act  or omission occurred." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 
510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. s 1346(b)). Be- cause the
alleged wrong committed by the VA took place in 


Florida, liability for negligent or intentional failure to pay a 
medical bill must be determined in accordance with Florida  law. See
Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120, 123  (D.C. Cir. 1994).


Florida does recognize a cause of action analogous to that  which Price
appears to be asserting. By Florida statute a  person may sue an
insurer when the person is damaged by an  insurer's "bad faith"
failure to settle his or her claim. Fla.  Stat. ch. 624.155(1)(b)(1);
see Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So.  2d 389, 391 (Fla. 1998). The
Florida Supreme Court has  construed the statute as encompassing
claims that the insurer  unjustifiably refused to pay an insured's
medical or hospital  bills, resulting in the insured's inability to
obtain additional  health care. Burger, 712 So. 2d at 392. The insured
may  also recover damages for emotional distress. Id.


Nevertheless, assuming Price's damages claim is cognizable  under
Florida Statute 624.155(1)(b)(1), a necessary predicate  of such a
claim is a determination that the insurer acted in  bad faith. See id.
Here, the propriety of the VA's purported  refusal to reimburse Price
has not yet been established.  Because a determination whether the VA
acted in bad faith or  with negligence would require the district
court to determine  first whether the VA acted properly in handling
Price's  request for reimbursement, judicial review is foreclosed by
38  U.S.C. s 511(a). The courts have consistently held that a  federal
district court may not entertain constitutional or  statutory claims
whose resolution would require the court to  intrude upon the VA's
exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Beam- on, 125 F.3d at 972-74 (due
process challenge to VA proce- dures); Weaver, 98 F.3d at 520 (claims
of fraud and misrepre- sentation in handling of benefits claim); Hicks
v. Small, 69  F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (tort claims of outrage
and  intentional infliction of emotional distress based on VA's 
reduction of benefits); Sugrue v. Derwinski, 26 F.3d 8, 11 (2d  Cir.
1994) (due process, Privacy Act and FOIA challenges to  VA's failure
to raise disability rating); Rosen v. Walters, 719  F.2d 1422, 1425
(9th Cir. 1983) (Privacy Act claim based on  destruction of medical
records pertinent to claim for veterans' 


disability benefits) (construing predecessor statute, 38 U.S.C.  s
211(a)).


For the preceding reasons, we conclude the district court  lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Price's federal claim.  As a
consequence, the court necessarily also lacked supple- mental
jurisdiction over Price's state law claim against North- east. See 28
U.S.C. s 1367(a); Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d  957, 962 (11th Cir.
1999) (collecting authorities); Harris v.  Secretary, United States
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d  339, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, the judgment of the  district court is


Affirmed.