UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


GTE SVC CORP

v.

FCC


97-1538a

D.C. Cir. 2000


*	*	*


United States Court of Appeals


FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT


Argued April 4, 2000 Decided July 14, 2000 


No. 97-1538


GTE Service Corporation and  Micronesian Telecommunications
Corporation,  Petitioners


v.


Federal Communications Commission and  United States of America, 
Respondents


MCI Communications Corporation, et al.,  Intervenors


Consolidated with  99-1045, 99-1046


On Petitions for Review of an Order of the  Federal Communications
Commission


Daniel E. Troy and Howard J. Symons argued the cause  for petitioners.
With them on the briefs were Gail L. Polivy, 


R. Michael Senkowski, Michael F. Altschul, Michelle M.  Mundt. David A.
Gross, James D. Ellis, Robert M. Lynch,  Michael J. Zpevak, William B.
Barfield, M. Robert Suther- land, L. Andrew Tollin, Michael Deuel
Sullivan, Luisa L.  Lancetti, S. Mark Tuller an Matthew B. Pachman. M.
 Edward Whelan and Theodore C. Whitehouse entered ap- pearances.


John Edward Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel,  Federal
Communications Commission, argued the cause for  respondents. With him
on the brief were Christopher J.  Wright, General Counsel, Laurel R.
Bergold, Counsel, Joel I.  Klein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Jus- tice, Robert B. Nicholson, and Robert J. Wiggers,
Attorneys.  Adam D. Hirsh, Attorney, entered an appearance.


John W. Katz, Veronica M. Ahern, Herbert E. Marks and  Thomas K. Crowe
were on the brief for intervenors.


Before: Williams, Ginsburg, and Sentelle, Circuit Judges.


Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.


Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Several parties petition for re- view of four
orders by the Federal Communications Commis- sion implementing the
rate integration requirement of  s 254(g) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended by  the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. s
254(g). The  petitioners challenge two determinations made by the Com-
mission: (1) That a telecommunications provider is required  to
integrate its rates across all commonly owned or controlled 
affiliates that provide interstate interexchange services; and  (2)
that the requirement of rate integration applies to provid- ers of
Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS), that is,  wireless
technologies such as cellular and PCS.


We hold first that the Commission's interpretation of  s 254(g) as
requiring rate integration across affiliates is  reasonable and second
that the Commission erred in conclud- ing the plain text of s 254(g)
required it to apply the rate  integration requirement to providers of
CMRS. We there-


fore vacate the order in relevant part and remand this matter  to the
Commission for further consideration whether, as an  exercise of its
delegated authority, s 254(g) should be applied  to providers of


I. Background


Prior to 1972 rates for interstate long distance telecommu- nications
services to and from non-contiguous domestic loca- tions such as
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were much  higher than rates for the
same services within the contiguous  48 states. In effect, providers
of long distance services  treated those locations as foreign for the
purpose of setting  long distance rates. See Establishment of Domestic
 Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental  Entities, 35
F.C.C.2d 844, 856 p 35 (1972) (Domsat II Order).  The Commission
became concerned that this disparate treat- ment "inhibited the free
flow of communications between the  contiguous states and
[non-contiguous domestic] points to the  disadvantage of all of our
citizens." Id. The Commission  also recognized that the use of
satellites, the cost of which is  insensitive to distance, was making
it economically feasible to  serve non-contiguous locations at rates
comparable to those  offered in the contiguous 48 states. See id.


In 1972, therefore, the Commission initiated a policy of  "rate
integration": Telecommunications carriers serving Alas- ka, Hawaii,
and Puerto Rico (and later the U.S. Virgin  Islands) were required, as
a condition of their licenses to use  new domestic satellites, to
submit a plan that would "give  maximum effect to the elimination of
overall distance as a  major cost factor and ... integrate these three
United States  points into the uniform mileage rate pattern that now
obtains  for the contiguous states." Id. at 857 p 37. Thus AT&T was 
required to develop a tariff that would integrate the rates it 
charged for interstate long distance service to Alaska, Hawaii,  and
Puerto Rico into the domestic rate pattern applicable in  the
contiguous 48 states. See Integration of Rates, 61  F.C.C.2d 380, 392
(1976) (1976 Rate Integration Order).  Rate integration would thus


contiguous states and ... noncontiguous points[ ] at rates  that are
equivalent to those prevailing for comparable dis- tances in the
contiguous 48 states." Integration of Rates, 9  F.C.C.R. 2197, 2198
n.2 (1993).


A. Rate Integration under the Telecommunications Act  of 1996


The Commission adopted its policy of rate integration as an  exercise
of its broad authority under the Communications Act  to regulate
carriers for the public convenience and necessity.  See 47 U.S.C. s
214; Domsat II Order, 35 F.C.C.2d at 856  p 35. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.  104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996), the Congress put rate inte- gration upon a statutory footing
by adding s 254(g) to the  Communications Act of 1934:


Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission  shall adopt
rules to require ... that a provider of  interstate interexchange
telecommunications services  shall provide such services to its
subscribers in each  State at rates no higher than the rates charged
to its  subscribers in any other State.


Although perhaps not obvious on its face, the parties agree  that s
254(g) means what the Conference Report says it  means:


New section 254(g) is intended to incorporate the polic[y]  of ... rate
integration of interexchange services....  The conferees intend the
Commission's rules ... to  incorporate the policies contained in the
Commission's  proceeding entitled "Integration of Rates and Services 
for the Provision of Communications by Authorized Com- mon Carriers
between the United States Mainland and  the Offshore Points of Hawaii,
Alaska and Puerto  Rico/Virgin Islands" (61 FCC2d 380 (1976)).


H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 132 (1996).


B. The Commission's Orders


The Commission promulgated rules requiring rate inte- gration under s
254(g) in a series of four orders: (1) Imple-


mentation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of  1934, as
Amended, Report & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 9564 (1996)  (Integration Order);
(2) First Memorandum Opinion and  Order on Reconsideration, 12
F.C.C.R. 11812 (1997) (First  Reconsideration Order); (3) Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 15739 (1997)  (Stay Order); and (4) Memorandum Opinion &
Order, 14  F.C.C.R. 391 (1998) (Second Reconsideration Order). The 
petitioners now challenge two determinations made in the  course of


1. Rate Integration Across Affiliates


In the Integration Order the Commission announced with- out elaboration
that it read the term "provider of interstate  interexchange
telecommunications services" in s 254(g) to  include "parent companies
that, through affiliates, provide  service in more than one state." 11
F.C.C.R. at 9598 p 69.  Upon reconsideration at the instance of GTE
and U.S.  West, Inc., the Commission explained that the statute was 
ambiguous on the specific issue whether for purposes of  rate
integration a "provider of interstate interexchange tele-
communications services" includes commonly owned or con- trolled
affiliates of the provider. First Reconsideration Or- der, 12 F.C.C.R.
at 11819 p 14. Because an interexchange  carrier could circumvent rate
integration by providing inter- state long distance service to each
non-contiguous location  through a separate subsidiary, the Commission
concluded  that requiring rate integration among affiliates was most 
consonant with the purpose of the statute. See id. p 15.  Under the
resulting rule, for example, the GTE affiliate that  provides long
distance service only in the Commonwealth of  the Northern Mariana
Islands is required to integrate its  rates with those of all other
GTE affiliates providing long  distance service anywhere in the
contiguous 48 states or in  other non-contiguous domestic locations.


2. Rate Integration by CMRS Providers


Prior to enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,  the Commission
had required only wireline carriers, and not  providers of CMRS, to
integrate their rates. In the Inte-


gration Order the agency gave no indication that it believed  s 254(g)
either required or authorized a change in this state  of affairs. In
the First Reconsideration Order, however, the  Commission stated,
again without elaborating, that CMRS  providers were required by s
254(g) to integrate the rates for  their interstate interexchange
services. 12 F.C.C.R. at 11821  p 18. Several parties petitioned the
Commission to reconsid- er and stay enforcement of that
determination.* In the  Second Reconsideration Order the Commission
explained its  rationale for requiring CMRS providers to integrate
their  rates: Section 254(g) by its terms applies to providers of 
interstate interexchange service without making an exception  for


Because CMRS does not use wireline exchanges, its cover- age by s
254(g) raised the following question for the Commis- sion: Which
interstate CMRS are "interexchange" services?  Noting that the
Communications Act defines "telephone ex- change service" as "service
within a telephone exchange, or  ... comparable service provided
through a system of  switches, transmission equipment, or other
facilities," 47  U.S.C. s 153(47), the Commission determined that CMRS
 within a "major trading area" (MTA) was "comparable" to  wireline
"service within a telephone exchange," 14 F.C.C.R. at  401 p 23;
therefore, CMRS between MTAs was comparable  to "interexchange"
wireline service, and interstate, inter-MTA  CMRS was subject to rate


II. Analysis


The petitioners seek review of the rules requiring rate  integration
among affiliates and the application of rate inte- gration to
providers of CMRS. Both challenges turn upon 




__________

n * The Commission, without expressing any doubt that s 254(g)  applies
to CMRS providers, stayed application of the rule requiring  CMRS
providers to integrate their rates across affiliates pending  further
consideration whether such integration would produce anti- competitive
effects owing to the prevalence of cross-ownership and  joint ventures
in the CMRS industry. See Stay Order, 12 F.C.C.R.  at 15746 p 14.


the Commission's interpretation of the phrase "provider of  interstate
interexchange telecommunications services" in  s 254(g). Because the
Congress committed administration of  the Communications Act to the
Commission, we review the  petitioners' challenges to the Commission's
interpretation of  s 254(g) using the two-step analysis of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.  v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron step one, we
 ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise  question at
issue." If so, then we "must give effect to the  unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." If not, then  under Chevron step two we
will defer to the agency's inter- pretation of the Act if it is
reasonable in light of the text, the  structure, and the purpose of
the Act. See id. at 842-43.


A. Rate Integration Across Affiliates


The petitioners make two arguments for the proposition  that the
Congress in s 254(g) unambiguously directed the  Commission to
prescribe rate integration only with respect to  each individual
provider of telecommunications services and  not with respect to all
commonly owned or controlled affili- ates. They first argue that
because "provider" means simply  "one that provides," the Congress
could not have meant the  phrase "provider of interstate interexchange
telecommunica- tions services" to include parent companies, which are
not  licensed to and do not provide telecommunications services. 
Further, because holding companies are not "providers," they  "may not
be used as conduits through which rate integration  requirements are
imposed on commonly owned affiliates."


Both parts of petitioners' argument miss the mark. First,  the
Commission no longer interprets "provider of interstate  interexchange
telecommunications services" to include parent  companies that are not
themselves carriers: In the First  Reconsideration Order the
Commission, responding to this  very argument, narrowed its
cross-affiliate rule to apply only  to "affiliated carriers"--thereby
excluding any parent compa- ny that is not itself a carrier. 12
F.C.C.R. at 11819 p 16.  And as to the petitioners' derivative claim
that the Commis- sion cannot regulate commonly owned affiliates except
by  impermissibly regulating parent companies as "conduits," the 


petitioners provide no legal support for this ipse dixit. Nor  does the
Commission either purport or need to regulate the  parent--as a
conduit or otherwise--when it requires two or  more carriers under
common control to coordinate their  activities.


The petitioners' second argument turns upon the Congress  having
expressly extended regulatory obligations to the "affil- iates" of a
carrier in other sections of the Act; by not  similarly including the
word "affiliates" in s 254(g), we are  told, the Congress
unambiguously (albeit implicitly) limited  the scope of the
integration requirement to the rates charged  by individual providers
of telecommunications services. The  petitioners make a substantial
point: In 1996 the Congress  added "affiliate" as a defined term in
the Communications  Act, see 47 U.S.C. s 153(1), and then used that
term in 15  sections of the Act, see 47 U.S.C. ss 222, 224, 228, 251,
260,  271-275, 541, 543, 548, 572, and 573. In many of those  sections
the Congress specifically extended a regulatory pro- hibition or
obligation from the individual carrier to the carri- er's affiliates.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. s 572 ("No local exchange  carrier or any
affiliate of such carrier ... [may acquire] more  than a 10 percent
financial interest, or any management  interest, in any cable operator
providing cable service within  the [LEC's] telephone service


If the Congress had written s 254(g) upon a blank slate,  announcing an
entirely new requirement that rates to non- contiguous points be
integrated, then the absence of "affili- ates" from the text of s
254(g), coupled with its inclusion in  so many other sections, might
be strong textual evidence that  the Congress spoke directly to this
issue. See, e.g., Alabama  Power Co. v. FERC, 160 F.3d 7, 14 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Section  254(g) does not, however, announce a new policy;
the legisla- tive history makes clear that the Congress intended s
254(g)  to carry forward by regulation the Commission's preexisting 
policy requiring rate integration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.  104-458,
at 132 (1996). An undisputed aspect of that policy is  that AT & T was
required to integrate its rates across all its  affiliated providers.
The parties dispute whether other carri- ers were required to
integrate rates across affiliates but, 


regardless of the answer to that question, it is clear that the 
Commission under its preexisting policy could and in the case  of AT&T
did mandate integration across affiliates. Against  that backdrop, the
omission of the word "affiliates" in a  statute intended to perpetuate
existing Commission policy  cannot be read to preclude for the first
time integration  across affiliates; the most the omission tells us is
that the  Congress did not specifically require the Commission to
order  rate integration across affiliates. We agree with the Commis-
sion, therefore, that s 254(g) is ambiguous on the precise  issue
whether affiliates may be included within the phrase  "provider of
interstate interexchange telecommunications ser- vices."


Turning to Chevron step two, the petitioners argue that the 
Commission's interpretation is unreasonable because it con- flicts
with two of the purposes of the 1996 Act, namely, "to  promote
competition and reduce regulation." Pub. L. No.  104-104, 110 Stat.
56, 56 (1996) (preamble), and with one of  the goals of rate
integration, namely, the expansion of tele- communications services
offered to non-contiguous domestic  locations, see Domsat II Order, 35
F.C.C.2d at 856 p 35. The  petitioners illustrate their point with the
following (not very)  hypothetical situation: A carrier provides
interstate interex- change service through separate affiliates in the
highly com- petitive mainland market and in a high-cost domestic over-
seas market (such as Guam, which cannot be served by  domestic
satellites because of its distance from the continen- tal United
States). If rates must be integrated across those  affiliates then,
according to the petitioners, the carrier must  either charge
above-market rates on the mainland, and there- fore become
noncompetitive, or charge below-market rates in  the overseas
location, and therefore lose money on every call.  Faced with this
Hobson's choice, the carrier will want to sell  its overseas
affiliate, presumably to a new owner with no  other operations subject


The problem with the petitioners' argument--passing over  the
Commission's factual rejoinder that the carrier would not  lose money
on every call--is that the central purpose of rate  integration,
namely, ensuring "service between the contiguous 


states and ... noncontiguous points[ ] at rates that are  equivalent to
those prevailing for comparable distances in the  contiguous 48
states," Integration of Rates, 9 F.C.C.R. 2197,  2198 n.2 (1993), by
its nature does nothing to reduce regula- tion or to promote
competition. The real question raised by  this argument, therefore, is
not whether integration across  affiliates is regulatory and
anti-competitive but whether it is  unreasonable in light of the
underlying goal of rate inte- gration (pace the preamble to the 1996
Act), namely, equal- ized rates to non-contiguous locations. Viewed
thus at the  margin, the petitioners' hypothetical scenario actually
demon- strates the reasonableness of the Commission's interpreta-
tion: If the Commission did not read affiliates into the term 
"provider" in s 254(g), then the petitioners' hypothetical car- rier
would charge higher rates in the non-contiguous market  (through one
affiliate) than it charges on the mainland  (through the other
affiliate), and there would be no rate  integration of non-contiguous
markets at all. We therefore  agree with the Commission that
interpreting "provider of  interstate interexchange telecommunications
services" to en- compass commonly owned or controlled affiliates is
reason- able in light of the text and the regulatory purpose of  s


Finally, the petitioners challenge the Commission's decision  as
inconsistent and therefore arbitrary and capricious. Even  if
interpreting "provider" to include affiliates is permissible,  the
petitioners claim, the Commission has interpreted "pro- vider" in
three inconsistent ways: (1) for wireline carriers,  "provider" means
a provider and all commonly owned or  controlled affiliates; (2) for
providers of CMRS, as to which  the Commission has stayed the
requirement of affiliate inte- gration, "provider" will likely be
interpreted to mean a pro- vider and all affiliates not jointly owned
by competing provid- ers; and (3) for the purpose of "geographic rate
averaging"-- another policy prescribed in s 254(g)--the Commission has
 "implicitly" excluded affiliates from the scope of the term 


We reject this challenge for two reasons. First, as the  Commission
notes, it has to date given but a single interpre-


tation to the term "provider" in s 254(g). For the purpose of  rate
integration, "provider" includes affiliates of both wireline  and CMRS
providers; the Stay Order did not alter this  interpretation, and the
Commission may yet adhere to it.  And in a separate order not under
review here, the Commis- sion gave the same interpretation for the
purpose of geo- graphic rate averaging. See Motion of AT&T Corp. to be
 Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 12 F.C.C.R. 20787,  20804 p
31 (1997). Second, even if the Commission ultimately  does interpret
"provider" differently with respect to wireline  service and CMRS,
that would not necessarily be arbitrary  and capricious. The
Commission might reasonably conclude  that requiring integration among
affiliates better advances  the purposes of the Congress with respect
to wireline service  than it does with respect to CMRS, depending upon
the  competitive structure of the markets in which the two ser- vices
are offered. On the record presently before us, there- fore, we see no
infirmity in the Commission's actions, and we  deny the petition to
review the requirement of integration  across affiliates.


B. Rate Integration by CMRS Providers


The Commission held that the phrase "provider of inter- state
interexchange telecommunications services" in s 254(g)  "unambiguously
applies to the interstate, interexchange ser- vices offered by CMRS
providers. If Congress had intended  to exempt CMRS providers, it
presumably would have done  so expressly as it did in other sections
of the Act." Second  Reconsideration Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 396 p 10.
In an  unusually direct confrontation under Chevron step one, the 
petitioners maintain not that the statute is ambiguous but  that it
unambiguously means the opposite of what the Com- mission says it
means. For our part, we cannot agree with  either the Commission or
the petitioners that the Congress  spoke unambiguously on the precise


The Commission's secondary assertion that the Congress  would have
expressly exempted CMRS from s 254(g) had it  so intended is
undermined by the Conference Report indicat- ing that the Congress
meant s 254(g) to incorporate the 


Commission's preexisting rate integration policy, see H.R.  Conf. Rep.
No. 104-458, at 132 (1996), which the Commission  had never before
applied to CMRS. As Commissioner Powell  wrote in dissent, "when it is
undisputed that CMRS providers  were not subject to the Commission's
pre-1996 Act rate  integration policy, and where Congress seems to say
it is  merely incorporating that policy, why would we expect to find 
an explicit and unambiguous indication to exclude them?"  Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell,  1999 WL 38420 (Jan. 28,
1999).


This leaves the Commission's primary assertion that the  term
"interexchange telecommunications service," which is  not defined in
the Communications Act, "on its face unambig- uously" makes CMRS
subject to rate integration under  s 254(g). The Commission starts out
in the hole: Because  CMRS does not use exchanges, it is by no means
obvious that  the Congress, when it used a phrase in which the word 
"interexchange" is an essential term, was referring to CMRS.  True,
the Congress provided a functional definition of "tele- phone exchange
service," including not just "service within a  telephone exchange"
but also "comparable service provided  through ... other facilities,"
47 U.S.C. s 153(47); therefore,  the Commission may characterize as
"exchange service" even  services that, like CMRS, do not use
exchanges. That the  Congress may have extended to providers of CMRS
various  statutory obligations attaching to "exchange service" does 
not, however, demonstrate that the Congress, in using the  word
"interexchange," must have extended the requirement  of rate
integration to providers of CMRS. The Commission  might decide, as an
exercise of its delegated authority to  interpret ambiguities in the
Act, that the phrase "interex- change telecommunications service" in s
254(g) is best read  in a manner analogous to the express definition
of "exchange  service," that is, as applying not only to wireline
interex- change service but also to CMRS that the Commission deter-
mines is "comparable"; but that interpretation is certainly  not


As for the petitioners' Chevron step one arguments, they  first claim
that the Congress's use of the word "interex-


change"--which they say has no relevance to CMRS--demon- strates that s
254(g) must apply only to wireline providers.  As we just explained,
however, the functional definition of  "telephone exchange service" in
47 U.S.C. s 153(47) demon- strates that the Congress has authorized
the Commission to  characterize as "exchange service" even services
that do not  use exchanges. Therefore it is not clear that the
Congress  was referring only to wireline service when it used the word
 "interexchange." The petitioners' second claim is that by  stating in
the legislative history that s 254(g) was intended to  codify the
Commission's preexisting policy, which did not  apply to providers of
CMRS, the Congress clearly and unam- biguously excluded providers of
CMRS from the coverage of  s 254(g). We think this reads too much into
both the Com- mission's policy and the legislative history. The
Commission  had never either applied or declined to apply the policy
to  providers of CMRS. There is no reason to believe that prior  to
the 1996 Act the Commission was in any way precluded  from extending
its policy to providers of CMRS, and the  Congress, in stating that it
was incorporating the Commis- sion's preexisting policy into s 254(g),
gave no indication that  it meant to freeze rate integration as it
then was and to  prohibit any further development or extension of the


The petitioners further argue that application of s 254(g) to 
providers of CMRS "would be inconsistent with the deregula- tory
intent" of 47 U.S.C. s 332(c) (authorizing Commission to  exempt CMRS
from some regulations), the definition of "tele- phone toll service"
in 47 U.S.C. s 153(48), and the pro- consumer purpose of the 1996
Telecommunications Act over- all. However probative these arguments
may be in determin- ing whether the Commission's interpretation of s
254(g) is  reasonable, they do not rise to the level of demonstrating
that  the Congress has spoken directly to this precise issue.


In light of the text and legislative history of s 254(g), then,  it is
unclear whether CMRS is included in the phrase "inter- exchange
telecommunications service": the Congress may  have been referring
only to wireline interexchange service, or  it may also have meant to
include "comparable" CMRS. At  this juncture we would ordinarily
proceed to step two and 


consider whether the Commission's interpretation of the stat- ute is
reasonable. In this case, however, the Commission  never exercised its
discretionary authority to interpret the  statute, as the Second
Reconsideration Order makes clear;  because it believed that the plain
text of s 254(g) subjected  providers of CMRS to the requirement of
rate integration,  the Commission did not go on to show why, even if
it is not  the only possible interpretation of the statute, it is
nonethe- less a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 14 F.C.C.R. 
at 396 p p 10, 11, 18.


Thus the Commission "act[ed] pursuant to an erroneous  view of law and,
as a consequence, fail[ed] to exercise the  discretion delegated to it
by Congress." Prill v. NLRB, 755  F.2d 941, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see
also FCC v. RCA Commu- nications Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1953).
Because the Com- mission might well exclude CMRS from coverage under 
s 254(g) as an exercise of its discretion, we must remand this  matter
for the Commission to make that determination in the  first instance.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88  (1943); Prill, 755 F.2d at
956-57.*


III. Conclusion


The petition for review is denied insofar as it challenges the 
Commission's requirement that carriers integrate their inter- state
long distance rates with those of all commonly owned or  controlled
affiliates in both contiguous and non-contiguous  domestic locations.
The petition is granted insofar as it  challenges the Commission's
requirement that providers of  CMRS likewise integrate their rates.
The orders under  review are vacated in relevant part and this matter
is re- manded to the Commission for further consideration.


So ordered.




__________

n * In view of this disposition, we do not address the petitioners' 
alternative claim that if s 254(g) applies to providers of CMRS then 
the Commission is required by 47 U.S.C. s 160 to forbear from 
enforcement of the requirement.