UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


KEEFE CO

v.

AMERICABLE INTL INC


98-7093b

D.C. Cir. 2000


*	*	*


Opinion for the court filed Per Curiam.


Per Curiam: Appellant Keefe Company filed this action  seeking recovery
for installment payments arising from a  contract under which
appellant allegedly assisted appellee  Americable in the obtaining of
contracts for the provision of  cable service to government
installations. The district court  granted summary judgment in favor
of the defense on two  theories: invalidity of the underlying
contract, and the run- ning of the statute of limitations. We have
heretofore vacat- ed the decision insofar as it was based on
invalidity, and  certified a governing legal question on the statute
of limita- tions theory to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 
That court having ruled on the certified question, we vacate  the
judgment of the district court as to a portion of appel- lant's claims
and remand for further proceedings consistent  with this opinion and
that of the District of Columbia Court of  Appeals.


Analysis


Except insofar as it is necessary to make our application of  the law
understandable, we will not rehash the facts underly- ing this
controversy as they are set forth in full in Keefe Co.  v. Americable
Int'l, Inc., 169 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Tak- ing the evidence as it
appeared to the district judge on the  summary judgment motion,
Americable breached the agree- ment between the parties in 1988 by its
failure to make both  one-time and monthly installment payments due
under the  agreement. Keefe did not bring this action until 1994. Am-
ericable argued, and the district court held, that the three- year
statute of limitations had run on all of Keefe's claims,  holding that
a breach of the contract as a whole had occurred  with the first
nonpayment and repudiation by appellee.  Keefe argued, both before the
district court and on appeal,  that its early claims might be
time-barred, but that those that  were due within three years next




__________

n 1 Judge Wald was on the original panel but had left the court by  the
time this matter was decided and therefore did not participate  in
this decision.


action were still viable. Everyone agrees that the law of the  District
of Columbia governs. It is well established that we  treat the
District of Columbia as a state for purposes of the  Erie Doctrine,
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct.  817, 82 L.Ed. 1188
(1938); A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra  Int'l Banking Corp., 62
F.3d 1454, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995)  (citing Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593
F.2d 1275, 1278-80 (D.C. Cir.  1979)). We therefore consulted the
precedent established by  the highest court of the District of
Columbia, that is its Court  of Appeals, but found none on point. We
therefore certified  to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals the


Under District of Columbia law, and upon the facts  described in this
opinion, when parties have entered into  a contract in which payment
is due on the first of each  month, calculated as a percentage of the
promisor's  revenues from a specific service already rendered by the 
promissee, does the limitation period begin to run sepa- rately on
each missed payment, as is generally the case  with installment
contracts, or, does repudiation or breach  of the contract as a whole
trigger a single limitations  period?


Keefe Co. v. Americable Int'l, Inc., 169 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir.  1999).
On July 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals published an  opinion, Keefe
Co. v. Americable Int'l, Inc., 2000 WL 963356  (D.C. 2000), carefully
considering the certified question and  determined that the statute of
limitations on each of the  payments due under the contract ran
separately, and that  therefore, "the statute of limitations does not
bar Keefe's  action to recover installment payments that accrued
within  three years prior to the filing of the action." Id. at *9.


As we noted above, the controlling question is within the  jurisdiction
of the court of the District. That court has  spoken. Therefore, we
vacate the district court's judgment in  favor of the
defendant/appellee, and remand for further pro- ceedings consistent
with this opinion and that of the District  of Columbia Court of


So ordered.