UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT


UNITED STATES

v.

BOWIE, JUAN


99-3060a

D.C. Cir. 2000


*	*	*


Randolph, Circuit Judge: Juan Bowie appeals his convic- tion for
possession of counterfeit currency, claiming the dis- trict court
improperly admitted evidence of his possession of  counterfeit
currency on an earlier occasion. We find the  evidence admissible,
though not on all the grounds cited by  the district court, and
therefore affirm the conviction.


I.


On May 16, 1997, a joint Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion/Metropolitan
Police Department narcotics task force exe- cuted a search warrant at
a southeast Washington, D.C.  apartment. During the search, an officer
outside noticed  Paul Little sitting in the passenger side of a parked
green  Pontiac with Tennessee plates, drinking a beer and listening 
to loud music. Little told the officer the car belonged to  "Boo" and
consented to a search. He also indicated that the  driver was upstairs
in the apartment building and motioned  toward the apartment being
searched. Officers found Bowie  in the apartment. He identified
himself as "Boo" but denied  owning the Pontiac.


The search of the Pontiac turned up a large amount of  counterfeit
currency and several items linking Bowie to the  car. More than $3,000
of counterfeit twenty and fifty dollar  bills were inside a console
between the driver's and passen- ger's seats, laying underneath a
pager activation form signed  by Juan Bowie and dated May 16, 1997. In
the glove  compartment was a Maryland traffic ticket issued ten days 
earlier. The ticket named Juan Bowie and indicated he was  driving a
car with the same Tennessee plates. The glove  compartment also
contained a court document bearing Bow- ie's printed name and what
appeared to be his signature. An  additional $90 in counterfeit fifty
and twenty dollar bills were  inside the pocket of a black leather
jacket in the trunk. The  serial numbers on the counterfeit bills from
the Pontiac's  console and from the trunk were identical.


Secret Service agents summoned to the scene recognized  the serial
numbers on the bills as the subject of an ongoing  investigation. They
took Bowie to the Secret Service's Wash- ington Office for
questioning. Agents testified at trial that  Bowie confessed to owning
the money and the other items in  the Pontiac and admitted that, using
his brother Gary as an  intermediary, he had paid somebody named Kevin
$2,000 in  genuine currency for $10,000 in counterfeit bills, $1,000
of  which he had already spent. Despite his admission, the  Secret
Service found none of Bowie's fingerprints on the bills.


This was not Bowie's first arrest for possession of counter- feit
money. One month earlier, police in Maryland caught  Bowie with
counterfeit bills identical to those seized on May  16. At 11:30 a.m.
on April 17, 1997, Prince George's County  police responded to an
automobile accident involving Bowie.  He was driving a Chevrolet
Celebrity owned by a third party;  with him was James Toler. The
police arrested Bowie on an  outstanding warrant and impounded the car
because Toler,  the passenger, did not have a valid driver's license.
An  inventory of the car turned up approximately $1,300 in coun-
terfeit currency inside the pocket of a jacket. An officer  found an
additional $80 in counterfeit bills on Toler, but found  none on
Bowie. The serial numbers on all of these bills  matched those on the
counterfeit bills later seized on May 16.  Inside the car was a bag
containing a pair of Reebok shoes  and Reebok socks as well as a
receipt issued at 10:52 a.m.  that day from a nearby Lady Footlocker


Later in the day of April 17, police recovered from the  Laurel City
Mall Lady Footlocker a $50 counterfeit bill  bearing the same serial
number as the other $50 bills seized  from the Chevrolet Celebrity.
According to the manager of  the Lady Footlocker, just before 11:00
that morning, a medi- um-built man wearing a black leather jacket
purchased a pair  of Reebok running shoes and Reebok socks with a $50
bill  and a couple of twenties. The manager could not positively 
identify Bowie from a photo array as the man who had passed  the
counterfeit $50 bill. However, when Bowie and Toler  were arrested
with identical counterfeit bills a short distance  away from the
Laurel City Mall and only forty minutes after 


the Lady Footlocker transaction, Bowie was wearing a black  leather
jacket and Toler a green coat.


The indictment in this case charged Bowie with possessing  counterfeit
currency only on May 16, not on April 17. The  prosecution sought to
introduce evidence of the uncharged  April 17 incident as prior acts
evidence under Fed. R. Evid.  404(b). The district court admitted the
evidence over Bowie's  objection. As a result, a significant portion
of the trial was  devoted to Bowie's arrest on April 17, 1997, the
discovery of  counterfeit notes in the car and on the passenger that
day,  and the passing of a counterfeit bill at the Lady Footlocker. 
The jury convicted Bowie of possessing counterfeit obli- gations and
he was sentenced to 41 months incarceration.  Bowie's only argument on
appeal is that admission of evi- dence of the April 17 incident
violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).


II.


Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits "evidence of  other crimes,
wrongs, or acts * * * to prove the character of  a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith." It  permits such evidence for
purposes unrelated to the defen- dant's character or propensity to
commit crime, such as  "proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan,  knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Fed.  R. Evid. 404(b). When the government plans to
introduce  "bad acts" evidence, it must, upon request by the accused, 
give notice of the "general nature of any such evidence." Id.  We
review the district court's Rule 404(b) rulings for abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 25-26  (D.C.
Cir. 2000); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498,  1532 (D.C. Cir.


The district court admitted evidence of the April 17 inci- dent on
alternative grounds. The court first found the evi- dence not barred
by Rule 404(b) on the basis that it was  "inextricably intertwined"
with Bowie's possession of counter- feit bills on May 16. Because the
serial numbers on the bills  seized in April tallied with those seized
in May, the April  evidence was, the court thought, "in some sense
really evi-


dence of the same crime." The court also found that the  April evidence
had permissible non-propensity purposes un- der Rule 404(b), chiefly
to establish Bowie's intent to defraud  and his knowledge of the
bills' inauthenticity but also to  corroborate his confession to the
Secret Service.


A.


We begin with the district court's ruling that Rule 404(b)  did not
apply to the April evidence. The court relied on a  line of decisions
in this and the other circuits holding that  Rule 404(b) does not
apply to evidence that is "inextricably  intertwined" with the crime
charged. See, e.g., United States  v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). The theory is  that because Rule 404(b) applies only to
evidence of a defen- dant's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," it
creates a dichotomy  between crimes or acts that constitute the
charged crime and  crimes or acts that do not. Professors Wright and
Graham  explain: "One of the key words in determining the scope of 
Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other'  than
those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible  under the
general rule." See 22 Charles Alan Wright &  Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
Federal Practice and Procedure  s 5239, at 445 (1978). Courts have
denominated evidence of  the same crime "intrinsic" and evidence of


As a practical matter, it is hard to see what function this 
interpretation of Rule 404(b) performs. If the so-called "in- trinsic"
act is indeed part of the crime charged, evidence of it  will, by
definition, always satisfy Rule 404(b). The rule bars  bad acts
evidence only when the evidence is offered solely to  "prove the
character of a person in order to show action in  conformity
therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence that  constitutes the very
crime being prosecuted is not of that  sort. So far as we can tell,
the only consequences of labeling  evidence "intrinsic" are to relieve
the prosecution of Rule  404(b)'s notice requirement and the court of
its obligation to  give an appropriate limiting instruction upon
defense coun- sel's request. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory


note on the 1991 amendment (indicating that the notice  requirement
does not apply to "intrinsic" evidence); Fed. R.  Evid. 105
(mandating, upon request, limiting instruction for  multi-purpose
evidence); United States v. Lewis, 693 F.2d  189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(requiring a court to issue a limiting  instruction without prior
request only if the evidence "has the  potential for substantially
prejudicing the defendant."); Unit- ed States v. Miller, 895 F.2d
1431, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1990).


Bifurcating the universe into intrinsic and extrinsic evi- dence has
proven difficult in practice. Which of a defendant's  acts should be
considered the charged crime and which  should not is often uncertain.
In order to brighten the line  separating intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence, many courts have  focused on the connection between a given
crime or act and  the charged crime. When evidence is "inextricably
inter- twined" with the charged crime, courts typically treat it as 
the same crime.1 Every circuit now applies some formulation  of the
inextricably intertwined "test." See United States v. 
Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989); United  States
v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000); United  States v. Gibbs,
190 F.3d 188, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1999); United  States v. Lipford, 203
F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2000); United  States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849,
861 (5th Cir. 1997); United  States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th
Cir. 1995); United  States v. Hughes, 213 F.3d 323, 329 (7th Cir.
2000); United  States v. O'Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2000);
United  States v. Matthews, 226 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. O'Brien, 131 F.3d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir.  1997);
United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.  1997). This
court has characterized evidence as inextricably  intertwined with the
charged crime in four cases. See United  States v. Allen, 960 F.2d at
1058; United States v. Washing- ton, 12 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir.




__________

n 1 "Inextricably intertwined," "intricately related," "intimately re-
lated," and other variations on this theme are used by different 
courts to express the same concept, namely the interconnectedness 
between a given crime or act and the charged crime. We will use 
"inextricably intertwined" in this opinion because the district court 
relied on it and it is recited more often in the case law.


Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1473-75 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States  v.
Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1998).


As we have written, treating evidence as inextricably inter- twined not
only bypasses Rule 404(b) and its attendant notice  requirement, but
also carries the implicit finding that the  evidence is admissible for
all purposes notwithstanding its  bearing on character, thus
eliminating the defense's entitle- ment, upon request, to a jury
instruction. See Fed. R. Evid.  105. There is, as well, a danger that
finding evidence "inex- tricably intertwined" may too easily slip from
analysis to  mere conclusion. What does the "inextricably intertwined"
 concept entail? When is a defendant's crime or act so 
indistinguishable from the charged crime that an item of  evidence is
entirely removed from Rule 404(b)?


We have not defined "inextricably intertwined" in the few  Rule 404(b)
cases in which we used those terms. See United  States v. Allen, 960
F.2d at 1058; United States v. Washing- ton, 12 F.3d at 1134-35;
United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d at  1473-75; United States v. Gartmon,
146 F.3d at 1020. Our  sister circuits have attempted various
formulations. The  Seventh Circuit, for instance, examines "whether
the evidence  is properly admitted to provide the jury with a complete
story  of the crime on trial, whether its absence would create a 
chronological or conceptual void in the story of the crime or  whether
it is 'so blended or connected' that it incidentally  involves,
explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends to  prove any element
of, the charged crime." United States v.  Hughes, 213 F.3d 323, 329
(7th Cir. 2000). According to the  Second Circuit, "evidence of
uncharged criminal activity is not  considered other crimes evidence
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) if  it arose out of the same transaction or
series of transactions  as the charged offense, if it is inextricably
intertwined with  the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it
is neces- sary to complete the story of the crime on trial." United 
States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000).


We do not find these formulations particularly helpful.  Some are
circular: inextricably intertwined evidence is intrin- sic, and
evidence is intrinsic if it is inextricably intertwined.  Others are
over-broad. The "complete the story" definition 


of "inextricably intertwined" threatens to override Rule  404(b). A
defendant's bad act may be only tangentially  related to the charged
crime, but it nevetheless could "com- plete the story" or
"incidentally involve" the charged offense  or "explain the
circumstances." If the prosecution's evidence  did not "explain" or
"incidentally involve" the charged crime,  it is difficult to see how
it could pass the minimal requirement  for admissibility that evidence
be relevant. See Fed. R. Evid.  401 and 402.


The district court invoked the "res gestae" doctrine in  finding the
April 17 evidence inextricably intertwined with the  charged crime.
See 10/2/98 Tr. 98. To the extent this  Latinism2 was meant to suggest
that the April 17 evidence  was outside Rule 404(b) because it
"explained the events" or  "completed the story," we do not agree. As
we have said, all  relevant prosecution evidence explains the crime or
completes  the story. The fact that omitting some evidence would 
render a story slightly less complete cannot justify circum- venting
Rule 404(b) altogether. Moreover, evidence neces- sary to complete a
story--for instance by furnishing a motive  or establishing
identity--typically has a non-propensity pur- pose and is admissible
under Rule 404(b). We see no reason  to relieve the government and the
district court from the  obligation of selecting from the myriad of
non-propensity  purposes available to complete most any story.


We recognize that, at least in a narrow range of circum- stances not
implicated here, evidence can be "intrinsic to" the  charged crime.
Rule 404(b), for instance, would not have  barred testimony from a
witness who saw Bowie put the  counterfeit currency in the Pontiac's
console. Although such  testimony relates to one of defendant's acts,
the act is the  charged crime of possessing counterfeit currency.3
See, e.g., 




__________

n 2 See United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir.  1981)
(stating that the inextricably intertwined doctrine is some- times
labeled res gestae, "an appellation that tends merely to  obscure the
analysis underlying the admissibility of the evidence.").


3 As noted earlier, the "intrinsic" label is unnecessary, as such 
evidence by nature does not "prove the character of a person in 


Badru, 97 F.3d at 1474-75 (evidence "offered as direct evi- dence of
the fact in issue" is not an "other" crime). In other  words, if the
evidence is of an act that is part of the charged  offense, it is
properly considered intrinsic. In addition, some  uncharged acts
performed contemporaneously with the  charged crime may be termed
intrinsic if they facilitate the  commission of the charged crime. See
22 Wright & Graham,  supra, s 5239, at 446-47 (noting that the
"inseparable  crimes" interpretation of Rule 404(b)'s "other" crimes
lan- guage "seems justifiable when used to cover situations where  the
seller of contraband must necessarily be shown to have  possessed


On the other hand, we are confident that there is no  general "complete
the story" or "explain the circumstances"  exception to Rule 404(b) in
this Circuit. Such broad exclu- sions have no discernible grounding in
the "other crimes,  wrongs, or acts" language of the rule. Rule
404(b), and  particularly its notice requirement, should not be
disregarded  on such a flimsy basis.


As to Bowie's case, we do not see how his acts on April 17  constituted
the same crime as that charged in the indictment.  The authorities
seized the counterfeit bills he had in posses- sion on April 17, so
the bills he possessed on May 16 could not  have been the same ones.
Contrast United States v. Towne,  870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989)
("The continuous possession  of the same gun does not amount to a
series of crimes, but  rather constitutes a single offense."). All of
the bills--those  recovered in April and those seized in May--were
doubtless  from the same supplier and possibly the same batch, and the
 evidence indicated that Bowie purchased them at one time.  But the
indictment charged him only with possession of the  counterfeit bills
found on May 16. Given the charge, the  April evidence was relevant,
for reasons we give later. But it  cannot be that all evidence tending
to prove the crime is part  of the crime. If that were so, Rule 404(b)
would be a nullity. 




__________

n order to show action in conformity therewith." It is thus admissible 
whether viewed as "intrinsic" or as containing no propensity infer-
ence.


While we therefore disagree with the district court that the  April
evidence was outside Rule 404(b), we agree with the  court's
alternative ruling that the government satisfied Rule  404(b).


B.


Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion.  "[A]lthough
the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is 'framed  restrictively,' the rule
itself 'is quite permissive,' prohibiting  the admission of other
crimes evidence 'in but one circum- stance'--for the purpose of
proving that a person's actions  conformed to his character." United
States v. Crowder, 141  F.3d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(Crowder II),  quoting United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1180
(D.C.  Cir. 1991). Compliance with Rule 404(b) does not itself  assure
admission of the other crimes evidence. If the defen- dant moves under
Rule 403, the court may exclude the  evidence on the basis that it is
"unfairly prejudicial, cumula- tive or the like, its relevance
notwithstanding." See Old Chief  v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179
(1997). The Supreme  Court made much the same point in Huddleston v.
United  States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988): if evidence is offered for a
 proper purpose under Rule 404(b), "the evidence is subject  only to
general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules  402 and


Rule 404(b) thus is not so much a character rule as a  special aspect
of relevance, constituting but one of many  exceptions to the general
rule that "all relevant evidence is  admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402.
The rule does not prohibit  character evidence generally, only that
which lacks any pur- pose but proving character. See Crowder II, 141
F.3d at  1206. A proper analysis under Rule 404(b) begins with the 
question of relevance: is the other crime or act relevant and,  if so,
relevant to something other than the defendant's char- acter or
propensity? If yes, the evidence is admissible unless  excluded under
other rules of evidence such as Rule 403.  Stated more formally, a
Rule 404(b) objection will not be  sustained if: 1) the evidence of
other crimes or acts is 


relevant in that it has "any tendency to make the existence of  any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the  action more
probable or less probable than it would be  without the evidence,"
Fed. R. Evid. 401; 2) the fact of  consequence to which the evidence
is directed relates to a  matter in issue other than the defendant's
character or  propensity to commit crime; and 3) the evidence is
sufficient  to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the
 other crime or act, see Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.  681,
689-90 (1988). See also United States v. Mathis, 216  F.3d 18, 26
(D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Gaviria, 116  F.3d 1498, 1532 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); United States v. Washing- ton, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080-81


In light of this standard, the district court properly admit- ted
evidence of the April 17 incident to show Bowie's intent  and
knowledge. To convict Bowie under 18 U.S.C. s 472,4  the government
had to prove three elements: possession of  counterfeit notes, intent
to defraud, and knowledge the notes  were counterfeit. See, e.g.,
Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d  1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Bolin, 35 F.3d  306, 309 (7th Cir. 1994). Intent and
knowledge were there- fore facts of consequence to the case. Evidence
that Bowie  possessed and passed counterfeit notes on a prior occasion
 was relevant because it decreased the likelihood that Bowie 
accidentally or innocently possessed the counterfeit notes on  May 16.
See Fed. R. Evid. 401; United States v. Burch, 156  F.3d 1315, 1324
(D.C. Cir. 1998). Intent and knowledge are  also well-established
non-propensity purposes for admitting  evidence of prior crimes or
acts. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  The government presented sufficient
evidence for a jury to  conclude that Bowie possessed counterfeit
currency on April  17 and passed a counterfeit note that day at the




__________

n 4 Title 18, U.S.C. s 472 states: "Whoever, with intent to defraud, 
passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass, utter, pub-
lish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States or 
keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counter-
feited, or altered obligation or other security of the United States, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than fifteen 
years, or both."


Mall Lady Footlocker. The government established that a  person
matching Bowie's description passed a counterfeit bill  with the same
serial number as on the bills found in the car  Bowie was driving and
on his passenger. Although the police  found no counterfeit bills on
Bowie's person, the jury heard  testimony that the man passing the
bill wore a black leather  jacket, and that when Bowie and Toler were
arrested barely  forty minutes later with matching counterfeit bills
and a  receipt from the Lady Footlocker, Bowie was wearing a black 
leather jacket and Toler a green coat.


This much Bowie does not contest. Rather, he claims that  the district
court inadequately weighed the probative value of  the evidence
against its potential for unfair prejudice. Evi- dence of other crimes
or acts having a legitimate non- propensity purpose undoubtedly may
contain the seeds of a  forbidden propensity inference. Recognizing
this possibility,  we have consistently stated that Rule 403 may bar
evidence  otherwise admissible under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United 
States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We do not, 
however, prescribe any specific form this balancing must  take, and
will not reverse for failure to make a formal Rule  403 finding if the
applicable considerations are apparent from  the record. See United
States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015,  1022 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United
States v. Washington, 12 F.3d  1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Bowie's
claim that the district  court performed no Rule 403 analysis at all
regarding intent  and knowledge is belied by the record. The court may
not  have recited Rule 403 verbatim, but it expressly considered  the
probative value versus the risk of unfair prejudice before  admitting
evidence of the April 17 events. See 11/10/98 Tr.  23-24; United
States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.  Cir. 1998).


On the probative value side of the balance, Bowie claims  that his
offer to stipulate deprived evidence of intent and  knowledge of its
probative force because "those issues were  not even contested." Brief
of Appellant at 24. Before trial,  Bowie orally offered to stipulate
that whoever possessed the  currency seized on May 16 had the
requisite intent to defraud  and guilty knowledge, but Bowie never
presented a proposed 


written stipulation or a jury instruction.5 Two months before  trial,
Bowie told the court that "we'll stipulate to whoever had  the intent
knew it was--we're not going to put at issue that  whoever had it
didn't know it was counterfeit." 10/2/98 Tr.  96. Five weeks later, he
stated that "if you want intent, we'll  stipulate to intent. If you
want knowledge, we'll stipulate to  knowledge. We'll stipulate to
absence of mistake....  Knowledge can be just about anything [the
prosecutor] wants  as far as the intent to defraud or the intent or
the absence of  mistake or knowledge." 11/10/98 Tr. 20-21. Bowie's
offers  encompassed only intent and knowledge, not corroboration:  he
never offered to stipulate that he confessed to owning the  money and
other items found in the Pontiac on May 16 and to  having paid $2,000
in genuine currency for $10,000 in counter- feit.


Whatever merit Bowie's stipulation argument had before,  see United
States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996)  (en banc) (Crowder
I), vacated, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), recent  cases in this court and the
Supreme Court have eviscerated  its conceptual underpinnings. We
briefly adopted Bowie's  reasoning in Crowder I but later discarded it
in light of Old  Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). In
Crowder II,  we held that "a defendant's offer to stipulate to an
element of  an offense does not render the government's other crimes 
evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(b) to prove that ele- ment, even
if the defendant's proposed stipulation is unequiv- ocal, and even if
the defendant agrees to a jury instruction of  the sort mentioned in
[Crowder I]." Crowder II, 141 F.3d at  1209. Following the Supreme
Court's lead in Old Chief, we  reiterated that evidence may be
relevant under the Federal  Rules of Evidence whether or not the issue
it relates to is  disputed. See 141 F.3d at 1206; see also Old Chief,
519 U.S.  at 179 (evidence going to an undisputed fact may be
relevant,  and "its exclusion must rest not on the ground that the




__________

n 5 Bowie suggested at one point that a "must-charge" jury instruc-
tion like that discussed in United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), would do. 
He did not offer his own jury instruction or one from a case that  has
not been overruled.


evidence has rendered it 'irrelevant,' but on its character as 
unfairly prejudicial, cumulative or the like, its relevance not-
withstanding"). We concluded that offers to stipulate may  figure into
the Rule 403 balancing, but cautioned that such  offers are not
determinative. See 141 F.3d at 1210.


Bowie's stipulation argument is identical to the one we  rejected in
Crowder II. In the district court, Bowie tried to  deflect the impact
of that case by arguing that "based on  Crowder I, we could offer to
stipulate and give a must-charge  instruction and in so doing estop
the government from intro- ducing that. All Crowder II has done is
said no, we're not  going to let the defendant make the choice. We're
going to  let the Court make the choice." 11/10/98 Tr. 20-21. Bowie's 
supposition misses the fundamental point of Old Chief and  Crowder II,
which is that evidence of undisputed issues may  be relevant and
highly probative regardless of the defen- dant's willingness to
concede certain points. Crowder II does  not, as Bowie insists,
transfer the power to "estop" the  government from the defendant to
the district court; rather,  it denies that offers to stipulate confer
any such power at all.  To exclude relevant evidence based on an offer
to stipulate,  the district court must do so under Rule 403, mindful
of the  Supreme Court's admonition in Old Chief of the central role 
of narrative integrity and our instruction in Crowder II that  an
offer to stipulate does not automatically tilt the Rule 403  balance.
See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187-89; Crowder II, 141  F.3d at 1210.


Aside from the conceptual deficiencies in Bowie's argument,  the
stipulations he offered are indistinguishable from the  offers to
stipulate that we rejected in Crowder II as wholly  insufficient. In
Crowder II, the defendants offered to con- cede "only that 'anybody
who possessed those drugs pos- sessed them with the intent to
distribute'." See 141 F.3d at  1208. Similarly, Bowie offered to
stipulate that some hypo- thetical person in possession of counterfeit
currency had the  requisite intent and knowledge. Crowder II is so
closely on  point to Bowie's proposed stipulation that we can
transplant  wholesale the reasoning from that case, changing only the 
defendant's name and the label of the crime. As in Crowder 


II, some hypothetical individual was not on trial, Bowie was.  And it
was Bowie's intent and knowledge, not "anybody's,"  that the
prosecution had to establish to the jury's satisfaction.  Yet the
prosecution's evidence of Bowie's prior counterfeit  currency
possession--a possession so close in time and cir- cumstance to that
charged in the indictment--was not meant  to show that someone had
intent and knowledge. The evi- dence was introduced to prove that
Bowie had the intent to  defraud and that Bowie knew what he was
possessing. Bow- ie's proposed stipulation could not possibly have
substituted  for such proof. It did not even mention him by name. Far 
from a choice between "propositions of slightly varying ab-
straction," the choice in this case was between concrete  evidence of
the defendant's actions giving rise to natural and  sensible
inferences, and abstract stipulations about hypotheti- cal persons not


Bowie's offer to stipulate contains yet another fatal defect.  The
district court admitted the prior crimes evidence in part  to
corroborate Bowie's confession.6 Yet Bowie never offered  to stipulate
that he told the Secret Service that he owned the  counterfeit
currency and other items found in the Pontiac on  May 16 and that he
had paid $2,000 in genuine currency for  $10,000 in counterfeit. The
April evidence corroborates the  last element of Bowie's confession
because it increases the  probability that Bowie did buy $10,000 in
counterfeit currency  for $2,000 in genuine currency. See Fed. R.
Evid. 401.  Adding the money seized in April (approximately $1,400) to
 that seized in May (approximately $3,100) gets us closer to  the
$10,000 Bowie said he bought, less the $1,000 he said he  spent.
Although Rule 404(b) does not explicitly list corrobora- tion among
its examples of non-propensity purposes, evidence  of other crimes or
acts is admissible to corroborate evidence  that itself has a
legitimate non-propensity purpose. See  United States v. Everett, 825
F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir. 1987);  United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281,
285 (7th Cir. 1995);  United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1370-71
(9th Cir. 1993);  United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1018-19




__________

n 6 Bowie has not argued against the admission of his confession.


1991); United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th  Cir. 2000);
United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1405  (11th Cir. 1998).7
Bowie's stipulation argument fails to recog- nize the legitimacy of
corroboration as a non-propensity pur- pose. To merit consideration,
an offer to stipulate must, at a  minimum, address all legitimate uses
of a piece of evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d
436, 441 n.3 (D.C.  Cir. 1994).


As in Crowder II, the April evidence had "multiple utility."  141 F.3d
at 1208. It not only tended to establish Bowie's  intent and
knowledge, but also corroborated Bowie's confes- sion to the Secret
Service. A "piece of evidence," the Court  wrote in Old Chief, "may
address any number of separate  elements, striking hard just because
it shows so much at  once." Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187.


Bowie's arguments on the prejudice side of the Rule 403  balance
warrant only a few words. Contrary to his claim that  the prior crimes
evidence threatened to mislead the jury  because Bowie had not been
convicted, the chain of inferences  connecting Bowie to the money on
April 17 was easily within  the jury's reach. See supra pp. 11-12; see
also Weinstein's  Federal Evidence s 404.21[2][b] (1997) ("extrinsic
evidence  need not establish that other criminal activity resulted in
a  conviction"). As for Bowie's argument that the prior crimes 
evidence created a substantial risk of convicting him based on 
character evidence, the district court did not abuse its discre- tion
in finding that the risk of unfair prejudice did not  substantially
outweigh its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid.  403.




__________

n 7 Some courts have imposed additional requirements for bad acts 
evidence introduced for the purpose of corroboration, requiring that 
the corroboration be direct and the corroborated matter be signifi-
cant. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1993). 
We see no reason to create such special rules. The underlying 
concerns are properly addressed through Rule 403.


In sum, neither Rule 404(b) nor Rule 403 barred admission  of the April
17 evidence to prove Bowie's intent and knowl- edge and to corroborate
his confession to the Secret Service.


Affirmed.