THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1993-1994
UNITED STATES
v.
ALVAREZ-SANCHEZ
511 U.S. 350
1994
* * *
SYLLABUS: UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ-SANCHEZ
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 92-1812. Argued March 1, 1994-Decided May 2, 1994
Nearly three days after local law enforcement officers arrested respondent on state narcotics charges, and while he was still in the custody of those officers, respondent confessed to United States Secret Service agents that he knew that Federal Reserve Notes the local officers had discovered while searching his home were counterfeit. The agents arrested him for possessing counterfeit currency and presented him on a federal complaint the following day. The Federal District Court refused to suppress the confession, rejecting, inter alia, respondent's argument that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered the confession inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501(c), which provides that a confession made while a defendant is ``under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before [a judicial officer] empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States'' if the confession was made voluntarily and ``within six hours'' following the arrest or other detention. Respondent was convicted. In vacating the conviction, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, by negative implication, Sec. 3501(c) permits suppression in cases where a confession is made outside the subsection's 6-hour post-arrest safe harbor period. The court concluded that Sec. 3501(c) applied to respondent's statement because respondent was in custody and had not been presented to a magistrate at the time he confessed, and held that the confession should have been suppressed.
Held: Section 3501(c) does not apply to statements made by a person who is being held solely on state charges. Pp. 5-11.
(a) The subsection's text clearly indicates that its terms were never triggered in this case. Respondent errs in suggesting that, because the statute refers to a person in the custody of ``any'' law enforcement officer or agency, the 6-hour time period begins to run whenever a person is arrested by local, state, or federal officers. The subsection can apply only when there is some ``delay'' in presenting a person to a federal judicial officer. Because the term delay presumes an obligation to act, there can be no ``delay'' in bringing a person before a federal judicial officer until there is some obligation to do so in the first place. Such a duty does not arise until the person is arrested or detained for a federal crime. Although a person arrested on a federal charge by any officer- local, state, or federal-is under ``arrest or other detention'' for the purposes of Sec. 3501(c) and its safe harbor period, one arrested on state charges is not. This is true even if the arresting officers believe or have cause to believe that federal law also has been violated, because such a belief does not alter the underlying basis for the arrest and subsequent custody. Pp. 5-8.
(b) Respondent was under arrest on state charges when he made his inculpatory statement to the Secret Service agents. Section 3501(c)'s terms thus did not come into play until he was arrested on a federal charge-after he made the statement. That he was never arraigned or prosecuted on the state charges does not alter this conclusion. Finally, there is no need to consider the situation that would arise if state or local authorities and federal officers act in collusion to obtain a confession in violation of a defendant's right to a prompt federal presentment, because in this case there was no such collusive arrangement, only routine cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Pp. 9-10.
975 F.2d 1396, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
OPINION OF THE COURT:
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 2, 1994]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the scope of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501, the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions. Respondent contends that Sec. 3501(c), which provides that a custodial confession made by a person within six hours following his arrest "shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person" before a federal magistrate, rendered inadmissible the custodial statement he made more than six hours after his arrest on state criminal charges. We conclude, however, that Sec. 3501(c) does not apply to statements made by a person who is being held solely on state charges. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
On Friday, August 5, 1988, officers of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department obtained a warrant to search respondent's residence for heroin and other evidence of narcotics distribution. While executing the warrant later that day, the officers discovered not only narcotics, but $2,260 in counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes. Respondent was arrested and booked on state felony narcotics charges at approximately 5:40 p.m. He spent the weekend in custody.
On Monday morning, August 8, the Sheriff's Department informed the United States Secret Service of the counterfeit currency found in respondent's residence. Two Secret Service agents arrived at the Sheriff's Department shortly before midday to take possession of the currency and to interview respondent. Using a deputy sheriff as an interpreter, the agents informed respondent of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After waiving these rights, respondent admitted that he had known that the currency was counterfeit. The agents arrested respondent shortly thereafter, took him to the Secret Service field office for booking, and prepared a criminal complaint. Due to congestion in the federal magistrate's docket, respondent was not presented on the federal complaint until the following day.[1]
Respondent was indicted for unlawful possession of counterfeit currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 472. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the statement he had made during his interview with the Secret Service agents. He argued that his confession was made without a voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights, and that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501(c).[2]
[1] For reasons that are not apparent from the record, respondent was never arraigned or prosecuted by the State of California on the state drug charges.
[2] Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501 provides:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence . . . .
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment . . . .
"The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
"(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detenti/n i& the ctrtn
CONCURRING OPINION:
TOC: Syllabus > Opinion of the Court > >
CASE STATISTICSCASES: 384 U.S. 436; 975 F. 2d 1396;
STATUTES: 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 472;
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