THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1995-1996
THOMPSON
v.
KEOHANE
516 U.S. 99
1996
* * *
SYLLABUS: THOMPSON v. KEOHANE, WARDEN, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 94-6615. Argued October 11, 1995-Decided November 29, 1995
During a two-hour, tape-recorded session at Alaska state trooper headquarters, petitioner Thompson confessed he had killed his former wife. Thompson maintained that the troopers gained his confession without according him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. The Alaska trial court denied his motion to suppress the confession, however, ruling that he was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, therefore the troopers were not required to inform him of his Miranda rights. After a trial at which the prosecution played the tape-recorded confession, the jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree murder, and the Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed his conviction. The Federal District Court denied Thompson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Both courts held that a state court's ruling that a defendant was not ``in custody'' for Miranda purposes qualifies as a ``fact'' determination entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d).
Held: State-court "in custody" rulings, made to determine whether Miranda warnings are due, do not qualify for a presumption of correctness under Sec. 2254(d). Such rulings do not resolve ``a factual issue.'' Instead, they resolve mixed questions of law and fact and therefore warrant independent review by the federal habeas court. Pp. 6-17.
(a) Section 2254(d) declares that, in a federal habeas proceeding instituted by a person in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment, the state court's determination of "a factual issue" ordinarily "shall be presumed to be correct." This Court has held that "basic, primary, or historical facts" are the "factual issue[s]" to which the statutory presumption of correctness dominantly relates. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112. Nonetheless, the proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery. Two lines of decisions compose the Court's Sec. 2254(d) law/fact jurisprudence. In several cases, the Court has classified as ``factual issues'' within Sec. 2254(d)'s compass questions extending beyond the determination of ``what happened.'' The resolution of the issues involved in these cases, notably competency to stand trial and juror impartiality, depends heavily on the trial court's superior ability to appraise witness credibility and demeanor. On the other hand, the Court has recognized the ``uniquely legal dimension'' presented by issues such as the voluntariness of a confession and the effectiveness of counsel's assistance and has ranked these as questions of law for Sec. 2254(d) purposes. ``What happened'' determinations in these cases warrant a presumption of correctness, but ``the ultimate question,'' the Court has declared, remains outside Sec. 2254(d)'s domain and is ``a matter for independent federal determination.'' Ibid. Pp. 7-12.
(b) The ultimate "in custody" determination for Miranda purposes fits within the latter class of cases. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination whether there was ``a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'' California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125. The first inquiry-i.e., what circumstances surrounded the interrogation-is distinctly factual and state-court findings in response to that inquiry attract a presumption of correctness under Sec. 2254(d). The second inquiry-i.e., would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave-calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts and thus presents a "mixed question of law and fact" qualifying for independent review. The practical considerations that have prompted the Court to type questions like juror bias and competency to stand trial as "factual issue[s]" do not dominate ``in custody'' inquiries. In such inquiries, the trial court's superior capacity to resolve credibility issues is not the foremost factor. Notably absent from the trial court's purview is any first-person vantage on whether a defendant, when interrogated, was so situated as to be ``in custody'' for Miranda purposes. Thus, once the historical facts are resolved, the state court is not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to make the ultimate determination of the consistency of the law enforcement officer's conduct with the federal Miranda warning requirement. Furthermore, classifying ``in custody'' as a determination qualifying for independent review should serve legitimate law enforcement interests as effectively as it serves to insure protection of the right against self-incrimination. As the Court's decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law. Pp. 12-16.
34 F.3d 1073, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined.
DISSENTING OPINION: Opinion of Thomas, J. (dissenting)
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[November 29, 1995]
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
Carl Thompson murdered his ex-wife, stabbing her 29 times. He then wrapped her body in chains and a bedspread and tossed the corpse into a water-filled gravel pit. As part of their investigation, police officers in Fairbanks, Alaska, questioned Thompson about his role in the murder, and Thompson confessed. Thompson was repeatedly told that he could leave the interview and was, in fact, permitted to leave at the close of questioning. I believe that the Alaska trial judge-who first decided this question almost a decade ago-was in a far better position than a federal habeas court to determine whether Thompson was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). So long as that judgment finds fair support in the record, I would presume that it is correct. I dissent.
To determine whether a person is "in custody" under Miranda, "a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but `the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam), quoting in turn Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood his situation." 511 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).
I agree with the majority that a legal standard must be applied by a state trial judge in making the Miranda custody inquiry. In light of our more recent decisions applying Sec. 2254(d), however, I do not agree that the standards articulated in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992), for distinguishing factual issues from mixed questions of law and fact, dictate a result either way in this case. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985) (juror bias determination is a question of fact, even though "[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037, n. 12 (1984) (juror bias is a question of fact although "[t]here are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified"). Because the Miranda custody issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact," we must decide, "as a matter of the sound administration of justice, [which] judicial actor is better positioned . . . to decide the issue in question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
The state trial judge is, in my estimation, the best-positioned judicial actor to decide the relatively straightforward and fact-laden question of Miranda custody. See California v. Beheler, supra, at 1128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (state "courts are far better equipped than we are to assess the police practices that are highly relevant to the determination whether particular circumstances amount to custodial interrogation"). In making the custody determination, the state trial judge must consider a complex of diverse and case-specific factors in an effort to gain an overall sense of the defendant's situation at the time of the interrogation. These factors include, at a minimum, the location, timing, and length of the interview, the nature and tone of the questioning, whether the defendant came to the place of questioning voluntarily, the use of physical contact or physical restraint, and the demeanor of all of the key players, both during the interview and in any proceedings held in court. In assessing all of these facts, the state trial judge will often take live testimony, consider documentary evidence, and listen to audiotapes or watch videotapes of the interrogation. Assessments of credibility and demeanor are crucial to the ultimate determination, for the trial judge will often have to weigh conflicting accounts of what transpired. The trial judge is also likely to draw inferences, which are similarly entitled to deference, from "physical or documentary evidence or . . . other facts." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). The Miranda custody inquiry is thus often a matter of "shades and degrees," Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 16), that requires the state trial judge to make any number of "`fact-intensive, close calls.'" Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (citation omitted).
The majority is quite right that the test contains an objective component-how a "reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood his situation," Stansbury v. California, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6)-but this alone cannot be dispositive of whether the determination should be reviewed deferentially. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., supra, at 402 (Rule 11 and negligence determinations, both of which involve objective tests, are subject to deferential review). "[T]he line between pure facts . . . and . . . the application to them of a legal standard that is as non-technical-as commonsensical-as reasonableness is a faint one." United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 559 (CA7 1994) (Posner, C. J., concurring). It distorts reality to say that all of the subtle, factbound assessments that go into determining what it was like to be "in the suspect's shoes" simply go out the window when it comes time for the "ultimate inquiry," ante, at 13, of how a reasonable person would have assessed the situation. "The state trial court [is] in the unique position, after observing [the defendant] and listening to the evidence presented at trial, to determine whether a reasonable person in [defendant's] position would have felt free to leave the police station." Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1419 (CA11 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940 (1992). It is only in light of these case-specific determinations that the reasonable person test can be meaningfully applied. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., supra, at 402 ("Familiar with the issues and litigants, the [trial] court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard").
For these reasons, I have no doubt that the state trier of fact is best situated to put himself in the suspect's shoes, and consequently is in a better position to determine what it would have been like for a reasonable man to be in the suspect's shoes. Federal habeas courts, often reviewing the cold record as much as a decade after the initial determination, are in an inferior position to make this assessment. Though some of the state court's factual determinations may, perhaps, be reflected on the record, many of the case-specific assessments that comprise the state trial judge's ultimate determination are subtle, difficult to reduce to writing, and unlikely to be preserved in any meaningful way for review on appeal. "State courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 15). "Absent indication to the contrary, state courts should be presumed to have applied federal law as faithfully as federal courts." Withrow v. Williams, supra, at ___ (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 9-10). We insult our colleagues in the States when we imply, as we do today, that state judges are not sufficiently competent and reliable to make a decision as straightforward as whether a person was in custody for purposes of Miranda. See 507 U.S., at ___ (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 19) ("We can depend on law enforcement officials to administer [Miranda] warnings in the first instance and the state courts to provide a remedy when law enforcement officers err").[1]
I also see no reason to remand this case to the Ninth Circuit for further analysis. There is no dispute that Thompson came to the police station voluntarily. There is no dispute that he was repeatedly told he could leave the police station at any time. And it is also clear that he left the police station freely at the end of the interrogation. In California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam), we held that a person is not in custody if "the suspect is not placed under arrest, voluntarily comes to the police station, and is allowed to leave unhindered by police after a brief interview." Ibid. And in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam), we found it "clear" that the defendant was not in Miranda custody where he "came voluntarily to the police station, . . . was immediately informed that he was not under arrest," and "[a]t the close of a 1/2-hour interview . . . did in fact leave the police station without hindrance." Id., at 495; see also ibid. ("Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect"). Because Thompson cannot establish a Miranda violation even under de novo review, I would resolve that question now, and avoid putting the State of Alaska to the uncertainty and expense of defending for the sixth time in nine years an eminently reasonable judgment secured against a confessed murderer.[2]
I respectfully dissent.
[1] The majority believes that federal oversight of state court custody judgments is necessary to "advanc[e] uniform outcomes," and when that cannot be achieved, to "reduce the area of uncertainty." Ante, at 14, n. 13. While uniformity of outcome is a virtue worth pursuing generally, we determined in a line of cases beginning with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), that on habeas, uniformity must give way to concerns of comity and finality. See id., at 310 ("The `costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus . . . generally far outweigh the benefits of this application'") (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)). Federal habeas review is not the time for fine-tuning constitutional rules of criminal procedure at the expense of valid state convictions based on reasonable applications of then-existing law. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) ("The `new rule' principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts").
[2] To the extent Thompson's claim has any merit at all, it seems certain that relief is barred by our decision in Teague v. Lane, supra, at 301, 310 (plurality opinion), and its progeny. "The interests in finality, predictability, and comity underlying our new rule jurisprudence may be undermined to an equal degree by the invocation of a rule that was not dictated by precedent as by the application of an old rule in a manner that was not dictated by precedent." Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992). In this case, it is clear that "granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent." Ibid. In light of Beheler and Mathiason, the State's judgment was, at the very least, reasonable. And "Teague insulates on habeas review the state courts' `"reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents."'" Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292, n. 8 (1992) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990), quoting in turn Butler v. McKellar, supra, at 414).
TOC: Syllabus > Thomas, J. (dissenting) >
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